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Abstract 
Objectives 
The objective of this study is to increase and deepen the knowledge of sending remittances to 
Uganda, Senegal and Nigeria by examining the determinants of the probability and amount of 
remittances and how they reflect the motives migrants have for remitting; by investigating the 
determinants of the choice migrants make between using official and unofficial remittance 
channels and how they reflect the different features of remittance markets; by developing a 
theoretical model for intra-household decision making regarding migration; and by analysing 
the determinants of the choice households and migrants make between international and 
internal migration. The results of the study may be of value in aligning remittance markets 
with the needs and motivations of migrants and in mobilising remittances more efficiently. 
Framework and methods 
The several motives for remitting are discussed in terms of the microeconomic theory of 
remittances, the theory of remittance channels is reviewed, and a model for intra-household 
decisions making regarding migration is developed. The existing empirical literature on 
motives for remittances and on the remittance markets of the countries under study is also 
reviewed. In the empirical estimations based on the above frameworks, migration and 
remittances survey data, jointly collected by the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank in the countries under study, are utilised. Five empirical estimation methods – the tobit 
model, the Heckman selection model, the two-part model, CLAD estimation, and the probit 
model – are employed in the examination of the research questions. 
Key findings 
The empirical results of this study imply that a variety of motives influence the remittance 
behaviour of Ugandan, Senegalese and Nigerian migrants. In addition, the motives differ in 
their relative intensities between different groups of migrants. On the whole and in 
accordance with previous research, the generally presumed altruistic motive is not explicitly 
supported by the estimations for any of the countries under study, and more self-interested 
concerns and contractual arrangements between migrants and their families – the exchange 
and the investment motive, in particular – seem to override purely altruistic ones.  
A diversity of factors also affect the choice migrants make between using official and 
unofficial channels, as well as the choice households and migrants make between 
international and internal migration. In terms of remittance channels, official remittance 
channels are generally more likely used by migrants residing in OECD countries, and by 
migrants with a high level of education, reflecting especially the differential access that 
different groups of migrants have to official channels. Other factors affecting the choice are 
more country-specific. The choice between international and internal migration, on the other 
hand, is determined by several factors – different in each of the countries under study – 
including, inter alia, the reason for migration, and the education and the potential occupation 
of the migrant. The effects of these factors reflect well the model developed to depict the 
migration decisions made in households. 
Keywords 
remittances; microeconomic theory of remittances; official and unofficial remittance 
channels; theory of remittance channels; international and internal migration; model for 
migration decisions; Sub-Saharan Africa 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter gives an introduction to the research topic of this study – sending remittances – 
by giving an overview of the aspects of remittances examined, the context in which they are 
studied, and the theory and methods they are investigated with. It also discusses why 
remittances are relevant object of study. First, the research questions, the theoretical and 
empirical framework and the objectives of this study are clarified. Second, the motivation for 
and the contribution made by this study to the existing remittance literature are discussed. 
Third, the empirical methods used in this study are introduced. Fourth, the key findings of this 
study are summarised. Fifth, a couple of definitions relevant to this study are given, and 
lastly, the structure of the study is outlined. 
1.1. Research questions, framework and objectives  
This study seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the sending of remittances to three 
Sub-Saharan African countries, Uganda, Senegal and Nigeria. First, this study examines the 
determinants of remittances sent by Ugandan, Senegalese and Nigerian migrants, and 
examines the implications of the analysis in terms of the theories of the motives for remitting. 
Second, this study investigates which factors affect the choice migrants make between official 
and unofficial remittance channels, and links this investigation to the theory and empirical 
knowledge of remittance channels and markets in the countries under study. Third, this study 
develops a theoretical model for analysing the roles that the families of migrants and expected 
remittances have in intra-household decisions on which household member should migrate, 
and where this migrant should migrate to. The latter decision is studied empirically, as well.  
To be precise, there are three distinct, but highly interrelated research questions concerning 
the sending of remittances into which this study provides insight. First, which factors 
determine the probability and amount of remittances to the countries under study, and what do 
these factors imply in terms of the motives migrants have for remitting? Second, which 
factors determine the choice migrants make between official and unofficial remittance 
channels, and how do they reflect the different features of remittance markets in the countries 
under study? Third, how could the roles of the families of migrants and expected remittances 
in intra-household decisions on migration be modelled theoretically, and which factors 
determine the choice between international and internal migration from the countries under 
study? The analysis of the uses and impacts of remittances in the receiving country is left for 
future analysis.  
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The theoretical framework of this study is provided by the microeconomic theory of motives 
for remittances, which is derived from the more comprehensive and developed theory of intra-
family transfers. The models chosen for this study, except for one of them, are thus not 
specifically developed for the context of migration and remittances. Also the theory of 
remittance channels is presented, and the empirical literature on the motives for remittances 
and on the characteristics of African remittance markets is utilised. For its part, the empirical 
analysis of this study employs data from Uganda, Senegal and Nigeria, collected through 
Migration and Remittances Household Surveys conducted for the Africa Migration Project, 
which was jointly implemented by the World Bank and African Development Bank in 2009 
and 2010. To the author’s knowledge, the data has not been used for similar estimation 
purposes in previous published studies. To ensure the robustness of the econometric analysis, 
several estimation methods are utilised, and their relative strengths and weaknesses 
scrutinised.  
The broad objective of this study is to increase and deepen the existing knowledge of, and to 
provide policy-relevant information on sending remittances. First, insight into the 
characteristics of remitters and to their motives for remitting is instrumental in creating a 
more favourable financial environment for remittances, i.e. an environment better aligned 
with the motives and needs of remitters. Second, understanding the factors affecting the 
choice between official and unofficial remittance channels may allow informed measures in 
the financial sector to be taken to mobilise remittances more efficiently through official 
channels. Third, apprehending more fully the role of the families of migrants and expected 
remittances in intra-household decisions on migration is pivotal in terms of forming a better 
conception of intra-household decision making dynamics and of the resultant migration 
patterns. All in all, increasing the understanding of different aspects of remittances may 
enable the developmental impacts of remittances to expand and intensify further. 
1.2. Motivation and contribution 
Remittances have become a significant and growing source of external financing in 
developing countries during the last decades. In 2011, officially recorded remittances to 
developing countries are estimated to have amounted to $351 billion, up by 8 percent from 
2010. Remittance flows to all six developing regions grew in 2011 for the first time since the 
global financial crisis, and the growth is expected to continue at an annual rate of 7-8 percent. 
(Mohapatra et al. 2011:1-2) Compared to other sources of financing, officially recorded 
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remittances to developing countries – $307 billion in 2009 – come close to foreign direct 
investment flows to developing countries, which in 2009 totalled $359 billion, while they 
clearly outpace the flows of official development aid, which in 2009 added up to $120 billion 
(The World Bank 2011b:21). 
According to the World Bank’s most recent remittance data on Sub-Saharan Africa, inward 
workers’ remittance flows are estimated to have totalled $21.5 billion in 2010, and are 
estimated to have increased 7.2 percent in 2011 (The World Bank 2011b:34; Mohapatra et al. 
2011:2). In terms of the countries under study, Nigeria is the region’s top recipient of 
remittances, with its inward remittances amounting to $10.0 billion in 2010. Also Senegal and 
Uganda make it to the list of top 10 remittance recipients by being fourth and sixth on it, 
respectively, with their inward remittances of $1.2 and $0.8 billion in 2010, respectively. (The 
World Bank 2011b:34) In Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, remittances embody vast 
developmental potential, as they have helped, inter alia, to reduce poverty, to increase 
resources of households directed to investments, and improve education and health outcomes 
(Ratha and Mohapatra 2011:14-6, 19, 21). Despite the hampering effects of high remittance 
costs, limited access to remittance service providers in rural areas, and the use of unofficial 
channels, innovative money transfer and other technologies are being adopted in the region, 
increasing the access to remittances. (Ibid: 2011:2) Thus, remittances, and those sent to Sub-
Saharan Africa in particular, are worth of further scrutiny and research.  
It is therefore no wonder that remittances have received attention from researchers and policy 
makers, who have studied their causes, uses and consequences widely in different contexts 
both theoretically and empirically. Especially the motives for remitting have been modelled 
theoretically, starting with the seminal paper by Lucas and Stark (1985) examining the 
motivations of remittance behaviour of Batswana migrants. However, while Lucas and Stark 
(1985) consider a wide spectrum of different motives, most recent studies on the motives for 
remittances tend to be labelled by the lack of comprehensiveness: the studies tend to take only 
one or two motives under scrutiny at a time, and often neglect the other aspects of sending 
remittances completely. Moreover, the existing theory of remittances, though it acknowledges 
that remittance and migration decisions are often taken jointly by migrants and their families, 
rarely model the role and considerations of the families explicitly.  
Thus, to fully understand remittances and to mobilise them more efficiently, a broader 
perspective is needed. On a positive note, a rather encompassing approach to remittances in 
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the context of Sub-Saharan Africa is taken by two recent publications by the World Bank and 
the African Development Bank, Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills and 
Investments (2011) and Remittance Markets in Africa (2011). However, they are primarily 
descriptive in their approach and lack a detailed theoretical and econometric analysis of the 
motives for remitting. 
This study stems from and contributes to the previous remittance literature by its similar, but 
more encompassing approach. Firstly, this study addresses all the theoretically modelled 
motives for remitting with its empirical estimations, making the resultant analysis richer and 
more comprehensive than many a previous analysis of similar empirical studies. Moreover, 
various econometric estimation methods are employed in the empirical investigation, 
providing an analytic approach to studying remittances. Secondly, unlike many a previous 
study, this study also elaborates on the financial context where remittances occur by 
examining the channels used for remitting. Third, the newly-developed model describes the 
roles of families of migrants and expected remittances in intra-household decisions on 
migration more intricately that has been done so far.  
1.3. Methodology 
In terms of the procedures of inquiry employed in this study, the theoretical frameworks and 
previous empirical research providing the basis for the empirical estimations of this study are 
discussed through a comprehensive literature review. In the empirical analysis of this study, 
different econometric estimation methods are used. To examine the determinants of the 
probability and amount of remittances, the tobit model, the Heckman selection model, the 
two-part model and CLAD estimation are employed. They all attempt to capture the sample 
selection problem that is inherent in the data on migrants and their remittances, and have all 
been widely used in previous empirical studies of the issue. Employing all of them and 
comparing their results with one another brings robustness to the results. The simple probit 
model is utilised in the investigation of the choice between official and unofficial remittance 
channels, and in the examination of the choice between international and internal migration. 
The model is appropriate for these kinds of research questions, where the dependent variable 
depicts two discrete outcomes.  
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1.4. Key findings 
The empirical results of this study imply that there are a variety of motives influencing the 
remittance behaviour of Ugandan, Senegalese and Nigerian migrants. On the whole and in 
accordance with previous studies in the field, the generally presumed altruistic motive for 
remittances seems to be overridden by more self-interested and contractual concerns of 
migrants. Also the factors influencing the choice between official and unofficial remittance 
channels, and the choice between international and internal migration are diverse and different 
from country to country. 
In terms of the motives for remitting, what is common to all of the countries under study is 
that remittances tend to increase with the income of the migrant, which is in accordance with 
most of the motives for remitting. When it comes to the analysis of Ugandan migrants, partial 
support is found to the exchange motive and particularly to the investment motive, under 
which remittances act as repayments of loans used to finance the education and/or migration 
of the migrant. However, there are differences in motivations and their intensity between male 
and female migrants and between migrants in OECD countries and those in African countries. 
The motives of Senegalese migrants seem to be even more mixed than those of Ugandan 
migrants, as none of the motives receive indisputable evidence. There is, however, some 
grounds for the exchange and inheritance motives: under the latter, migrants aim to ensure the 
receipt of a future inheritance with remittances. One possible reason for the ambiguity is that 
the remittances of Senegalese male and female migrants, and those of migrants in OECD and 
in African countries, seem to be motivated by rather different considerations. In turn, among 
Nigerian migrants, there is also evidence of the presence of both the exchange and the 
investment motive. Further, while the intensity of certain motives differs between Nigerian 
male and female migrants, the residence of migrants does not seem to cause any significant 
differences in migrants’ remittance behaviour. 
When it comes to the choice between official and unofficial remittance channels, especially 
residing in an OECD country and being highly educated affect positively the probability of 
using official channels: the former receives support from Uganda and Senegal, the latter from 
Uganda and Nigeria. The choice between international and internal migration, on the other 
hand, is determined by several factors that differ from country to country, and include factors 
such as the migrant’s reason for migration, his education and potential occupation. These 
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results are consistent with the new model developed to depict the migration decisions made in 
households. 
1.5. Definitions 
In conjunction with its data on remittances, estimated on the basis of the International 
Monetary Fund’s balance of payments data, the World Bank (2012a) defines workers’ 
remittances and compensation of employees to comprise “current transfers by migrant 
workers and wages and salaries earned by non-resident workers”. Their data is the sum of 
three items: workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers. 
According to this account, remittances are defined as “current private transfers from migrant 
workers resident in the host country for more than a year, irrespective of their immigration 
status, to recipients in their country of origin”. (Ibid.) This definition of workers’ remittances 
and compensation for employees is employed in discussions on the aggregate level of 
remittances.  
However, the above definition is not applicable for the purposes of the empirical estimations 
of this study, as the household survey data utilised in the estimations includes remittances also 
from migrants resident in the host country for less than a year. Thus, the definition given in 
Plaza’s et al. (2011:7) preliminary documentation, which specifically regards the data this 
study employs, is used. According to this account, remittances include “both international 
(cross-border) and internal (within-country) ‘person-to-person’ transfers of resources (both 
monetary and in-kind) often sent by migrant workers. Moreover, the same document defines a 
migrant as “a person who used to live in a household in the country in which the interview is 
being conducted, but left before the interview to live abroad, or in another village or urban 
area within the country, for at least six months” (Ibid.).  
The above definitions are those one should be aware of in advance. When it comes to 
definitions of other relevant concepts related to the theory, methodology or data discussed in 
this study, they are given when they come across. 
1.6. Structure of thesis 
This study is structured to progress logically from the theoretical to the empirical. In chapter 
2, the microeconomic theory of remittances is introduced by presenting the models for the six 
key motives for remittances: altruism, exchange, investment, inheritance, insurance and 
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strategic selection. These models provides the theoretical framework for the empirical 
estimations of the probability and amount of remittances. 
In chapter 3, the theoretical and the empirical background for the empirical estimations of the 
choice between official and unofficial remittance channels is discussed. A model for the 
choice between different channels is presented, and the remittance markets of the countries 
under study are examined. Chapter 4, in turn, presents and elaborates on the new model 
describing the intra-household decision making related to migration and remittances, forming 
the framework for the estimations of the choice between international and internal migration. 
Chapter 5 presents the econometric estimation methods employed in this study. The tobit 
model, the Heckman selection model, the two-part model and CLAD estimation are discussed 
in terms of their standard models, estimation, assumptions, specification tests, and marginal 
effects, and their strengths and weaknesses in relation to the research question and the 
empirical data are discussed. 
The survey data and variables used in this study are the focus of chapter 6. First, the survey 
methodologies employed in each of the countries under study, and their implications for the 
study’s empirical estimations are reviewed. The chapter also presents the independent and 
dependent variables, and the empirical specifications used in this study, and discusses the 
potential problems they, and the data itself may cause to the validity of the study. Some 
statistical findings made from the estimation samples are also scrutinised.  
In chapter 7, the results of the various empirical estimations are presented for each of the 
countries under study separately. First, the results for the factors affecting the probability and 
amount of remittances of the whole group of migrants are presented. Second, these results are 
contrasted across genders and destinations of migrants, and the effect of possible additional 
variables on remittances are reviewed. Third, the results for the factors affecting the choice 
between official and unofficial remittance channels, and for the factors affecting the choice 
between international and internal migration, are discussed. Last, the main findings from each 
of the countries under study are compared with one another. Chapter 8 concludes. 
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2 Theories of motives for remittances 
On the whole, there are two main strands of literature on remittances: one focusing on the 
causes and uses of remittances, and the other concentrating on the macroeconomic impact of 
remittances. Some theories especially of the determinants of and the motives for remittances 
have been developed: these theories often take a microeconomic perspective, and focus 
mostly on the roles that families and intra-family relationships have in decisions on migration 
and remittances. (Chami et al. 2003:6) However, as Rapoport and Docquier (2006:1139) point 
out, it is a challenge to discriminate between competing theories of motives for remittances 
due to their similar predictions, and additional, but rarely available, variables would often be 
needed to compose truly discriminative tests. 
Regarding its origins, the theory of remittances stems from the theoretical framework built for 
the motives for general intra-family transfers. For instance, the altruistic motive, where 
transfers are motivated by the agents’ unselfish concern with the welfare of one another, was 
initially studied by Barro (1974) and Becker (1974), and the inheritance motive, where 
parents may threat to disinherit their children to extract attention and/or transfers from them, 
was first suggested by Bernheim et al. (1984). However, it was Lucas and Stark’s (1985) 
study “Motivations to remit: Evidence from Botswana” that was one of the first papers to 
apply this theoretical discussion to remittances. In their view, there are three distinct sets of 
motives and aspirations underlying remittance decisions: pure altruism, pure self-interest, and 
tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest. These three broad groups further include more 
distinctive descriptions of what motivates migrants’ remittance behaviour.  
In this chapter, models for the motives of altruism, exchange, investment, inheritance, 
insurance and strategic selection are presented and discussed in sections from 2.1 to 2.6 in 
terms of their main determinants and their expected impact on the probability and amount of 
remittances. For simplicity, it is assumed in all of the subsequent sections that there is one 
migrant, denoted by superscript m, and one recipient household with one or more household 
members, denoted by superscript h. Utility is referred to with U, pre-transfer incomes with I, 
consumption with C, and R denotes the amount of remittances sent by the migrant m to the 
household h. 
Section 2.7 summarises the main predictions of these theories. In section 2.8, some previous 
studies on remittances reflecting the theoretical framework are reviewed. On the whole, this 
chapter forms the theoretical foundation for the empirical estimation of the probability and 
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amount of remittances: the theory both motivates the choice of variables, elaborated in section 
5.2.1, and enables the discussion on the empirical results in chapter 6 in terms of whether any 
of the motives may be singled out as predominantly underlying the remittance behaviour of 
Ugandan, Senegalese and Nigerian migrants. 
2.1. Altruism 
Altruism has been seen as an important motive to remit and it is commonly taken as given in 
many empirical studies (Rapoport and Docquier 2006:1145). Migrants usually feel the 
unselfish need to support their families, which implies that remittances are a rather stable 
source of capital for the migrants’ families, as they are likely to remain dependent on this 
capital also in the future (Bouhga-Hagbe 2006:6). Even though it is commonly supposed that 
these kinds of nonmarket intra-family transfers decline and move to the realm of marketplace 
exchanges as the economy develops, Stark (1995:13-4) argues that if families receive 
altruistically motivated transfers, which are valued more than transfers through the 
marketplace, the preference for these intra-family transfers do not vanish when exchange 
opportunities increase.  
A model for altruistically motivated intra-family transfers by Stark (1995) is presented here to 
discuss the altruistic motive, as the model may easily be applied to remittances, and can 
account for both one- and two-sided altruism. The migrant’s and the household’s utility iU , 
hmi ,= , is affected by the pleasure, or felicity, the agent gets from his own consumption C, 
denoted by ( )ii CV , and the other agent’s utility. For iV  it holds that 0' >V  and 0'' <V . 
Thus, their utilities are given by 
   ( ) ( ) ( )mhhmmmmhmm CCUCVCCU ,1),( ββ +−=  and             (2.1) 
   ( ) ( ) ( )hmmhhhhmhh CCUCVCCU ,1),( ββ +−=                          (2.2) 
where iβ – 210 ≤≤ iβ  – denotes the weight that the agent places on the utility of the other 
relative to his own felicity, i.e. measures his degree of altruism. Solving equations (2.1) and 
(2.2) in terms of ( )ii CV  yields  
   ( ) ( ) ( )hhmmmmhmm CVCVCCU αα +−= 1),(  and                         (2.3) 
   ( ) ( ) ( )mmhhhhmhh CVCVCCU αα +−= 1),(  ,              (2.4) 
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α . The migrant’s utility may 
be expressed in terms of his and the household’s incomes iI  and remittances R as  
   ( ) ( ) ( )RIVRIVCCU hhmmmmhmm ++−−= αα1),( .              (2.5) 
Differentiating the equation with respect to R and supposing that ( ) ( )⋅=⋅ lniV  gives the first-
order condition 
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              (2.6) 
which is binding for 0>R . Assuming that there cannot be negative remittances, optimal 
remittances *R  are thus given by 
    ( ){ }0,1* hmmm IIMaxR αα −−=  .              (2.7) 
For this equation it holds that 0,0,0
***
>
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
mhm
R
I
R
I
R
β
 and 0
*
<
∂
∂
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β
.  
Quite intuitively, when the migrant’s income mI  increases, he is able to consume – relative to 
the consumption of the recipient household – more than he optimally would, and will thus 
prefer to increase remittances to the recipient household to arrive back to his optimal 
consumption. Also, if the migrant becomes more altruistic and mβ  increases, his optimal 
relative consumption decreases, resulting in larger remittances. In turn, if the recipient 
household’s income hI  increases, the household’s relative consumption increases above the 
optimal level, meaning that it would prefer to transfer money to the migrant. However, as 
such transfers are not allowed, this merely translates into smaller remittances from the 
migrant to the receiving household. Moreover, if the recipient household becomes more 
altruistic and hβ  increases, it receives less remittances, since the household will be more hurt 
by the decrease in the migrant’s utility arising from sending remittances. Importantly, these 
transfers are mutually agreed to by both the migrant and the recipient household. (Stark 
1995:15-20)  
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One specific prediction of the altruistic motive is that if both the migrant’s income increases 
and the recipient household’s income decreases by one dollar simultaneously, remittances 
from the migrant to the household should increase by exactly one dollar, i.e. 
     1=
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
hm I
R
I
R .                           (2.8) 
This result is called income pooling, or redistributive neutrality property. To understand the 
result, suppose that the distribution of income changes slightly such that hm dIdI −= and 
0>mdI . The migrant adjusts the remittances he sends to cancel the decrease in the recipient 
household’s income. Now, the increase in the migrant’s income is also cancelled, and he does 
not increase his own consumption. Effectively, this means that the consumption of either of 
the agents is not changed, when they are linked by altruism and remittances from the migrant 
to the recipient household. (Laferrère and Wolff 2006:897)  
Further implications arise from the altruism-based model developed by Funkhouser 
(1995:139), First, he suggests that, in addition to the predictions above, the importance that 
the migrant assigns to the recipient household’s utility is dependent on the relationship the 
migrant has to the receiving household member, and on whether he intends to return. Second, 
the more migrants there are from the same household, the less the migrant remits. Third, the 
time-discount factors of the migrant and his earnings profile affect the amount of remittances: 
when the migrant’s earnings increase with his experience in his new country of residence, 
remittances should increase, but if the migrant values his own future consumption 
significantly more than the utility of the recipient household in the future, remittances may 
decline over time. (Ibid.) However, these implications are rather general and predicted by 
other motives for remittances, as well. 
2.2. Exchange 
In contrast to being altruistically motivated, remittances may also be involved in Pareto-
improving exchanges between the migrant and the household: in these cases, remittances act 
as compensation for services – taking care of the migrant’s assets or relatives back home, for 
instance – that the migrant’s former household members perform on behalf of the migrant. As 
the outcome and the division of surplus is determined by the agents’ relative bargaining 
powers and their external options, the amount paid for the service lies somewhere between the 
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market price for such services and the opportunity cost of the recipient. (Rapoport and 
Docquier 2006:1145)  
To examine the exchange motive theoretically, the model presented in the previous section is 
modified slightly, and the model for exchange-motivated transfers by Cox (1987) is utilised. 
In the latter, neither the migrant nor the recipient household is altruistic, and a fixed service 
X  provided by the household is exchanged for remittances R. The migrant’s and the recipient 
household’s felicities iV  now depend on their consumption and the service, ( ),, XCV ii  
hmi ,= . The increased disutility of effort arising from the service is accounted for by the 
partial derivatives 0,0,0 '''' <<> mX
h
X
m
X VVV and 0
'' >hXV . The recipient household will enter 
into the exchange arrangement and provide the service only if the compensating remittances 
are large enough to give the household at least the same felicity level as a situation with no 
exchanges: 
    ( ) ( )0,, hhhh IVXRIV ≥+ .                          (2.9) 
Under the exchange motive, this non-negativity constraint is binding, and the last unit of 
remittances sent by the migrant to the recipient household does not equalise the agents’ 
marginal utilities of consumption, but compensate for the services performed by the 
household. Solving the constraint (2.9) for equality and expressing remittances as 
( )XIRR h ,=  , the implicit function theorem yields  
   ( ) ( )( ) 0,
0,,
≠
∂+∂
∂∂−∂+∂
−=
∂
∂
hhh
hhhhhh
h CXRIV
CIVCXRIV
I
R                  (2.10) 
   ( )( ) 0,
,
>
∂+∂
∂+∂
−=
∂
∂
hhh
hh
CXRIV
XXRIV
X
R                         (2.11) 
Expression (2.10) means that, in contrast to the altruistic case, the amount of remittances can 
either increase or decrease with the recipient household’s income. Intuitively, when the 
household’s income increases, the quantity of services exchanged declines, since the increase 
in income causes a decline in the household’s marginal utility of consumption. Consequently, 
the household requires a higher compensation per service. Whether the sign of expression 
(2.10) is positive or negative depends also on the migrant’s demand for the service: the harder 
it is for the migrant to find substitutes for the household-provided service, i.e. the more 
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inelastic his demand for the service is, the more likely it is that the sign is positive. (Cox 
1987:512-7) When it comes to the effect of education on remittances, the model predicts that 
remittances decrease with the migrant’s education, as educated migrants are less inclined to 
return home (Rapoport and Docquier 2006:1164).    
In addition, it is important to consider whether the migrant decides to send remittances in the 
first place. Suppose there is an initial endowment point ( )0,mm IV  and ( )0,hh IV . In short, the 
migrant will send remittances, if the migrant’s marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of 
remittances for services is greater than that of the receiving household’s at the endowment 
point, i.e. the migrant can gain from trade with the household. Formally, and denoting the 
household’s MRS at X = 0 with ( ) hh PdXdR 00/ =  and the migrant’s MRS at X = 0 with 
( ) mm Pdsdr 00/ = , remittances occur when the hm PP 00 > . If the latent variable hm PPr 00 −=  
determining the remittance decision is positive, remittances will be sent. It can be shown that  
     0<
∂
∂
hI
r  and             (2.12) 
     0>
∂
∂
mI
r .             (2.13) 
These expressions may be explained as follows. When the recipient household’s income hI  
increases, its marginal utility at the endowment point falls and he requires more consumption 
to be compensated for providing the first unit of service. If the price at which the household 
agrees to supply the service rises high enough, exchange may not take place. In turn, if the 
migrant’s income mI  increases, his marginal utility of consumption at the endowment point 
falls too, and he is willing to give up more consumption to obtain the first unit of services. 
These results in terms of the remittance decision hold in the case of the altruistic motive, as 
well: thus, it is the effect of the recipient household’s income on the amount of remittances 
that may distinguish these motives from one another. (Cox 1987:517-9)  
Different kinds of contractual arrangements between the agents, reflecting their bargaining 
powers, may be modelled, and further differences between the altruistic and exchange 
motives may be found. Suppose, for instance, that remittances are repayments of loans taken 
by the migrant from the household, and that the recipient household receives public transfers 
of some sort. If public transfers to the recipient household increased so that the lifetime 
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wealth of the household, but not that of the migrant, increased, remittances at later periods 
from the migrant to the recipient household would increase: the liquidity-constrained migrant 
would be able to borrow more, meaning higher repayments to the household later on. In other 
words, the increase in the household’s lifetime wealth improves the household’s bargaining 
position, as its lowered credit constraints enable it to lend more to the migrant than 
previously. Under altruism, however, it is predicted that such public transfers crowd out 
privately sent remittances completely, and both the migrant’s and the recipient household’s 
consumptions are unchanged. (Cox and Jimenez 1992:157-8)  
2.3. Investment 
The previous section and the above situation described by Cox and Jimenez (1992:157-8) 
relates closely to the so-called investment motive, under which the migrant sends remittances 
to repay loans on investments made by his former household in his education and/or 
migration. In these kinds of exchanges, like in the previous section, there is a participation 
constraint that is determined by the agents’ external options, and the ultimate outcome and 
division of the surplus depends on the agents’ relative bargaining powers. First and foremost, 
these kinds of familial implicit contracts aim at increasing family income. (Rapoport and 
Docquier 2006:1145, 1156) Effectively, the investment motive and its most typical models 
may be seen as generalisations of the model by Cox (1987) reviewed in the previous section: 
under the investment regime, the migrant compensates his former household for a monetary 
loan rather than services, and there are two time periods instead of one. Clearly, the higher the 
initial investment in the migrant, the higher are the subsequent remittances compensating for 
this investment. 
As the intuition behind the investment motive – modelled by e.g. Cox et al. (1998) and Ilahi 
and Jafarey (1999) – is rather similar to the one reviewed in the previous section, a model by 
Rapoport and Docquier (2006) is presented, as it includes the determination of the optimum 
amount of migrants that the household should send. The basic premise of the model is that the 
recipient household aims at increasing its income by sending migrants until it is no longer 
income-maximising. However, migration entails costs, and poorer households may not be 
able to send the number of migrants that would be optimal to them.  
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Suppose that total familial output in agriculture is depicted by the function 




 − 2
2

β
ϕ , 
where   is the number (or proportion) of workers employed in the domestic activity, φ is a 
technological parameter describing the quantity and quality of land, and 10 << β  captures 
the decreasing marginal productivity of labour. Assuming that income is equally divided 
within a given family and focusing distinctly on inequality between households, a two-period 
framework is constructed: if no-one migrates, income per household member at each period is 
given by 
     
221
ϕβ
ϕ −== hh II .             (2.14) 
Migration to a high-wage destination will cost c per migrant, whose number (or proportion) is 
denoted by m. The migration cost is financed with first-period savings as there are no credit 
markets. Migration occurs in the second period, meaning that in the first period, 1= , and in 
the second period, m−= 1 . Assuming no risk-aversion and no inter-temporal discounting of 
income, utility is linear in income. In addition, it is assumed that there is a minimal level of 
subsistence, denoted by minI , which is kept for consumption at each period. 
The number of migrants is determined by the household’s wealth, captured by φ. Even though 
members of poor households are likely to have more incentives to migrate, as their foregone 
earnings are lower than those of members of rich households, poor households may not have 
the liquidity to finance every profitable migration. The liquidity constraint is given by 
   ( )ϕβϕβϕ ,
2
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 − .          (2.15) 
This gives the maximal, or constrained proportion of migrants cm , which is increasing in φ, 
decreasing in minI , and a decreasing and convex function of c. 
To find out the optimal, or unconstrained proportion of migrants *m , total recipient household 
income is maximised: 
   ( ) ( ) m
m
mImmmcMax +−−−+−− 21
2
1
2
ϕβ
ϕ
ϕβ
ϕ ,            (2.16) 
which gives 
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The actual proportion of migrants is given by { }( )ceff mmMinm ;* , i.e. it lies between the 
optimal proportion given by equation (2.17) and the constrained proportion given by equation 
(2.15). The optimal proportion is decreasing in φ, and is a linearly decreasing function of c. 
The amount of remittances received by each remaining household member is given by the 
difference between the average household income and the domestic income per remaining 
household member, distinguished by squared brackets: 
    ( ) ( ) ( )


 −−−


 −−−+ effeffeffeffm mmmmI 1
2
1
2
1 2 ϕβϕϕβϕ .           (2.18) 
This gives remittances R, which is a concave function of the migrant proportion: 
          ( )


 −+−= effmeff mImR 1
2
ϕβ
ϕ .                        (2.19) 
Taking the total derivative of R with respect to φ gives 
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which may be positive or negative, depending on the number of migrants and whether it is the 
constrained or unconstrained region in question: the model predicts that the relationship 
between remittances and the recipient household’s income is inverse U-shaped for interior 
solutions. (Rapoport and Docquier 2006:1157-9) This prediction thus distinguishes the 
investment motive from the exchange motive, under which the amount of remittances 
responds positively to an increase in the recipient household’s income.   
The two models are further set apart by the effect that unemployment has on remittances: 
while unemployment at home lowers the bargaining power of the recipient household and 
thus decreases the amount remitted under the exchange motive, this is not the case under the 
investment motive. As education insures at least partly against unemployment, higher 
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unemployment at home increases the value of education. This, in turn, improves the 
contractual terms for the family, resulting into higher remittances. (Stark and Bloom 
1985:174)  
2.4. Inheritance 
An important aspect of all contractual arrangements is their enforcement, i.e. the methods that 
make, for instance, a contract exchanging an educational loan for future remittances incentive 
compatible for both the migrant and his former household. A few such enforcement 
mechanisms are suggested by Poirine (1999:593): the migrant may be denied of future family 
solidarity, lose rights to benefit from the care of the village community for his elderly parents 
or children, lose prestige in the community, or lose the rights to inherit family assets. It is this 
last mechanism of inheritance as a form of enforcement that is now examined, as it is a rather 
likely way of a household to try to ensure remittances from a migrant.  
The model by de la Brière et al. (2002) gives insight into what affects remittance decisions of 
a migrant who contributes to an investment in his parent’s assets in the hope of inheriting 
them later on. The migrant attempts to maximise the utility of the investment portfolio, and 
can choose to invest either in safe assets such as a savings account, or in risky assets such as a 
possible inheritance, whose riskiness arises from the uncertainty of the time of the parent’s 
death. The migrant saves a constant rate s. In the next period, one unit of the safe asset yields 
( )i+1 , while investing in the inheritance yields only if the parent dies. The assets of the 
parent’s increase with the law of motion 
    ( )( )( )'11 iRIAAsA tptptptppt +++=+ ,            (2.21) 
where ptA are the parent’s assets at time t, 
p
tI  is the parent’s autonomous income, tR  are 
remittances, 'i  is the rate of appreciation of the parent’s assets, and ( )ptp As  is the parent’s 
saving rate, which increases, but with a decreasing rate, with wealth. 
If the parent dies in the next period, the child inherits ( ) ptht AnR 1, +γ , where ( )ht nR ,γ  is the 
reward function of the parent and hn  is the number of heirs. The reward function is increasing 
in tR , as the possibility of inheritance is intended to induce remittances, but the effect of the 
number of heirs is not as straightforward. On one hand, a larger number of heirs implies a 
smaller return for any one agent, but on the other hand, the threat of depriving any one 
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migrant of his inheritance is more credible when the parent has a large number of heirs to give 
his wealth to. Thus, it holds that 0,0 ≤∂∂≥=∂ hRt nR t γγδγ and ( ) 0
2 ≥∂∂∂ th Rnγ . 
The migrant maximises the expected utility he gets from his portfolio: 
   ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∑ ++++ +−
t
m
tIt
m
tNIt
t
R
AuAuMax
t
1,11,11 φφδ  ,                     (2.22) 
where 1+tφ  is the probability of inheriting at time t+1, ( )( )( )iRIAsA tmtmtm tNI +−+=+ 11,  is the 
migrant’s asset position at t+1 with no inheritance, mtA  is the migrant’s asset position at time 
t, mtI  is the migrant’s income,  and ( )( )( ) ( )( )'111, iRIAsiRIAsA tptptptmtmtmtI +++++−+=+ γ  is 
the migrant’s asset position with inheritance.  
Deriving the first-order conditions from expression (2.22) gives 
      ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] 0'1'11'1'1 1,11,1 =+++++++−++−− ++++ isiRIAsiAuiAu ptptptpRmtItm tNIt t γγφφ .    (2.23) 
Thus, the marginal return for the migrant from investing in the safe asset is ( )i+1 , and from 
investing in inheritance, his marginal return is ( )[ ]( )'11 isRIAs ptptptpRt t +++++ γγφ . The 
following condition gives the optimal allocation between the two assets: 
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The optimal amount of remittances, *tR , may be determined by applying the implicit function 
theorem to the first-order condition in equation (2.23) – in reduced form, it may be expressed 
as  
   ( )Imthmttptpttt InAIARR ξφ −+±++++= ++ ,,,,,, 11** ,                    (2.25) 
where Iξ  is denotes the migrant’s risk aversion at the asset level 
m
IA . If the risk aversion is 
below a threshold level of Aξ , the effects of 
p
tA  and 
p
tI  are positive. Moreover, a richer and 
wealthier, and not too risk averse a migrant will remit more. The ambiguous effect of hn  
contains the two effects mentioned above: inheritance of any one migrant is decreased due to 
having to share it with other heirs, decreasing the return on his investment in remittances, but 
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competition among heirs may increase the parent’s response to the remittances he receives 
from any one migrant. However, the migrant will remit more if the probability of inheriting is 
higher. (de la Brière et al. 2002:313-5) To this end, Rapoport and Docquier (2006:1161) 
suggest that in the case of multiple migrants, remittances per migrant may first increase and 
then decrease with the number of other migrants, i.e. meaning an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between remittances and the number of other migrants. 
2.5. Insurance 
Contractual arrangements, where the migrant insures his former household against drops in 
rural incomes, may also be arise instead of more self-interested contracts reviewed in the 
previous sections. Insurance contracts are made possible by the fact that the risks of the 
migrant’s urban or foreign job are rarely associated with the risks inherent in his former 
household’s rural activities. Like self-interested contracts, these contracts need to be self-
enforcing, as well. However, as harsh enforcement mechanisms as mentioned in the previous 
section may not be needed: the mere loyalty and altruism of the migrant may act as sufficient 
enforcement in contracts aiming at insurance and consumption smoothing rather than income 
maximisation. (Rapoport and Docquier 2006:1151) 
To depict an insurance contract between a migrant and his parent back home, a model by de la 
Brière et al. (2002) is presented. The model assumes that remittances are not invested, 
meaning that the migrant does not attempt to encourage risk-management behaviour by his 
family. As regards the roles of the agents, the parent is the principal and main beneficiary of 
the contract, and the migrant acts as an insurer and draws up an optimal contract for the 
insurance. The principal may be any other member of the household who is the main recipient 
of the insuring remittances. 
The parent is risk-averse, and he receives income PI  with probability π, and an income 
ISI p −  with probability π−1 , where 0>IS  represents a random income shock. The parent 
may want to enter into a contract with his risk-averse migrant child to insure himself against 
these shocks, so if the parent is willing to pay a premium p, the migrant will send his parent 
remittances aISR =  when the shock hits, with 10 ≤≤ a  denoting the coverage of the 
contract. It is assumed that the parent chooses both the premium p and the coverage a, and 
simultaneously takes into account the preferences of his migrant child. 
The parent maximises his utility PU  subject to the participation constraint of the migrant: 
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where mU  is the migrant child’s utility and mI  is his income. The first-order conditions yield 
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A Taylor expansion around incomes yields 
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where ( )⋅χ  and ( )⋅ξ  represent the parent’s and the migrant’s absolute risk aversions at 
incomes pI p −  and pI m + , respectively. Thus, the relative risk aversion of the two agents 
determines the optimal risk sharing level. Optimal remittances to the parent are thus given by  
           ( )( ) ( ) ISpIpI
pIaISR pm
m
−++
+
==
χξ
ξ* .            (2.29) 
As the premium p may be influenced by other variables, the risk aversions of the agents, and 
thus remittances, are influenced indirectly be them, as well. Solving the parent’s optimisation 
problem for a by first solving a second-order Taylor expansion of the participation constraint 
for the premium p, and then substituting this expression into the parent’s utility results in the 
following reduced form solution for a:  
    ( )( )00,,1, ξχπ −+−−−= ISaa ,                        (2.30) 
where 0χ  and 0ξ  are the parent’s and migrant’s absolute risk aversions at incomes pI  and 
mI , respectively. When coverage is costly, the parent wants less coverage if the size and/or 
the incidence of shocks increase, or if he is less risk-averse. The parent opts for less coverage 
also if the migrant is more risk-averse, since the cost of insurance is increasing in the 
migrant’s risk aversion. As regards remittances, they may be expressed in reduced form as  
         ( )( )00** ,,1, ξχπ −+−−+== ISRaISR .                    (2.31) 
27 
 
Remittances are increasing in the size of the shock and the parent’s risk aversion, and 
decreasing in the migrant’s risk aversion. As increasing wealth decreases absolute risk 
aversion, richer migrants will remit more in case a shock hits their parents, and poorer parents 
will receive larger remittances in case they are hit by a shock. What is notable, and in contrast 
to the models previewed thus far, remittances do not directly depend on either the migrant’s 
or the recipient household’s income. (de la Brière et al. 2002:311-3, 315) 
In addition to these predictions, Rapoport and Docquier (2006:1153) compare the insurance 
motive to the altruistic motive and point out that under the insurance motive, remittances 
should be sent relatively irregularly and should not decrease during a given period, while 
under the altruistic motive, remittances should decrease over time with the dissolving feelings 
of altruism. Moreover, the effect of the recipient household’s income on remittances may be 
positive under the insurance motive: wealthier households with large assets are more likely to 
send migrants, as migration is more worthy to them than to poorer households. Moreover, as 
bargaining power increases with wealth, wealthier households are able to induce higher 
remittances than poorer ones. In other words, the probability and amount of remittances may 
be increasing in the recipient households’ income across households, but be decreasing for a 
given household. (Ibid.) 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) approach the possible insurance contracts between 
migrants and their former households slightly differently and suggest that migrants may send 
remittances to insure themselves, rather than their former households, in the face of income 
uncertainty. Remittances may either act as premia ensuring that the migrant receives support 
from his family in the case he need to return home, or they may be accumulated as 
precautionary savings – in the form of physical or financial assets, for instance – back home. 
The key prediction of this approach is that the higher the income risk the migrant faces, the 
larger are the remittances he sends in order to insure himself. (Ibid:229) 
2.6. Strategic selection 
While the motives for remittances discussed above may be applied to various situations 
involving intra-family transfers, the strategic motive for remittances was developed by Stark 
(1995) specifically for the context of migration. The model is based on the premise that 
employers in the migrants’ destination country do not have sufficient information regarding 
the migrants’ different skill levels, so the wage employers pay is based on the average product 
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of the whole group of migrants. High-skill workers clearly suffer from this situation, and 
would benefit from having a means to persuade workers with lower skills to remain home. 
This means is provided by remittances, sent by the high-skill workers to the low-skill 
workers. (Ibid:93) In this section, a two-group case of this model is reviewed in more detail. 
The model starts with there being two countries, a rich country R and a poor country P¸ and 
with workers with two skill levels originating from country P. To reflect their difference, 
skill-determined wages W in country R are higher than in country P for all skill levels θ, i.e. 
( ) ( )θθ PR WW > . The skills of low-skill workers, constituting a share α  of workers, are 
denoted by 1θ , and those of high-skill workers, constituting a share α−1  of workers, are 
denoted by 2θ . It is assumed that the workers have been observed in country P, so their skills 
are known there, but this is not the case in country R. Thus, if the true skills of workers are 
not revealed in country R over time, employers in country R will offer all migrants a wage 
reflecting their average product. Moreover, workers are assumed to prefer the lifestyle of 
country P, which is captured by a discount factor k, 10 << k , which is applied to wages in 
country R. Discount factor k includes also the costs associated with migration. Thus, workers 
compare ( )θRkW  with ( )θPW  when making their migration decisions, and k is such that 
( ) ( )11 θθ PR WkW <  and ( ) ( )22 θθ PR WkW > . These last conditions are meant to capture the 
different migration incentives of the symmetric and asymmetric information cases.  
Under symmetric information, only high-skill workers will migrate. In contrast, under 
asymmetric information, if the wage based on the average product of migrants with different 
skill levels, RWk , paid in country R is higher than the wage paid for high-skill workers in 
country P, i.e.  
         ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )221 1 θθαθα pRRR WkWkWWk >−+= ,                   (2.32) 
then both high- and low-skill workers will migrate under asymmetric information. But, if 
employers in country R correctly identify the skills of high-skill workers and adjust their wage 
accordingly in the next period, low-skill workers will return to country P. As workers with 
different skill levels are no longer pooled, the wage of the high-skill workers will naturally 
rise: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21222 11 θαθαθαθαθ RRRRR kWkWkWkWkW −+>−+= .          (2.33) 
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Migration is thus positively selective ex post: even though initially workers with all skill 
levels migrate, in time their true skills are revealed, the informational asymmetry is removed, 
and low-skill migrants return home, producing a feature of positive selectivity.  
Obviously, high-skill workers would prefer not to be pooled with low-skill workers even in 
the beginning. Hence, they are likely to be willing to make a transfer to the low-skill workers 
to persuade them to stay home. This transfer T, or remittances, must be smaller than the 
difference between the wage of high-skill workers in country R  if they were to migrate there 
alone, and their wage in country R if they were to migrate there with low-skill workers: 
        ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]212 1 θαθαθ RRR WWWT −+−< ,                      (2.34) 
where 
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) εθθαθα
α
α
+−−+=
−
121 1
1
pRR WkWkWT ,           (2.35) 
where 0>ε is a sufficiently small constant. From expressions (2.34) and (2.35) it is derived 
that  
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For T that fulfils expression (2.36), high-skill workers are able to induce low-skill workers to 
stay home by offering them T
α
α−1  each. Transfers larger than T cannot be extracted by low-
skill workers even if they threaten to migrate, as this threat is not credible: if they migrated, 
they would receive the wage RWk , but if they stay home, they receive ( ) TWp α
α
θ
−
+
1
1  each, 
which is larger than RWk  by ε. Also the high-skill workers are better off under this 
arrangement, as they are left with ( ) TWR −2θ  – worth ( )[ ]TWk R −2θ  to them – which is more 
than RWk . 
What this model implies is that if this joint action by migrants is successful, they form action 
groups based on their skills, migration is selective ex ante, and only high-skill workers will 
migrate. In a sense, then, remittances act in advance of informational asymmetry and thus 
enhance allocative efficiency. Therefore, there is a positive relationship between selectivity 
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and remittances, and a negative relationship between return migration and remittances. It 
should be noted that the formation of groups is more likely when the difference between the 
wage of high-skill workers in country R and the wage of low-skill workers in country P is 
large, and when the workers’ individual skill levels are only slowly identified in the 
destination country. Moreover, the larger the group of migrants is, the smaller are strategic 
remittances per migrant: the larger and less cohesive the group of high-skill workers is, the 
more likely will the free riding problem associated with bribing low-skill workers arise. 
Under the strategic motive, high-skill workers act purely out of their self-interest and send 
remittances to protect their wage from being lowered by the presence of low-skill workers. 
Remittances are thus sent to those at home who can credibly threaten the migrant with 
engaging in migration themselves, i.e. those with some earning power. Even more 
interestingly, some migrants might send remittances to non-migrant workers toward whom 
there prevails no altruism. The strategic motive also gives an explanation to why remittances 
stop at some point: as soon as the skills of high-skill workers are identified, their wage can no 
longer be affected by the migration of low-skill workers. Thus, remittances are no longer 
needed to bribe the latter. (Stark 1995:91-103) 
Despite its clear predictions, the model is criticised by Rapoport and Docquier (2006:1149) 
who point out that each migrant may free ride on others’ efforts to achieve positive selection, 
and that the gains of selection are not that large if the migrants’ skills are revealed in a short 
period of time. Moreover, they note that while any one ethnic community of migrants is 
clearly able to distinguish itself from other migrant communities, employers may not be able 
to do this as well, and may assimilate them to a wider group of foreigners. Thus, the selection 
that communities undertake within them will benefit the whole group that it is identified with. 
This would, in turn, reduce the occurrence of strategically motivated remittances within any 
ethnic community, as remittances would not anymore serve the purpose of promoting wealth 
among this community. (Docquier and Rapoport 1998:580-1) Moreover, the predictions of 
the model are not easily distinguished from those of the altruistic model (Rapoport and 
Docquier 2006:1150). 
2.7. Predictions of theories 
To be able to compare the theories more efficiently, a table by Rapoport and Docquier 
(2006:1163), which concisely summarizes all the predictions discussed in the previous 
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sections, is adapted and presented here as table 1. It clearly explicates the independent 
variables of interest and their relationship to remittances predicted by the models discussed 
above. It is especially useful when reviewing the empirical results for the estimations of the 
probability and amount of remittances in chapter 7. 
Table 1. Predictions of models for motives for remittances 
 Motives 
Independent  
variable Altruism Exchange  Investment Inheritance Insurance 
Strategic 
selection 
Migrant's income >0 >0 >0 >0 nde* >0 
Migrant's education nde <0* >0* nde nde >0 
Time since arrival ≤0 nde nde nde nde ≤0 
Number of migrants 
or heirs <0 nde nde 
Inverse U-
shaped effect nde nde 
Recipient's long-run 
income <0 ≠0 ≠0 nde* nde* <0 
Adverse short-run 
shocks to the  
recipient's income >0 ≠0* >0 nde >0 >0 
Recipient's assets nde nde nde >0* nde nde 
Specific predictions 1=
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
hm I
R
I
R  possible
I
R
h 0>∂
∂  
Inverse U-
shaped effect 
of Ih 
 Irregular basis 
1
1
−=
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
−
∂
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h
hm
I
R
I
R
I
R
 
nde = no direct effect       
* specific prediction       
 
2.8. Empirical evidence 
In this section, some empirical studies on motives for remittances and their results are 
scrutinised. Quite often these studies consider only two motives, present models for them, and 
then attempt to determine econometrically which of these motives dominates migrants’ 
remittance behaviour in the context under study. There are exceptions, however, such as the 
pioneering empirical paper by Lucas and Stark (1985) mentioned in the beginning of the 
chapter. The study presents theoretical frameworks for three different sets of motives, and in 
its subsequent empirical analysis on Batswana migrants, the presence of all of the motives 
reviewed above, except for the strategic motive, is tested as well. For this reason, this paper is 
examined in detail first. The other studies chosen under review are closely linked in their 
approach to the theoretical framework discussed in the previous sections, give insight into the 
methods most generally used in this field of study, utilise data from a variety of developing 
countries, and thus are a good representation of the empirical literature on the motives for 
remittances. 
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Lucas and Stark (1985) consider remittances to be motivated by three different motives: pure 
altruism, pure self-interest, and tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest. While the first 
two motives correspond closely to the altruistic motive and the exchange and inheritance 
motive modelled in sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4, respectively, the third motive sees remittances as 
a part of an intertemporal, mutually beneficial contractual arrangement between the migrant 
and the recipient household. This motive reflects the investment and insurance motives 
described in sections 2.3 and 2.5. The authors test for all of these motives empirically by 
carrying out standard OLS estimations which, as will be discussed in chapter 4, does not 
properly take into account the sample selection problem pertaining remittance data.    
Lucas and Stark (1985) discover that in Botswana, remittances rise with both the migrant’s 
income and the recipient household’s income: while the first result is consistent with various 
motives, the second result implies that the exchange or investment motive may underlie 
migrants’ remittance decisions. They test for the investment motive by studying the effect of 
the migrant’s years of schooling and find that remittances increase with years of schooling, 
but they increase even more among such migrants who are children, grandchildren, nieces or 
nephews of the household head, i.e. closely related to the household head. What this suggests 
is that migrants may send remittances at least partly as a repayment of investments made in 
their education.  
The authors also investigate whether any inheritance considerations affect the amount the 
migrant remits to the recipient household by inspecting whether the recipient household’s 
assets – in this case, cattle – has an effect on remittances. Lucas and Stark’s (1985) results 
show that sons tend to remit more to households that have more cattle, which implies that 
migrants attempt to ensure the receipt of inheritance with remittances. This finding is also 
consistent with the authors’ notion that in Botswana, sons are more likely to inherit than other 
household members. However, the sons also tend to keep their cattle with the recipient 
household who takes care of the cattle – behaviour that is in accordance with the exchange 
motive – so it is not entirely clear-cut whether it is the possible inheritance or the maintenance 
of cattle that is motivating remittances. 
Also the insurance motive is tested for by Lucas and Stark (1985), when they examine the 
effect of drought – both independently and interacted with the number of cattle and acres of 
land owned – on remittances. Alone, the variable depicting the village-specific severity of 
drought is positive and significant, implying that remittances rise with the scale of the income 
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shock hitting the recipient household. However, adding the interaction terms to the 
specification makes the drought per se insignificant: what this means is that those who receive 
more remittances in times of hardship are those whose sustenance is more reliant on cattle or 
crops. Thus, remittances seem also to provide insurance against income risks for migrants’ 
households back home.  
All in all, the study by Lucas and Stark (1985) – despite its outdated methodology – is a prime 
exemplar of empirical studies on remittances: it finds that there is no single motive driving the 
remittance behaviour of migrants collectively, but that there may be differences in 
motivations between migrants, and any one migrant may be motivated by several different 
considerations. In addition, it demonstrates well how these kinds of analyses can be enriched 
and supported by non-econometric investigation of the anthropological, cultural and climatic 
context where the migrants and their families make their migration and remittance decisions.  
The study by Cox et al. (1998) represents the more common type of studies, which test for 
one or two motives for remittances. They take the altruistic and the exchange motive under 
consideration in the context of Peru, and examine transfers flowing from parents to children 
and from children to parents with probit and tobit estimations. The type of exchange they are 
scrutinising is that of repaying loans on investments in education, which falls under the 
investment motive described in section 2.3. Before discussing the motives for transfers, 
however, they investigate whether transfers respond to capital market imperfections and 
liquidity constraints, and find that timing does significantly affect transfers from children to 
parents: transfers are more likely when the earnings of the recipient household are low, i.e. 
when households are very young or old. At these phases, the desired consumption of the 
household exceeds its current earnings and remittances provide the needed consumption 
smoothing, which can be interpreted as a sign of capital market imperfections.  
Focusing on Cox’s et al. (1998) results obtained from the estimation of the specification for 
child-to-parent transfers, which mostly comprise remittances, the authors find that while the 
probability of remittances is negatively associated with the recipient household’s income – 
consistent with both the altruistic and the exchange motive – the amount sent is positively 
associated with the recipient household’s income, which is possible only under the exchange 
motive. This result suggests that the purely altruistic framework is not sufficient for 
describing the data the authors are investigating, and a bargaining-cum-altruism framework 
should be employed instead.  
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Cox et al. (1998) make some other interesting findings, as well. For instance, if the recipient 
household receives social security income, the probability of remittances decreases, but their 
amount increases. The effect of social security on the incidence of remittances coincides with 
both the altruistic and the exchange motive: on one hand, social security benefits, as noted by 
Cox and Jimenez (1992), crowd out altruistically motivated private transfers, but on the other 
hand, households who expect to receive social security pensions are less inclined to make 
intergenerational contracts with their children to ensure the receipt of old-age support. 
Moreover, the observation that the probability of remittances is increased if the recipient is 
unemployed or ill cannot discriminate between the altruistic and the exchange motive, as 
these results may indicate that there are some informal insurance schemes at place that fall 
under Lucas and Stark’s (1985) framework of tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest.  
In the study by de la Brière et al. (2002), the inheritance motive is tested against the insurance 
motive in the context of Dominican Sierra – the models for these motives suggested by these 
authors are presented in sections 2.4 and 2.5, respectively. The authors employ standard and 
random-effects OLS, tobit, and censored least absolute deviation (CLAD) estimations, and 
restrict their analysis on remittances sent by children of household heads. Based on the 
descriptive statistics they hypothesise that remittances are involved in both asset accumulation 
and in insurance schemes. To test this they estimate their remittance specification for all 
migrants, as well as for different groups of migrants, e.g. for male and female migrants, and 
for migrants residing in the US and in Dominican Sierra.  
In terms of all migrants, de la Brière et al. (2002) conclude that the inheritance motive, 
supported by two findings, affects migrants’ remittance decisions more strongly than the 
insurance motive. First, inheritable land as such increases remittances. Second, the interaction 
between the number of heirs and parents’ land assets is negative, meaning that inheritance 
becomes a less attractive investment as the number of siblings grows, which in turn reduces 
the incentives to remit. The insurance motive is only weakly supported, as the variable 
indicating the number of working days the migrant’s parents lost due to illness affects 
remittances significantly and positively only in the CLAD estimation. 
When it comes to the heterogeneity among migrants possibly affecting the above results, de la 
Brière et al. (2002) find that in terms of the insurance motive, female migrants respond 
strongly to the number of lost working days by parents, but male migrants are unaffected. 
Also migrants residing in the US respond more strongly to this variable than migrants residing 
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in Dominican Sierra. Moreover, male migrants with siblings are not motivated by insurance, 
but male migrants without siblings need to take the role of the sole insurer of the family and 
correspondingly their remittances respond to their parents’ lost working days. In contrast, 
female migrants’ insurance behaviour is not affected by the existence of other migrants in the 
household. In terms of the inheritance motive, de la Brière et al. (2002) find no difference 
between the remittance behaviour of male and female migrants, as remittances sent by both 
groups respond positively to their parents’ land assets. However, the residence of migrants 
does play a role: only migrants residing in the US respond significantly to their parents’ land 
assets, and their remittances decline as the number of heirs increases.  
The insurance motive has been investigated by several other authors, as well, and it has 
received support from e.g. Gubert (2002) in the context of Western Mali, and from Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2006) in the context of Mexico – these studies are briefly reviewed next. 
In contrast, the study by Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) on Guyanese migrants comes to the 
opposite conclusion: they test the insurance motive against the altruistic motive and find that 
per migrant remittances decline with the number of migrants, which is consistent with the 
altruistic motive but in contrast to the insurance motive.        
In his study, Gubert (2002) studies the effect of two shock variables: the number of household 
members who did not cultivate because of illness in 1996, and the number of funerals held in 
1996. In addition to these observable shocks, he constructs three crop income shock variables 
from income data. What Gubert (2002) finds is that in general, remittances act as insurance as 
they increase when bad shocks hit the recipient household. More importantly, he finds that 
different kinds of shocks are insured. Gubert (2002) also notes that moral hazard problems 
may arise because of imperfect monitoring of the insurance contract, as recipient households 
have the incentive to under-report income or cut down their labour effort in order to be 
eligible for financial assistance or to not be obliged to support others.  
As mentioned in section 2.5, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) take a different approach 
and hypothesise that migrants who face a greater income risk in the country they are currently 
residing in remit more than those facing a lower risk. Consistent with their hypothesis, the 
results of the study imply that as the income risk of migrants – captured by their legal status, 
existence of social networks and work experience in the US – increases, migrants insure 
themselves either by remitting more to their parents or by accumulating more savings in their 
home country. The authors find that family-provided insurance is acquired mostly by 
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migrants who are male, younger, less educated, have larger households back home, have less 
work experience in the US, work as wage and salary workers, and do not have social 
networks in the US. In contrast, self-insuring migrants are older, work in specific tasks, have 
social networks in the US, and receive fringe benefits in their jobs in the US.  
Judging by the empirical remittance literature reviewed above, the overall consensus seems to 
be that remittances are not motivated solely by the altruism of migrants, as is often assumed, 
but by different contractual arrangements – regarding either services performed by 
households, repayments of educational loans, or insurance – between migrants and their 
former households. This is also the conclusion reached by Rapoport and Docquier 
(2006:1171), but they point out that altruism should not disregarded altogether, as it still 
serves as a driver of these contracts.  
To conclude, the above studies provide a relevant framework for the estimations of the 
probability and amount of remittances, as they, among other studies, inspire both the 
theoretical and empirical approach taken in the analyses of motives for remittances that 
follow. Not only they provide some theoretical background and models whose predictions are 
to be tested empirically, but they also guide the choice of estimation methods and variables to 
be employed. In addition, they provide plenty of suggestions for dealing with different 
theoretical and empirical challenges and point out problematic issues that need to be taken 
into account when making particular choices and drawing conclusions. However, despite their 
undeniable value as a source of information and inspiration, the lack of comprehensiveness of 
these studies draws attention to the work that still needs to be done both theoretically and 
empirically to improve the understanding of remittances, and thus acts as a motivation for this 
study, as well. 
3 Remittance channels  
This chapter elaborates on the theoretical framework and context of the research question 
examining the use of different remittance channels. First, a theoretical model for the choice of 
remittance channel is presented, and some empirical findings regarding the use of remittance 
channels is examined. In addition, remittance trends and markets of Uganda, Senegal and 
Nigeria are each discussed in turn, with an emphasis on the remittance channels used in these 
countries. These descriptions form the background for the estimations of the choice between 
official and unofficial remittance channels examined in sections 7.1.5, 7.2.6 and 7.3.6.  
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3.1. Theory of choice of remittance channel 
On the whole, the theoretical literature on remittance channels is much scarcer than on the 
motives of remittances. However, some models depicting the choice between official and 
unofficial remittance channels have been developed in the recent years. In a sense, these 
models are similar to the ones for motives for remitting that they both tend to start with 
migrants deriving utility from certain choices they make regarding remittances. In this 
section, a model by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2005) is presented, as it is a representative 
example of the theoretical framework that has emerged around remittance channels. 
In the model for choosing a certain remittance channel, each migrant, denoted by subscript i, 
ni ,...,2,1=  gets utility ijU from using any of the possible remittance channels, denoted by 
subscript j, nj ,...,2,1= . Naturally, after considering his alternatives, the migrant chooses the 
channel that gives him the highest utility. The level of utility that the migrant can get from 
using a certain channel depends on several personal and payment characteristics, as well as on 
demographic and employment characteristics. Thus, the utility derived from choosing a 
certain remittance channel may be expressed as  
        ijjijijijij xVU εβε +=+=
' ,                          (3.1) 
where ijV  and ijε represent the deterministic and stochastic components of the utility function, 
respectively. The probability that migrant i chooses the remittance channel j is equal to the 
probability of ijU  being the largest of inii UUU ,...,, 1211 , i.e. 
        { } { } { }kikjijikijikijiij xxPUUPjYPP ββεε '' −≤−=>=== ,                          (3.2) 
where nk ,...,2,1= , and jk ≠ . Given the deterministic components, this probability depends 
on what is assumed about the distribution of the stochastic error terms inii εεε ,...,, 21 . If 
all ijε are mutually independent with a log Weibull distribution, then the multinomial logit 
model may be derived from utility maximisation (McFadden 1974). It can then be shown that 
the choosing a certain remittance channel may be expressed by the probability 
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The probability of the most commonly used remittance channel may be set as the base 
category in the estimation, and the relative risk ratios for a one-unit change in the 
corresponding independent variables ijx may be obtained: 
     ( )jij
ik
ij x
P
P
β'exp= ,               (3.4) 
where the category of reference is remittance method j. When there are only two alternatives, 
the model reduces to the standard binary logit model. (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2005:565-
6; Verbeek 2008:221-2) This is indeed the case in this study, where the several remittance 
channels are grouped into two alternative categories based on whether they are regarded as 
official ( 1=j ) or unofficial ( 0=j ). In this setting, the probability of using official channels, 
may be expressed as  
     { } { } { }1'1111'1 01 βεεβ iiiii xPxPYP ≤−=>+== .             (3.5) 
Again, the distribution of the error term ijε  determines the form of this probability: if a 
standard normal distribution is assumed, as is the case in this study, the probit model is 
obtained. (Verbeek 2008:203) 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2005:559, 565) suggest a number of independent variables ijx  
that may determine the choice of remittance channel, such as the amount of remittances, the 
migrant’s documentation status, his age, his gender, his education level, his occupational 
sector, the time he has spent in his country of residence, the extent of his networks of family 
and friends in his country of residence, the degree of rurality of the remittance-receiving 
household, and the intended use of remittances. These variables are rather similar to the 
determinants of the motives for remitting appearing in table 1 and discussed in sections 2.1 
through 2.6. 
In terms of hypotheses, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2005:559-60) distinguish between three 
remittance channels – banks, money transfer firms (MTFs) and unofficial channels – and 
expect the above-mentioned variables to affect the use of these channels differently. First, 
they expect that the higher the amount of remittances, the more likely will migrants use banks, 
as the transaction costs on a personal check do not depend on the check amount. Also more 
educated migrants, migrants with more work experience and with wider networks of family 
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and friends in their country of residence are more likely to use banks, as they are likely to 
understand the banking system and to hold a bank account. In contrast, the authors expect 
banks to be less likely used when migrants are undocumented or older. In addition, using 
unofficial channels and MTFs is more likely when migrants remit to more rural areas where 
banks may not be available. Lastly, the authors expect that banks are more likely used when 
remittances are sent for savings or investment purposes. (Ibid.)   
The authors make an important note that including the amount of remittances as an 
independent variable may result in endogeneity, as it is likely that the migrants choice of 
remittance channel may depend on the cost associated with remitting a certain amount of 
money, whereas it is also possible that the amount of remittances may be affected by the 
remittance channel used by the migrant. They account for this possibility by first estimating a 
tobit model for the amount of remittances, from which they obtain unconditional predicted 
values for the amount remitted. They then use this to instrument the amount of remittances in 
their multinomial logit model for the choice of remittance channel. (Ibid:556-7) 
3.2. Empirical evidence 
Most of the empirical studies on remittance channels has focused on the characteristics of the 
channels when attempting to determine why some remittance channels are used more often 
than others. These studies have concluded that – inter alia – the cost of using a certain 
channel, its convenience, security, speed, trustworthiness, familiarity and the access of both 
the migrant and the recipient household to the channel are the main determinants of the 
migrant’s decision on which remittance channel to use (see e.g. Buencamino and Gorbunov 
2002; El Qorchi et al. 2003; Freund and Spatafora 2005; Hernandez-Coss 2005; Pieke et al. 
2005). While these factors obviously are important in the choice, also the characteristics of 
the remitting migrants may also have a significant impact on the choice of using a certain 
remittance channel. Thus, two empirical studies considering the influence of these 
characteristics are reviewed in this section.  
Continuing with the study by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2005) on Mexican immigrants in 
the United States, the authors examine through a multinomial logit model the different 
migrant characteristics affecting the choice between using banks, money transfer firms 
(MTFs), unofficial remittance channels and other remittance channels. MTFs form the 
estimation’s base category, as they are the most commonly used remittance channel. The 
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authors find that relative to MTFs, banks are less likely used by undocumented migrants, 
while more educated migrants, migrants employed in industry, and migrants with social 
networks in their country of residence are more likely to use banks relative MTFs. 
Meanwhile, migrants that are self-employed or work a specific-task job, and migrants 
remitting to rural areas are more likely to use unofficial remittance channels relative to MTFs. 
However, MTFs are preferred over unofficial channels as the time the migrant has spent in the 
United States lengthens. (Ibid:569) While these findings support the authors’ hypotheses 
mentioned in the previous section, the estimation results regarding the effects of the age of the 
migrant, the amount of remittances he sends, and the intended use of remittances go against 
what they initially assume.  
In their study on Moldovan migrants, Siegel and Lücke (2009) incorporate both migrant- and 
channel-related independent variables into their multinomial logit model for the choice 
between official services (banks, money transfer operators and post offices), unofficial 
services (third parties such as minibus operators) and personal transfers (migrants themselves, 
relatives and friends). The authors find that unofficial services and personal transfers are more 
likely used relative to official ones, when migrants and the recipient households are primarily 
concerned about the cost of the service as opposed to its speed, convenience, security, or trust.  
In terms of the migrant-related characteristics, more educated migrants are less likely to use 
unofficial services and personal transfers, while migrants residing in EU countries are much 
more likely to use unofficial services relative to official ones than migrants residing in CIS 
countries, reflecting the illegal residence status of many Moldovan migrants in the EU. As 
could be expected, then, being a legal resident in the destination country reduces quite 
significantly the probability of using unofficial services relative to official ones. Also the 
duration of migration has an effect on the choice of remittance channel: while short-term 
migrants are less likely to use unofficial services relative to official ones, they are more likely 
to use personal transfers relative to official ones. In addition, recipient households with a bank 
account are much less likely to use unofficial services relative to official ones. However, the 
bank account may have been opened for the household to be able to use these services. 
(Ibid:9, 17-9) 
Similarly to the empirical studies on the motives for remittances, these studies provide a 
relevant framework for the estimations of the choice between official and unofficial 
remittance channels: among other studies, they provide the theoretical underpinnings for the 
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empirical estimations, as well as guide the choice of variables to be included in the 
specifications. Importantly, they give insight into the multitude of factors affecting the choice 
of remittance channel: when it comes to the estimations of this study, they would greatly 
benefit from the possibility of including several variables that have been used in the studies 
reviewed above. This matter is discussed in more depth in section 6.4.1. 
3.3. Remittance trends and channels in Uganda 
With their rather staggering growth in recent years, remittances to Uganda are becoming a 
substantial source of development finance. Recorded workers’ remittances to Uganda totalled 
$914.5 million in 2010, with a growth of 17.5 percent from the previous year. Remittances 
have already outpaced foreign direct investments made into the country, and represent the 
second largest inflow into the country after official development aid, which amounted to 
$1.786 billion in 2009. (The World Bank 2012a) In 2010, there were 757.5 thousand Ugandan 
emigrants, and among their top destinations were Kenya, the United Kingdom, Tanzania, the 
United States and Rwanda. Moreover, in 2000 as much as 35.6 % of tertiary-educated 
population emigrated. (The World Bank 2011b:248) As remittance senders to Uganda, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Australia are at the top, while within sub-Saharan 
Africa, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa represent the major 
remittance-sending countries (Ngugi and Sennoga 2011:245-6). The significant growth of 
remittances is mainly the consequence of the increasing number of Ugandans working abroad, 
of the loosening foreign exchange regulatory regime, and new remittance technologies that 
have increased competition in the remittance markets and decreased transfer costs (Ibid:245).  
In terms of the channels used for remitting, the Bank of Uganda (2010:11) defines 
commercial banks and international and local money transfer operators – all of which are 
regulated by the Bank of Uganda – as official, or formal, channels, while the unofficial, or 
informal, channels comprise all unlicensed service providers as well as friends and relatives. 
The results of a survey on remittances conducted in 2009 by the Bank of Uganda show that 
the most frequently used channels to remit are international money transfer operators such as 
Western Union and Money Gram (32.6 percent), followed by commercial banks (23.5 
percent) and friends and relatives in Uganda (21.8 percent). There was also a decrease in the 
percentage of households using unofficial remittance channels from 41.6 percent in 2008 to 
37.4 percent in 2009.  
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The choice between official and unofficial remittance channels is determined mainly by the 
remitter’s preferences, but also by the ease of access to the channel, and by its transaction 
costs. (Ibid:11-3) Moreover, those migrants who manage to find work at the formal sector 
tend to use official remittance service providers, such as banks, credit institutions and 
microfinance-related institutions, while those employed in the informal sector tend to resort to 
unofficial means of transfer, e.g. to bus companies, family members and friends. Furthermore, 
official service providers are more frequently used when the remitter resides in an urban 
centre, as these centres are where the financial institutions of Uganda are mainly concentrated. 
Also international remittances are often sent through official channels. In contrast, unofficial 
channels are most used by customers whose areas are underserviced by financial institutions. 
Also, domestic remittances find their way to their recipients mainly through semi-official and 
unofficial channels. (Ngugi and Sennoga 2011:247-50) 
While there is an abundance of different remittance service providers in Uganda, they all 
differ in their scope of services, products, and transfer costs. To overcome the problems of 
high transaction costs, slow speed of transfers and limited access to banking services, a large 
number of new entries to the market have been made in recent years: for instance, mobile 
money transfer services and informal services such as community-based firms and transport 
firms have gained entry. (Ibid:247, 251) 
3.4. Remittance trends and channels in Senegal 
In 2010, Senegal received $1.346 billion in recorded workers’ remittances, which represents 
as much as 10.4 percent of Senegal’s GDP. With this amount, Senegal is in the 4th place 
among remittance-receiving countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in the total volume of 
remittances (The World Bank 2012a; The World Bank 2011b:34). In the early 2000s, 
remittances to Senegal grew quite rapidly, but in 2009 and 2010, remittances fell: there was a 
7.5 percent decline between 2008 and 2009, and a 1.4 percent decline between 2009 and 
2010. Both foreign direct investment flows ($237.2 million in 2010) and official development 
aid ($1.018 billion in 2009) have been surpassed by remittances, further emphasising the 
significance of the latter. In 2010, most of the 636.2 thousand Senegalese emigrants were 
destined for the Gambia, France, Italy, Mauritania and Spain. In 2000, nearly 18 percent of 
the tertiary-educated population emigrated. (The World Bank 2012a; The World Bank 
2011b:217)  
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The Senegalese official remittance market consists of banks, money transfer operators, the 
post office, and microfinance institutions. According to the African Development Bank 
(2007:26), 10 percent of remittance flows go through banks, 36 percent through money 
transfer operators, and 8 percent through postal orders – the rest 46 percent of remittances go 
through various unofficial channels. While the high costs of using money transfer operators 
limits the growth of the industry, the use of banks as remittance channels is restricted due to 
the long distances to banks in remittance-receiving areas, long delays and waiting times in the 
delivery of services, and the sometimes unexpected commission charges. Moreover, the 
bankarisation rate of Senegal is estimated to as low as around 5 percent on average. (Ibid:29-
30) Microfinance institutions, on the other hand, act as intermediaries between money transfer 
operators and beneficiaries, and intensify the competition for money transfer services in the 
unofficial sector by making the distribution network denser (Ibid:30). In turn, the post office 
is highly competitive due to its presence in areas with low bankarisation (Cisse 2011:231). 
The unofficial remittance market consists of carriers, “fax”, in-kind transfers through traders, 
goods sent by migrants, and remittances sent by mail. The carrier system, where a 
community’s remittances are assigned to one carrier is the most commonly used, but suffers 
from a bad reputation. In the second most popular system, i.e. in “fax” system, remittances are 
gathered at one collection point and redistributed to their recipients very rapidly through a 
trader in the recipient’s country after identification by telephone. This mode of transfer is both 
quick and less expensive than money transfer operators, but more risky as well. (The African 
Development Bank 2007:35-6)  
Surprisingly, cost is not the principal factor that determines whether a official or unofficial 
mode of transfer is used, as many migrants and recipients are unaware of them. Migrants 
decide to use unofficial channels due to the downsides of the official market, such as 
exchange rate fluctuations, waiting times at agencies, high costs and limited reach of banking 
services. Also the large number of unauthorised Senegalese workers abroad tends to resort to 
unofficial channels rather than official ones. (Ibid:32-4) Moreover, there are entry barriers to 
the remittance service business and regulations that impede remittance operations, such as 
ceilings on the amount on remittances and minimum capital requirements, which further 
encourage remitters to use the unofficial sector. In addition, despite their speed and reliability, 
official remittance services are expensive and bureaucratic. (Cisse 2011:237) 
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In sum, the Senegalese remittance markets are becoming more formalised primarily due to the 
growth of money transfer operators, but the limited reach of banking services poses a 
problem. Yet, remittances have improved this situation, and the reach is better among the 
recipients of remittances than among the population generally. (The African Development 
Bank 2007:39-40) 
3.5. Remittance trends and channels in Nigeria  
Nigeria receives the largest absolute amount of remittances of all Sub-Saharan African 
countries, with a total of $10.045 billion in recorded workers’ remittances received in 2010 
(The World Bank 2012a; The World Bank 2011b:34). Remittance flows to Nigeria have 
grown steadily in the last few years, but declined somewhat in 2009, but already in 2010 they 
returned to a higher level than in 2008. As in Senegal, foreign direct investment and official 
development aid have been exceeded in scale by remittances: Remittances are nearly 1.7 
times as large as foreign direct investment flows, and over 6 times as large as official 
development aid flows to Nigeria. In 2010, the stock of Nigerian emigrants totalled 1.0 
million, and their main destinations were the United States, the United Kingdom, Chad, 
Cameroon and Italy. Of the tertiary-educated population, 10.7 percent emigrated in 2000. 
(The World Bank 2011b:195) Most of the remittances to Nigeria come from the United States 
(CBN 2007; cited in Agu 2011:188). 
As in Uganda and Senegal, there are both official and unofficial remittance service providers. 
The official sector is predominantly formed by global money transfer operators with Nigerian 
banks as their agents, and the national postal carrier NIPOST. An important feature of the 
official sector is that a substantial fraction of remittance service providers have formed some 
kind of a partnership with money transfer operators, banks, or mobile phone companies. 
Telecommunications operators provide remittance services as well, but they still lack in reach 
and depth. In the unofficial sector, on the other hand, both monetary and in-kind remittances 
are carried by friends or private merchants. (Agu 2011:190-1, 195) 
Currently, remittances to Nigeria are not encouraged by any policies or incentives, but 
hampered by, inter alia, registration, licensing and capital requirements for the remittance-
providing firms. Also corruption in the government, anti-money-laundering requirements and 
exchange controls are considered as barriers to entry to the market. In effect, remittance 
markets in Nigeria is an oligopoly, where banks need to get together among themselves and 
45 
 
with money transfer operators in order to operate remittance services. Despite their 
collaboration, banks are in competition with each other, as well. Thus, the unofficial sector, 
with a totally different customer base that is not even recognised by banks, is not perceived as 
a threatening competitor by the official sector. (Ibid:199-205) 
In terms of remittance fees, their payment is almost solely the responsibility of the sender, and 
depend on the money transfer operator used and on where the remittances are sent from. 
However, both senders and recipients may be charged when remittances are domestic and sent 
through local couriers and transportation firms. The highest proportional fees accrue to those 
remitting small amounts. In addition, many banks have strict identification requirements to 
secure the integrity of remittance services, and they exclude some parts of the Nigerian 
population from receiving remittances through official remittance services: these people are 
often self-employed, employed in the informal sector, or casually employed and thus do not 
have official identity cards. (Ibid:206-10) 
Thus, a lot remains to be improved in the remittance markets of Nigeria. For instance, 
competition should be increased to bring down the costs of remittance services; access to 
remittance services should be improved by empowering NIPOST, whose country-wide 
infrastructure could be much more effectively utilised; and the use of remittance proceeds 
should be enhanced. Only then there is a chance for the greatest possible benefits for both 
remittance senders and receivers to come about. (Ibid:212-5) 
4 Model for intra-household decisions on migration  
Judging by the models for the motives for remitting reviewed in sections 2.1 through 2.6 it 
may be concluded that even though most of these models incorporate the considerations of 
both the migrant and the household to some extent, they rarely explicitly model the household 
and how it is actually affected by one or more of its members migrating outside the household 
to work. There are exceptions, however: for instance, the model for the investment motive by 
Rapoport and Docquier (2006) presented in section 2.3 goes quite a long way in modelling the 
household, and how its income and its liquidity constraints affect its decisions regarding 
migration. What the authors attempt to determine with their model is the optimum number of 
migrants the household should send in order for it to maximise its income, but disregard, for 
instance, the characteristics of the migrant and those of his destination country, and the effects 
they may have on the optimum number of migrants.  
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However, it would be of great interest and importance to bring these kinds of issues under 
consideration in a microeconomic model for migration decisions, as they will have an effect 
on a variety of decisions made in households as well as on the subsequent remittances. For 
instance, the characteristics of the potential migrant and his potential destinations, and the 
characteristics of the sending household itself are very likely to have an effect on the 
decisions on which of the household members should migrate, where should he migrate to, as 
well as on the amount of remittances the household may expect from the migrant it decides to 
send. The questions of who to send as a migrant and where to send him are precisely those the 
model developed in this section attempts to answer. To the author’s knowledge, similar 
models with the same premises and framework do not exist.  
Existing research is not ignored, however, in the development of the model: the model 
incorporates some features of the models described in the previous chapter, such as those of 
the model for the strategic motive by Stark (1995), and also some empirically validated 
hypotheses made by Lauby and Stark (1988) in their investigation of Filipino migrants. Most 
profoundly, however, the model builds on the theory of comparative advantage, and how it 
can be factored into the migration-related decision making of the household. The model 
developed has an empirical counterpart in this study, as well: a probit model for the 
probability of sending a migrant abroad is estimated for Ugandan, Senegalese and Nigerian 
migrants in sections 7.1.6, 7.2.7 and 7.3.7, respectively. 
4.1. Standard model 
The model starts with a household that has decided to send one of its members to work 
outside the household to earn extra income. It should be noted that even though the expression 
“send a migrant” is used, the household is not necessarily the sole entity making the migration 
decision: as Stark and Bloom (1985:174) note, migration decisions are often jointly made by 
the migrant and some group of non-migrants, costs and benefits are shared, and remittances 
are seen as a contractual arrangement between the migrant and his former household.  
Nonetheless, what the household aims at with sending a migrant is to reach a minimum 
income minI , which it needs to escape from destitution. The household has two workers, one 
with low skills and one with high skills, and attempts to determine which of them to send 
outside the household to earn extra income. In terms of the destination country of the worker, 
there are also two choices, a rich country and a poor country, and the worker that does not get 
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sent outside the household remains at home. More concretely, the rich country may be 
considered to represent international, and the poor country to represent internal migration. As 
in the strategic motive model by Stark (1995) reviewed in section 2.6, the skills, or 
productivities, of low- and high-skill workers are denoted by θ1 and θ2, respectively, and the 
rich and poor countries by subscripts R and P, respectively. Staying at home is denoted by 
subscript H. 
The workers are paid an hourly wage ( )θW  according to their skills in both country R and 
country P. As the workers’ education is one indicator of the their skills, these wages also 
partly reflect the possibly disparate returns to the workers’ education. In contrast to the 
assumption made by Stark (1995), it is assumed that their skills are accurately recognised and 
compensated for in both countries. In terms production at home H, the workers’ hourly output 
is also translated into wages, so the workers’ wages fulfil the following conditions: 
    
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ,
,
222
111
θθθ
θθθ
HPR
HPR
WWW
WWW
>>
>>
                          (4.1) 
    ( ) ( )12 θθ WW > ,                           (4.2) 
    ( )
( )
( )
( )2
2
1
1
θ
θ
θ
θ
P
H
P
H
W
W
W
W
< , and                                    (4.3) 
    ( )
( )
( )
( )2
2
1
1
θ
θ
θ
θ
R
H
R
H
W
W
W
W
<                           (4.4) 
First, the wage is better in country R than in country P for both the low- and high-skill 
worker, and these wages are better than that paid at home H. Second, the high-skill worker is 
paid better than the low-skill worker in country R, country P and at home, so he has an 
absolute advantage in all locations. According to conditions (4.3) and (4.4), the high-skill 
worker has a comparative advantage at home H over working outside the household, meaning 
that he is relatively more productive at home than the low-skill worker. Conversely, these 
conditions also mean that the low-skill worker has a comparative advantage of working 
outside the household over staying at home. 
In terms of the labour markets the migrant will be entering outside the household, it could be 
reasonably assumed that there is a chance that the migrant will not find work immediately, or 
that he finds only temporary work or work with reduced hours. To capture this possibility in 
country R and country P, let there be a good state G where the migrant finds full-time work 
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with h hours of work per day immediately, and a bad state B where he is assumed to work αh 
hours per day, with 10 << α . Thus, in a good state, the low-skill worker will earn either the 
income 
     ( ) ( ) hWI RGR ×= 11 θθ  or                          (4.5) 
     ( ) ( ) hWI PGP ×= 11 θθ                (4.6) 
in country R or in country P, respectively, and in a bad state, he will earn the either the 
income 
     ( ) ( ) hWI RBR αθθ ×= 11  or              (4.7) 
     ( ) ( ) .11 hWI PBP αθθ ×=                (4.8) 
The earnings of the high-skill worker may be presented similarly. At home, the working hours 
of both migrants are known and do not depend on good or bad states – for simplicity, they are 
normalised to 1, so the income earned at home, ( )θHI , equals ( )θHW . 
Assuming that the actual occurrence of good and bad states is not known ex ante, the income 
of the migrant at the destination country can only be expressed in expected terms. The 
likelihood of the good state is π, and the likelihood of the bad state is 1 – π. Thus, the low- 
and high-skill workers may be expected to earn the following incomes in country R and in 
country P, respectively: 
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For the expected incomes above, obviously the same conditions hold as for the workers’ 
wages described in expressions (4.1) through (4.4). Further, for migration of either of the 
workers to be beneficial, it is assumed that these expected incomes for all reasonable working 
hours are larger than the income the same worker earns at home. However, migration is 
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costly, which also needs to be taken into account. Assuming that country P is much closer 
than country R, migration to country P is considered to be costless and migration to country R 
costs c. Migration cost c is small enough for the migration of either of the workers to remain 
beneficial.   
As mentioned earlier, the household’s primary concern is to escape from destitution, for 
which it needs a minimum income of minI . To be precise, this income corresponds to the size 
of the household after one of the workers has migrated. Assuming that the migrant worker 
remits all of his expected income to the household, and that there is no other work effort 
expended at home except for that of the remaining worker, the household has four ways of 
achieving this minimum income through the work effort of the remaining worker and the 
migrant’s remittances: either the high-skill worker remains home, and the low-skill worker is 
sent either to country R or to country P, or the low-skill worker remains home, and the high-
skill worker is sent either to country R or to country P. Thus, the household compares four 
possible incomes – taking into account also the cost of migration – in its decision-making. If 
the high-skill worker remains home, the household income amounts to either 
  ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) chWWcIEI RHRH −×−++=−+ 1212 θπααπθθθ  or           (4.13)
  ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) hWWIEI PHPH ×−++=+ 1212 θπααπθθθ ,           (4.14) 
and if the low-skill worker remains home, the household income equals either 
  ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) chWWcIEI RHRH −×−++=−+ 2121 θπααπθθθ  or           (4.15)
  ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) hWWIEI PHPH ×−++=+ 2121 θπααπθθθ ,           (4.16) 
depending on the destination country. Unlike under the investment motive, the household 
does not attempt to maximise its income, but first and foremost it aims at avoiding the 
situation where its income falls under the minimum income minI . Hence, from these 
formulations it can be seen that the expected working hours h and the cost of migration c 
determine, which of the workers is sent outside the household. For it to be irrelevant which 
one of the workers is sent outside the household, i.e. for the household to receive its needed 
income minI  in all possible cases, the working hours h must fulfil the severest condition of the 
following:  
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Clearly, the higher the needed income minI , and the higher the migration cost c, the higher are 
also the migrant’s working hours h needed to fulfil the household’s requirements. However, 
the higher is the wage of the worker remaining at home relative to the wage of the migrating 
worker, the lower are the required working hours of the migrant. The effects of the chance of 
finding full-time employment π and the fraction of full hours worked α is not as 
straightforward, however, since they appear in the denominator with both a positive and a 
negative sign. Yet, as both π and α are between zero and one, the negative effect of their 
product is always outweighed by their individual, positive effects. Thus, the better are the 
chances of the worker finding full-time employment, and the higher fraction of full hours he 
can work when underemployed, the fewer working hours h are needed to attain the minimum 
income minI  required by the household. 
An important note is made by Lauby and Stark (1988:478), who point out that the number of 
children in the household is likely to affect the household’s decisions on migration. Firstly, 
the more children there are in the household, the larger is the household’s need for additional 
income, which naturally increases minI . Secondly, if there are a large number of children, the 
household is ensured that there will also be someone left at home to work. Thus, the 
probability of a household member’s migration is likely to increase with the size of the 
household, or more precisely, with the number of children in the household. In addition, the 
need for additional income may be affected by the education levels and occupations of the 
members of the household remaining at home. (Ibid.) Moreover, it could be possible that the 
size of the household affects the decision of sending a migrant abroad negatively: as 
international migration is likely to involve higher costs than internal migration, a large 
household with large consumption needs may not be able to finance it.  
4.2. Extensions 
The model derived in the previous section can easily be augmented from its basic form. For 
instance, the likelihood of finding full-time employment π may differ between the destination 
countries, in which case π would get different values in country R and in country P. The 
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chance of finding full-time employment may also be different for the different skill groups of 
migrants, and π may thus depend on θ, as well. The same may apply to the fraction of hours 
worked α when the migrant is underemployed.  
Also, the model could be easily extended to include the possibly differing loyalties, or degrees 
of altruism, of the two workers by assuming that the migrants remit only a fixed proportion γ 
of their expected income to the household. It could be expected that the larger the degree of 
altruism, the larger is this remitted proportion. A related suggestion is made by Lauby and 
Stark (1988:485) in their study on Filipino migrants, who hypothesise that when compared to 
migrating sons, migrating daughters may be more reliable in terms of providing support to her 
parents and to the education of their siblings.   
Similarly to model for the strategic motive developed by Stark (1995), the migrants and/or the 
household may apply a discount factor k, 10 << k , either to the wage of country P or to the 
wage of country R, depending on which location they prefer more. While Stark (1995:94) 
argued that migrants may prefer the lifestyle in country P, in which case the discount factor 
would be applied to the wage in country R, there may be other reasons for its application, and 
reasons for applying it to the wage of country P. For instance, the migrant and/or the 
household may prefer a location where another household member has already migrated to, or 
where there is a community of migrants from the same source country.  
In addition, as suggested by Stark (1995:93), it is possible that the individual skills of the 
migrant workers are not recognised by employers in country R, and that the high-skill worker 
may face statistical discrimination there. When considering his wage, employers may pool 
him with the already existing group of migrants in country R, and may pay him a lower wage 
than the migrant’s personal skill level or productivity would suggest. If the migrants at 
country R are paid according to their average product or skill level, this wage RW  may be 
expressed as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )221 1 θθβθβ pRRR WWWW >−+=  – β representing the share of low-skill 
workers in country R – and incorporated into the model above. When it comes to country P, 
especially in the case of this model, it is a rather reasonable assumption that in country P, the 
recognition of individual skills and paying according to them is more likely, as country P 
represents the migrant’s home country.    
Also another alternative assumption could be made in terms of the treatment of high-skill 
migrant workers in country R. It could be reasonably assumed that in country R, the skills of 
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the high-skill worker would not be recognised in the beginning, and thus he would not be 
allocated to the high-skill jobs he would be suitable for. Instead, in the beginning he would 
have to work in the same jobs as the low-skill migrant workers – who have been correctly 
allocated to low-skill jobs – and get paid the wage ( ) ( ) RRR WWW == 12 θθ . However, it could 
be assumed that in time, the skills of the high-skill worker will be recognised and he will have 
the opportunity to progress to jobs requiring better skills and offering a higher wage that is 
more in accordance with the migrant’s actual skills. This kind of an extension could be made 
by developing a two-period variation of the above model: in the first period, all workers 
regardless of their skills would get paid a wage ( ) ( ) RRR WWW == 12 θθ  in country R. In the 
second period, the low-skill worker would remain in his low-skill jobs, the high-skill worker 
would switch to a high-skill job, and they would be paid their skill-determined wages ( )1θRW  
and ( )2θRW , respectively, with ( ) ( )12 θθ RR WW > . 
Naturally, in the case sketched above the decision making of the household would become 
slightly more complicated, and it would have to consider, inter alia, how probable it is for the 
high-skill migrant to find and get a high-skill job at the second period. In addition, as pointed 
out by Lauby and Stark (1988:481-2), the household may have preferences in terms of the 
pattern of earnings and the kind of job the migrant takes. For instance, in terms of the scenario 
above, if the household only cares about the short-run satisfaction of its income need minI , it 
may not care at all about the possible progress of the high-skill migrant at country R, and thus 
may disregard the second period altogether, and the positive effect the high-skill migrant’s 
increased earnings would have on the household’s income in the second period.  
This section introduced only a few possible extensions to the basic model developed in the 
previous section. As the basic model is sufficient for the purposes of this study, the formal 
modelling of the above suggestions is not embarked on here but possibly in future research. 
5 Empirical methods 
In the literature studying the determinants of remittances, two estimation methods – the tobit 
model and the Heckman selection model – are most prevalently used. Though some earlier 
papers, such as the one by Lucas and Stark (1985), use OLS to model the remittance 
behaviour of migrants, it is now widely understood that OLS estimates may be biased and 
inconsistent in the context of estimating the determinants of remittances: there is a significant 
number of migrants who do not remit at all, and those who do, can be considered to self-select 
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themselves non-randomly into the “state” of remitting. Remittances are thus observed only for 
a non-random sample of migrants, which is likely to introduce sample selection bias into the 
estimations.  
Thus, models such as the tobit model and the Heckman selection model, which take this 
restricted nature of the dependent variable and the sample selection bias linked to it into 
account, are preferred in more recent papers studying the determinants of remittances. In 
addition to these estimation methods, the two-part model consisting of separate probit and 
OLS estimations, and the censored least absolute deviations (CLAD) estimation are employed 
to model the determinants of remittances. Since none of the used methods is a perfect fit for 
the research question or the underlying data, it is useful to compare the estimation results 
obtained with each of them. To model the choice between official and unofficial remittance 
channels, and between international and internal migration, a probit model is used.  
In this chapter, each of these methods is introduced and their strengths and weaknesses 
relative to the research question and data at hand are discussed. Throughout the following 
sections it should be kept in mind that the continuous dependent variable iy  - the amount of 
remittances – appearing in the tobit, Heckman selection and two-part model, as well as in the 
CLAD estimation, is on logarithmic scale. All of the estimations were carried out using Stata 
11. 
5.1. Tobit model  
The original Tobit model is named after James Tobin, and since its introduction in 1958 the 
model has been generalized in a variety of ways. Tobin (1958) proposed the use of maximum 
likelihood in the estimation of the model, and the applicability of the usual ML theory was 
later proved formally by Amemiya (1973). The tobit model is designed for applications, 
where the dependent variable is continuous but censored, i.e. its range is restricted from below 
or above. Often the range is restricted from below so that all negative values are mapped to 
zero. When this is the case, the model depicts two things simultaneously: it describes both the 
probability that the dependent variable equals zero, and the distribution of the dependent 
variable given that it gets a positive value. (Verbeek 2008:232)  
In terms of this study, modelling the determinants of remittances with the tobit model regards 
the remittance process as a one-stage decision: the decision to remit and the amount of 
remittances are made together, and they are both affected the same way by the independent 
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variables. In the empirical remittance literature, the tobit model has been employed by, for 
instance, Cox et al. (1998), Gubert (2002) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006). 
5.1.1. Standard and its estimation  
The standard tobit model is one with censoring from below at zero – stated formally, the so-
called threshold parameter L equals zero. The latent variable *iy  is linear in the independent 
variables, with an additive error that is normally distributed and homoskedastic. Formally, it 
may be presented as follows:  
           iii xy εβ +=
'* ,   i = 1, 2, …, N ,                      (5.1) 
where the error term 
     εi ~ [ ]2,0 σΝ                        (5.2) 
and where the observed iy  is defined as, with L = 0, 
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The error term iε  has a constant variance 
2σ  across observations and is independent of ix . 
The   –  sign means that iy  is observed to be missing, but often it is recorded at zero. 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005: 536; Verbeek 2008: 231-232) In the tobit estimations of this 
study, there are no negative remittances, and when iy  is observed to be missing, i.e. when the 
household receiving remittances has reported that it has not received any remittances during 
the previous 12 months, iy  is recorded at zero. As there is no censoring in its true meaning, 
these zero observations are called corner solutions. 
As mentioned, the tobit model first depicts the probability that 0=iy , given vector ix :  
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where σ is the standard deviation of the tobit model error term. Second, the model describes 
the distribution of iy , conditional on it being positive. For this left-truncation at zero, iy  is 
only observed if 0* >iy , and the left-truncated mean, given vector ix , is given by 
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The last term in equation (5.5), ( )( )σβ
σβφ
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, is called the inverse Mill’s ratio and denotes the 
conditional expectation of a mean-zero normal variable given that it is larger than β'ix− . This 
expectation is evidently larger than zero. The last term in the equation also makes it clear why 
it is not suitable to restrict attention only to the positive observations and estimate a linear 
model from the subsample – the conditional expectation of iy  does not merely equal β
'
ix , but 
depends also nonlinearly on ix .
1
The tobit model is usually estimated through maximum likelihood. The contribution that an 
observation makes to the likelihood function either is the probability mass at the observed 
point 
 (Cameron and Trivedi 2005:539-41; Verbeek 2008:232)  
0=iy , or the conditional density of iy , given that it is positive, times the probability 
mass of observing 0>iy . Maximising the loglikelihood function with respect to β  and 
2σ  
gives consistent and asymptotically efficient estimators for both β  and 2σ , given that the 
model is correctly specified. (Verbeek 2008:234) In terms of the tobit model estimations of 
this study, the estimation is by maximum likelihood, but the subsequent inferences do not 
assume that the density is correctly specified, which is referred to as pseudo-maximum 
likelihood estimation. 
The most significant weakness of the tobit maximum likelihood estimation is that it relies 
heavily on its distributional assumptions of the error term iε : the maximum likelihood 
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estimators of β  and 2σ are rendered inconsistent when non-normality or heteroskedasticity in 
the error terms is detected (Verbeek 2008:238). Non-normality of the error terms means that 
the errors are not jointly normally distributed, which in turn means that also iy  is not 
normally distributed, and exact statistical inferences from a given sample cannot be made. 
Heteroskedasticity of the error terms, on the other hand, means that the variance of the error 
terms is not constant over observations, even though the error terms are mutually uncorrelated 
(Ibid:20, 88). 
In terms of how well the model approximates the observed data, the goodness-of-fit measure 
for the maximum likelihood estimator is 2Rpseudo − , defined as 01 ln/ln1 LL− , where 1ln L  
is the log likelihood of the fitted model, and 0ln L  is the log likelihood of an intercept-only 
model. As the tobit model has a continuous dependent variable, and the log likelihood is the 
log of a density, it is possible that 02 <− Rpseudo  or 12 >− Rpseudo . Moreover, the 
measure does not increase as independent variables are added, unlike the standard 
2R measuring the goodness-of-fit of the standard regression model. (Cameron and Trivedi 
2009:345-6) Thus, for the tobit model, the 2Rpseudo −  has no real meaning. Thus, along 
with the tobit estimations of this study, the model F-statistic, which tests the significance of 
all of the independent variables, is reported in addition to the 2Rpseudo −  to give a better 
indication of the model’s fit.  
5.1.2. Specification tests 
Both non-normality and heteroskedasticity of the error terms should be tested after tobit 
estimations. For this purpose, Lagrange multiplier tests are of great appeal, as they only 
require estimation of the models under the hypothesis of normality and heteroskedasticity. 
Also conditional moment tests, which have been developed with generalised residuals, may 
be performed. (Cameron and Trivedi 2009:535) In this study, this latter approach was 
adopted, and a test for non-normality based on the framework of Pagan and Vella (1989) and 
described by Verbeek (2008:238-40) was employed. The test for heteroskedasticity employed 
in this study follows similar lines and is also described by Verbeek (2008:239). These tests 
are not further detailed here, but in practice, both of them are manually constructed from Stata 
11 output by following instructions given by Cameron and Trivedi (2009:535-7).  
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In the tobit estimations of this study, the above tests detected both non-normality and 
heteroskedasticity. To address heteroskedasticity, heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard 
errors are employed in the estimations. However, Wooldridge (2009:594) notes that the tobit 
model may provide reasonably good estimates of the partial effects on the conditional means, 
if departures from the assumptions are moderate. 
5.1.3. Marginal effects 
The interpretation of the coefficients of the independent variables obtained by estimating a 
tobit model is not exactly straightforward, as these parameters in β  have a double 
interpretation: they include the impact of changes in independent variables on the probability 
of nonzero remittances, and the impact of a changes in independent variables on the amount 
of remittances (Verbeek 2008:234). In other words, the parameters in β  measure the partial 
effects of the independent variables on ( )*iyE , *iy  being the latent variable. Thus, more 
informative marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of observing a 
positive iy , and on the conditional expected iy , [ ]0>ii yyE , should be examined. 
(Wooldridge 2009:589) Both of these marginal effects are studied in conjunction with the 
estimation results in chapter 7. 
To obtain the effect of changes in the independent variables on the conditional mean of the 
dependent variable, the dependent variable is differentiated with respect to xik. Depending on 
whether one is interested in the latent variable mean, or the truncated mean given in equation 
(5.5), the marginal effects, are given by  
latent variable:   [ ] kiki xyE β=∂∂ /*                  (5.6) 
left-truncated at zero:   [ ] ( ) ( )[ ] kikii xyyE βωλωωλ 21/0 −−=∂>∂                          (5.7) 
where σβω /'ix= , ( ) ( ) ( )ωωφωλ Φ= , and the equalities ( ) ( )zzzz φφ −=∂∂ /  and 
( ) ( )zzz φ=∂Φ∂ /  are used.2 ix To note, the dependence of expectations on vector  is 
suppressed. (Cameron and Trivedi 2005:541-2; Verbeek 2008:233) 
                                                     
2 Also the left-censored (at zero) marginal effect may be obtained, taking the form [ ] kiki xyE βω)(/ Φ=∂∂  (Cameron and 
Trivedi 2005:542). 
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The use of the tobit model in modelling the remittance behaviour of migrants may not be 
appropriate, as it does not allow the independent variables to have a different impact on the 
decision on whether to remit and on how much to remit – it assumes that those migrants who 
are more likely to remit are also those who, on average, send more remittances. In other 
words, the marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of remitting and on 
the amount remitted are bound to have the same sign. The appropriateness of the tobit model 
in this respect may be informally assessed by estimating a separate probit model for the 
probability of remitting and comparing its estimates with the tobit estimates: the probit 
coefficient estimate jγ  for an independent variable jx  should be “close” to the ratio of σβ j , 
where jβ  is the tobit coefficient estimate for the independent variable, and σ  the standard 
deviation of the tobit model error term (Wooldridge 2009:595). This test is carried out for the 
three countries under study and discussed in appendix 2. 
5.2. Heckman selection model 
The Heckman selection model, which is a standard model for describing sample selection 
problems, was developed by James Heckman (1976). The model divides the one-stage 
process of the standard tobit model into two stages: at the first stage, the individual decides 
whether to participate in an activity, and at the second stage, the level of participation in this 
activity is observed for the participants. Thus, in contrast to the tobit model, an independent 
variable may affect the probability of a nonzero observation, and the level of a positive 
observation of the dependent variable differently (Verbeek 2008:241).  
The Heckman selection model is well suited for the study of remittance behaviour of 
migrants: a sample selection problem arises, as only those migrants who decide to send 
remittances at the first stage are self-selected into the sample of the second stage, at which 
they decide on the amount of remittances – for those who do not remit, the amount of 
remittances is not observed. This selection may bias standard OLS estimates, in which case a 
correction through the Heckman selection model is needed. The Heckman selection model – 
either as an alternative or as a complement to the tobit model – has been employed widely in 
the remittance literature, for example in studies by Hoddinott (1992), Funkhouser (1995) and 
Agarwal and Horowitz (2002).  
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5.2.1. Standard model and its estimation 
In essence, the selection model consists of a participation equation where 
     
00
01
*
*
≤=
>=
ii
ii
hifh
hifh                           (5.8) 
and a resultant outcome equation where 
     
.0
0
*
**
≤−=
>=
ii
iii
hify
hifyy                                       (5.9) 
This model introduces a latent variable *ih , and the outcome of interest iy  is observed if 
0* >ih . In terms of this study, remittances, iy , are recorded as missing if the migrant chooses 
not to remit, i.e. 0=ih . The model specifies a linear model with additive errors for the latent 
variables: 
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Variables in ix1  are all included in ix2 , plus at least one identification variable not contained 
in ix1 , discussed in section 5.2. As 
*
iy  is not observed for those not participating, the latter 
equation in the equation pair (5.10) describes the potential outcome, not the actual one. The 
conditional expected iy , given that 1=ih , is given by 
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where the dependence of expectations on x, which is the union of vectors ix1  and ix2 , is 
suppressed. If the error terms ε1 and ε2 are independent of one another, i.e. the covariance 
012 =σ , the equation for 
*
iy  may be estimated consistently by OLS. However, if the two error 
terms are correlated, i.e. 012 ≠σ , sample selection bias in the OLS estimator arises: the 
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covariance gives rise to the inverse Mill’s ratio 
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 – also termed as Heckman’s lambda 
– biasing [ ]1=ii hyE .3
However, Verbeek (2008:245) points out that the inclusion of the Heckman’s lambda into the 
Heckman selection model does not eliminate all the problems of sample selection, as the non-
random selection implies a fundamental identification problem. Therefore, the validity of any 
solution will depend upon the validity of the assumptions that are made, which can only be 
partly tested (Ibid.). 
 (Cameron and Trivedi 2005:547-9; Verbeek, 2008:241-2) 
Like the tobit model, the Heckman selection model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The 
participation equation of the model describes the binary choice problem of whether to remit or 
not, so the likelihood contribution is the probability of observing 1=ih  or 0=ih . The 
outcome equation gives the distribution of the amount remitted for those who remit, so the 
contribution to the likelihood function is the density ( )1=ii hyf . Maximisation of the 
loglikelihood function with respect to the unknown parameters leads to consistent and 
asymptotically efficient estimators that have an asymptotic normal distribution. (Ibid:243-4) 
In terms of the Heckman selection model estimations of this study, the estimation is by 
maximum likelihood, but the subsequent inferences do not assume that the density is correctly 
specified, which is referred to as pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation. 
Due to its estimation through maximum likelihood, the Heckman selection model suffers 
from the same weaknesses as the standard tobit model, discussed in section 5.1.1, when it 
comes to its distributional assumptions of homoskedasticity and normality of the error terms. 
The validity of these assumptions could not be tested in this study, but heteroskedasticity-
robust clustered standard errors are still used in the estimations.  
Similarly to the tobit model, the goodness-of-fit measure for the Heckman selection model’s 
maximum likelihood estimator is 2Rpseudo − . For the Heckman selection model, the 
2Rpseudo −  has no real meaning and is not even reported in the estimation output produced 
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by Stata 11, as the model includes both a continuous and a discrete dependent variable. Thus, 
after the Heckman selection model estimations of this study, the model chi-squared –statistic 
is reported to give an indication of how well the model approximates the observed data.  
5.2.2. Identification 
To identify the model, the participation equation must contain all the independent variables 
that the outcome equation does, but also at least one independent variable that does not appear 
in the outcome equation (Baum 2006:268). If exactly the same independent variables are 
used, the model with normally distributed errors are close to unidentified, and 
multicollinearity problems arise. The independent variable that is excluded from the outcome 
equation should be chosen so that it affects the choice of whether to remit or not, but not the 
amount remitted. (Cameron and Trivedi 2005:551) However, such exclusion restrictions, that 
are also defensible, are quite difficult to make (Ibid.; Verbeek 2008:244).   
Also Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) point out that sample selection models such as the 
one by Heckman (1976) may lead to identification problems, as it is difficult to theoretically 
justify and find variables that affect the decision on whether to remit, but do not have an 
impact on the amount remitted. Still, the results of the Heckman estimation provide a good 
comparison to those obtained with the tobit model and to those obtained with the two-part 
model. The variables tested for identification purposes in the Heckman selection model are 
discussed in section 6.2.1.3. 
5.2.3. Marginal effects 
Again, the marginal effects are different depending on whether the latent variable mean or the 
truncated mean is considered. Denoting the union of ix1  and ix2  with x, 1
'
1 βix  may be 
rewritten as 1
'γx  and 2
'
2 βix  as 2
'γx . If ix1  is not equal to ix2 , 1γ  and 2γ  will have some zero 
entries. Differentiation with respect to x gives the marginal effects (given x)  
uncensored: [ ] 1* / γ=∂∂ xyE i                  (5.12) 
truncated at zero: [ ] ( ) ( )( )2'2'2'121/1 γλγγλσγ xxxxhyE ii +−=∂=∂ ,           (5.13) 
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where ( ) ( ) ( )zzz Φ= φλ , and the equalities ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )22 /// zzzzzzz Φ−Φ−=∂∂ φφλ  
( ) ( )( )zzz λλ +−=  and ( ) ( )zzzz φφ −=∂∂ /  are used.4
5.3. Two-part model  
 (Cameron and Trivedi 2005:552) The 
interpretation of these marginal effects is similar to that discussed in section 5.1.3.  
The third model used in this study is a two-part model like the Heckman selection model, but 
the two parts of the model are not correlated as in the Heckman selection model. The two-part 
model was presented by Cragg (1971:831-2) as a generalisation of the tobit model: in the first 
part of the model, a decision is made about whether to participate in some activity or not. In 
the second part, a decision on the level of participation is made. Quite obviously, in terms of 
this study the first decision is about whether to remit or not, and the second decision is made, 
given that the first decision is to send remittances, on how much to remit.  
Comparing the two-part model to the Heckman selection model, Manning et al. (1987:60) 
conclude in their Monte Carlo experiments that if one is not certain about the true equation 
specification for a research question, but uses the data at hand to find an acceptable 
specification – as is the case in this study – the overall selection bias in the predictions of the 
two-part model is close to insignificant. Effectively, choosing a fitting specification for the 
observed data eliminates the bias from ignoring the selection effect, for the most part at least 
(Ibid.). In this study, there is also an empirically proven argument for estimating the two-part 
model without sample correction: when the Heckman selection model is applied to the 
Nigerian data, the correlation coefficient between the error terms is found to be insignificant, 
meaning that the standard OLS estimation of the equation for positive remittances is likely to 
yield consistent estimators.  
5.3.1. Standard model and its estimation 
One form of Cragg’s (1971:831) two-part model assumes particularly that iy  follows a 
logarithmic distribution, which is a relevant consideration in terms of this study: the 
continuous dependent variable, i.e. the amount of remittances, is used in its logarithmic form 
to obtain a more symmetric distribution for it. A specification for this case is given by 
Manning et al. (1987:62-3): slightly altering their specification, the first equation of the two-
                                                     
4 Also the censored (at zero) marginal effect may be obtained, taking the form 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) 12'2'1212'1'2'2/ γγφγσγγγγφγ xxxxxxyE i −Φ+=∂∂  (Cameron and Trivedi 2005:552). 
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part model is for the latent variable *ih  for the dichotomous event of zero versus positive 
outcomes 0>iy :  
     iii xh 22
'
2
* εβ += ,                (5.14) 
where, ih  gets the value of one if 0
* >ih  and zero otherwise, and i2ε  ~ ( )1,0N . The 
outcome iy  is positive if 0
* >ih and zero otherwise, so the second equation is a linear model, 
on the logarithmic scale, for positive outcomes, on the condition that positive outcomes are 
observed (given vector ix1 ): 
          ( ) iiii xhy 11'1* 0 εβ +=> ,                             (5.15) 
where ( ) 00*1 =>ii hE ε , and ε1i is independently and identically distributed for 0* >ih . In 
equation (5.15), normality of the error distribution is not assumed. However, a zero 
correlation between the error terms i1ε  and i2ε  is assumed, which makes this model different 
from the Heckman selection model. Another difference of equation (5.15) from the second 
equation in the equation pair (5.10) for the Heckman selection model is that equation (5.15) 
refers to observed rather than potential outcomes. (Ibid.)  
The first equation of the two-part model may be represented by a probit model, and the 
second by a standard regression model (Cragg 1971:831). In terms of the probit model, the 
probability of observing 1=ih , given vector ix2 , is given by 
 { } { } { } { } ( )2'22'2222'2* 001 ββεεβ iiiiiii xFxPxPhPhP =≤−=>+=>== ,                 (5.16) 
where F denotes the distribution function of i2ε− . For the probit model, F is the standard 
normal distribution function ∫
∞− 




−
2
'
2
2
2
1exp
2
1β
π
ix
dtt . Like the tobit model and the Heckman 
selection model, the probit model is estimated through maximum likelihood. The likelihood 
contribution of observation i with 1=ih  is given by the probability { }ii xhP 1=  as a function 
of the unknown parameter vector β , and similarly for 0=ih . Maximising the loglikelihood 
function with respect to β  gives the likelihood estimator βˆ . (Verbeek 2008:203)  In terms of 
the probit model estimations of this study, the estimation is by maximum likelihood, but the 
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subsequent inferences do not assume that the density is correctly specified, which referred to 
as pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation. The second equation of the two-part model, given 
by the standard regression model, is estimated through ordinary least squares.  
Similarly to the tobit and Heckman selection model, due to its estimation through maximum 
likelihood, the probit model suffers from its heavy reliance on the distributional assumptions 
regarding the error terms: if the assumptions of normality or homoskedasticity of the error 
terms are violated, the maximum likelihood estimator is inconsistent. In turn, for the OLS 
estimator to be unbiased in the second equation of the two-part model, the well-known Gauss-
Markov conditions must be satisfied. In terms of consistency, one of the benefits of the 
standard regression model – compared to the above-discussed models employing the sensitive 
maximum likelihood estimation – is that the consistency of the OLS estimator does not 
assume normality of the error term distribution, and any distributional results for the OLS 
estimator, and the t- and F-statistics, are approximately valid even if the errors are non-
normally distributed, provided that the Gauss-Markov conditions are satisfied. However, the 
consistency of the least squares estimator s2 for the error variance σ2 still relies on the 
homoskedasticity of the error terms. (Verbeek 2008:18, 33-6)  
Similarly to the tobit model and the Heckman selection model, the goodness-of-fit measure 
for the probit model’s maximum likelihood estimator is 2Rpseudo − . As the probit model 
has a discrete dependent variable and the log likelihood is the log of a 
probability, 10 2 ≤−≤ Rpseudo , and the measure increases as independent variables are 
added into the specification. (Cameron and Trivedi 2009:345-6) Thus, for the probit model, 
the 2Rpseudo −  gives a measure of how much better the specified model performs than a 
model that contains only a constant as an independent variable. For the standard regression 
model, the goodness-of-fit is measured by 2R – 10 2 ≤≤ R  – which gives the proportion of 
sample variance of iy  that is explained by the specified model (Verbeek 2008:21). 
5.3.2. Specification tests 
Regarding the probit estimations, the assumption of homoskedasticity of the error terms may 
be tested by comparing two alternative models, one with a variance normalised to one and 
another with a heteroskedastic error term with a non-constant variance, by using a Wald test 
as described by Cameron and Trivedi (2009:455). As this test detected heteroskedasticity in 
all of the probit estimations of this study – for the probability of remittances, for the choice 
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between official and unofficial remittance channels and for the choice between international 
and internal migration – heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered standard errors are used. In turn, 
the assumption of normality of the error terms may be tested with a Lagrange multiplier test 
as described in detail by Verbeek (2008:211-2). In this test, first an alternative distribution 
that is more general than the normal is specified, and then the restrictions implied by the 
normal distribution are tested against the alternative. In all of the probit estimations of this 
study, non-normality was detected by this test.  
In terms of the OLS estimations, to test for heteroskedasticity of the error terms, the Breusch-
Pagan test, proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1980), is employed. Even though 
heteroskedasticity was not detected in any of the OLS estimations of this study, 
heteroskedasticity-robust clustered standard errors are used in the estimations – the resulting 
test statistics are asymptotically appropriate, whether the errors have constant variance or not 
(Verbeek 2008:94). In addition, two features of the survey data, explained in more detail in 
section 6.1.4, justify the use of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors: first, the survey data 
of this study has a cluster design, so clustered standard errors should be, and are, used, since 
they allow for intragroup correlation between the error terms. Second, the observations of data 
are weighted using probability weights. Specifying these two features in estimations 
automatically imply the use of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Baum 2006:138; 
StataCorp 2009:309). 
5.3.3. Marginal effects 
The coefficients of the probit model can not be interpreted in a straightforward manner. Thus, 
for a continuous independent variable ikx2 , the marginal effect is the partial derivative of the 
probability that 1=iy . The marginal effect at some specific point, given vector ix2 , is given 
by 
    { } ( ) ,/1 22'2'2 kiiki xFxhP ββ=∂=∂                (5.17) 
where ( ) ( ) zzFzF ∂∂=' . Thus, the effect of a change in ikx2  depends on the values of ix2 . 
Often marginal effects are computed for the ‘average’ observation, in which case ix2  is 
replaced with sample averages in previous estimations. However, it is possible also to 
compute average marginal effects, which are given for continuous independent variables by 
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     ( )∑i kixFN ,ˆˆ
1
22
'
2
' ββ               (5.18) 
and for discrete independent variables by the average of the discrete differences in the 
predicted probabilities. (Cameron and Trivedi 2005:467) While a marginal effect at a point 
gives an estimate of the marginal effect at chosen covariate values, an average marginal effect 
gives an estimate of a population-averaged marginal effect.  
In the standard regression model, i.e. in the second equation of the two-part model, the 
estimation coefficients themselves give the marginal effects of independent variables on the 
dependent variable. In this study the dependent variable is on the logarithmic scale, so a 
coefficient i1β  of a discrete or any other non-logarithmic independent variable gives the 
relative change in iy  owing to an absolute change of one unit in ikx1 , referred to as semi-
elasticity. If the independent variable is on logarithmic scale as well, then the coefficient i1β  
of this kind of variable gives an elasticity, i.e. the relative change in the dependent variable 
owing to a relative change in the independent variable. (Verbeek 2008:55)  
It is important to note that in nonlinear models such as the probit, tobit and Heckman 
selection model, the interpretation of marginal effects of interaction variables is not as 
unambiguous as in linear models such as OLS. In terms of the probit (and logit) model, this 
issue is discussed by Ai and Norton (2003:125), who point out that the true interaction effect 
is not found by looking at the coefficient of the interaction variable in a probit estimation, but 
by computing cross derivatives. Not following the notation used thus far, this has four 
implications: first, the interaction effect could be different from zero, even if the coefficient 
12β  of an interaction between variables 1x  and 2x  is zero. Second, the simple t-test on the 
coefficient 12β  cannot tests the statistical significance of the interaction effect. Third, the 
interaction effect depends on the independent variables. Fourth and last, the interaction effect 
can have different signs for different values of covariates. Thus, the sign of 12β  may not give 
the true sign of the interaction effect. (Ibid:124)  
Stated formally, the interaction effect of 1x  and 2x  on the dependent variable iy  is  
     ( )
21
2
12
,
xx
xF
∆∆
∆
=
β
µ ,             (5.19) 
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which is estimated by  
     ( )
21
2
12
ˆ,ˆ
xx
xF
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∆
=
β
µ ,             (5.20) 
where the function ( )⋅F  is known up to β  and twice continuously differentiable, and βˆ  is a 
consistent estimator of β . These features ensure that also 12µ  and 12µˆ are consistent.  
The asymptotic variance is consistently estimated by 
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where βΩˆ  is a consistent covariance estimator of βˆ . The t-statistic is given by 1212 ˆˆ σµ=t , 
which under some regularity conditions has an asymptotic standard normal distribution. 
(Ibid:125)  
In terms of this study, interaction effects and their true marginal effects of interaction 
variables in a probit model are estimated, when the results obtained with the two-part model 
for the probability and amount of remittances for the whole group of migrants are contrasted 
across genders and destinations of migrants. The results obtained with the tobit and the 
Heckman selection model are not similarly contrasted, as at the moment, true marginal effects 
of interaction variables in nonlinear models may be estimated in Stata 11 only after probit 
estimations.   
5.4. Semiparametric estimation for censored models: CLAD estimator  
The censored least absolute deviations (CLAD) estimation to a regression model where the 
dependent variable is constrained to be non-negative was first developed by James L. Powell 
(1984) as a generalisation of the least absolute deviations estimator (LAD). The CLAD 
estimator is semiparametric, as it is only partly parameterised: the uncensored mean β'ix  is 
parameterised, but the error distribution is not (Cameron and Trivedi 2005:564). As the 
CLAD estimator starts with a similar problem of a left-censored-at-zero linear model for the 
latent variable as the tobit model, which is appropriate for modelling the data on the amount 
of sent remittances, the CLAD estimator is suitable for this purpose, as well.  
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5.4.1. Standard model and its estimation 
In the semiparametric literature, the linear model for the latent variable iii xy εβ +=
'* , which 
is left-censored at zero, is usually written as  
     { }iii xy εβ += 0',0max ,             (5.22) 
where the dependent variable iy  and the independent variable vector ix  are observed for each 
I, while the parameter vector 0β   and the error term iε  are not observed. The definition of the 
LAD estimator starts with the notion that for any scalar random variable Z, the function 
[ ]ZbZE −−  is minimised by choosing b to be a median of the distribution of Z. It is further 
assumed that the error term iε  is continuously distributed and has a median zero, and that the 
density function is positive at zero. What this means is that the median function for iy  takes 
the form ( ) { }0'0 ,0max, ββ ii xxm = . Thus, the probability that 0=iy  when 00' >βix , is less 
than one-half, and the median of iy  is 0
'βix . Conversely, if 00
' ≤βix , the probability that 
0=iy  is more than one-half, and the median of iy  is zero. (Powell 1984:305)  
The CLAD estimator Nβˆ  minimizes the sum of absolute deviations of iy  from { }0',0max βix  
over all β  in parameter space B, or  
     ( ) { }∑
=
−=
N
i
iiN xyN
S
1
',0max1 ββ .               (5.23) 
The existence of the minimum is ensured by the parameter space B being compact. However, 
the behaviour of the regression function 0
'βix  must be restricted to ensure that the LAD 
estimator Nβˆ  is unique for large samples: the censored sample median provides a consistent 
estimate of the population median, if less than a half of the sample is censored. Moreover, the 
independent variables ix  are required not to be collinear for the uncensored observations. 
(Powell 1984:305-6; Cameron and Trivedi 2005:564)  
5.4.2. Assumptions 
To sum up the assumptions made that ensure the consistency of the CLAD estimator Nβˆ , first 
the parameter vector 0β  must be an element of a compact parameter space B. Second, the 
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error terms iε  must be independently and identically distributed, independent of the 
independent variables ix , and have a median zero. Moreover, the distribution function of iε   
must be continuously differentiable with density f  that is positive at zero and bounded above, 
i.e. 
     ( ) 0>> kxf iλ ,             (5.24) 
whenever k<λ , some 0>k , all i. 
Third, the independent variables ix  must be independently distributed random variables with 
0
3 KxE i <  for all I and some positive 0K . Moreover, the smallest characteristic root iv  of 
the matrix 
          ( ) 





≥∑
i
iii xxxN
E '00
'11 εβ             (5.25) 
has 0vvi >  whenever 0NN > , some positive 00 ,vε  and 0N .  
Clearly, the assumptions on the distribution of the error term iε  are much weaker than those 
required for consistency of the maximum likelihood or least squares estimators for the 
censored regression model. Moreover, some of the assumptions made above may even be 
relaxed. It is sufficient that the conditional distribution of iε   given ix   has median zero for all 
I, and the corresponding distribution functions for iε  only need to be continuously 
differentiable in a uniform neighbourhood of zero, with density functions as shown in 
equation (5.25). Importantly, even the assumption of homoskedasticity is not needed for the 
consistency of Nβˆ , as the conditional median of the dependent variable will still be of the 
form { }0',0max βix . Under some further assumptions, Nβˆ  is also asymptotically normal, which 
holds even if the error terms iε  are heteroskedastic. (Powell 1984:307-12). 
The facts that the consistency of the CLAD estimator does not depend on the functional form 
of the error terms, and that it is robust to heteroskedasticity of the error terms iε  makes the 
estimator for the censored regression model an attractive alternative to the sensitive maximum 
likelihood estimator – employed by both the tobit model and the Heckman selection model – 
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which is rendered inconsistent when either non-normality or heteroskedasticity are detected. 
As both of these were indeed detected in this study after the estimation of the tobit model, 
CLAD estimations were carried out. However, the practical estimation proved troublesome 
due to non-convergence, and the estimation could be carried out properly only with the 
Senegalese data. Moreover, the censored sample median would not even have provided a 
consistent estimate of the population median in the case of Uganda, where more than a half of 
the sample is censored. The CLAD estimation of the probability and amount of remittances 
for Senegal are presented in appendix 4 and may be considered as a robustness check to the 
tobit, Heckman selection and two-part model estimates for Senegal discussed in sections 
7.2.1, 7.2.2 and 7.2.3. 
6 Data 
The data used in the empirical estimations comes from Migration and Remittances Household 
surveys conducted as a part of the Africa Migration Project, which was jointly implemented 
by the World Bank and the African Development Bank in 2009 and 2010. The intention of the 
project was to increase the information on, and to increase the development impact of 
migration and remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa. (The World Bank 2011a) Surveys were 
conducted in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda. and covered 
recent migration and remittance trends, housing conditions, household assets and 
expenditures, use of financial services, internal and international migration and remittances 
from former household (and non-household) members, and return migration. A single-round, 
cross-sectional survey was implemented in the above-mentioned six countries, but different 
sampling designs were employed in each of them so as to obtain representative samples of 
households. (Plaza et al. 2011:6-9) The Ugandan, Senegalese and Nigerian survey data may 
be obtained from the World Bank Microdata Catalog (DECDG 2011). 
Uganda, Senegal and Nigeria were chosen for this study, as their samples were the only ones 
that were nationally representative. In section 6.1, the coverage, methodology and sampling 
procedure of the Ugandan, Senegalese and Nigerian surveys are briefly presented. It is also 
discussed how the sampling designs affect the subsequent estimations, and what limitations 
the empirical data used in the estimation has. In section 6.2, the independent and dependent 
variables used in the empirical estimations of this study – the probability and amount of 
remittances, the choice between official and unofficial remittance channels and the choice 
between international and internal migration – are described. Section 6.3 presents some 
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statistical findings made from the estimation samples, and section 6.4 discusses the possible 
threats to the internal validity of the study.  
6.1. Sampling designs of Migration and Remittances Household Surveys  
6.1.1. Ugandan Migration and Remittances Household Survey 
In 2010, Makerere Statistical Consult Limited conducted the Migration and Remittances 
Household Survey in Uganda. Only its main features discussed here, but for a more detailed 
description of the survey methodology, one may refer to the methodological report by 
Makerere Statistical Consult Ltd (2011). The survey data collected in Uganda is 
representative of the whole nation, and as a frame for sample selection, the 2002 Population 
and Housing Census was used – 1,940 households were ultimately selected.  
The sampling frame was subsequently divided into two strata, rural and urban, and a two-
stage stratified sampling was carried out. At the first stage, 200 enumeration areas, i.e. the 
primary sampling units were selected from each stratum, and at the second stage, 10 
households per enumeration area were selected from three strata of households – households 
without migrants, households with internal migrants and households with international 
migrants. Because the enumeration areas were selected proportionally and because 
stratification was employed at both sampling stages, the sample is not self-weighting, so the 
probabilities of households being selected are not equal. To make the sample representative of 
the whole nation, weights were attached to the sampled units at each of the two sampling 
stages, and these weights were multiplied with each other to yield the final household 
weights. (Makerere Statistical Consult Limited 2011:3-7). 
6.1.2. Senegalese Migration and Remittances Household Survey  
The Senegalese Migration and Remittances Household Survey was conducted by Consortium 
pour la Recherche Economique et Social (CRES) in 2009 – for the full methodology report, 
one may refer to the manual composed by the World Bank and CRES (2009). The survey data 
collected from Senegal is nationally representative, and the sampling frame used for the 
survey was the 2002 General Population Census – altogether, 2,100 households were 
interviewed.  
A two-stage stratified sampling design was adopted: at the first stage, 100 census districts, i.e. 
primary sampling units, were selected and they were categorised into six strata, defined by 
whether they had high or low migration, and by whether the region was urban Dakar, other 
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urban or rural. At the second stage, 21 households per census district were selected from three 
strata of households: 7 households without migrants, 7 households with internal migrants and 
7 households with international migrants. The census districts were chosen proportionally, 
and combined with the stratification at both levels of the sampling design, the data needed to 
be weighted to make it nationally representative. (The World Bank and CRES 2009:3-4) 
6.1.3. Nigerian Migration and Remittances Household Survey  
The Nigerian Migration and Remittances and Household Survey was conducted by Zibah 
Consults Ltd in 2009. Due to the sampling procedure of the Nigerian migration and 
remittances household survey being highly complex, only a coarse outline of it is given here – 
for a detailed description of the survey design, one may refer to the methodology report by 
Zibah Consults Ltd (2011). The survey data collected in Nigeria is representative of the whole 
nation, and the sampling frame used in the survey was the 2006 National Population Census – 
2,251 households were successfully interviewed.  
All in all, the sample selection had four stages. At the first stage, 17 states, i.e. primary 
sampling units, were selected from two strata of states with high and low migration rates. For 
the high migration rate stratum, 12 states were randomly selected at the first stage, with one 
state falling into the sample twice; at the second stage, two local government areas were 
randomly selected from each sample state; at the third stage, two enumeration areas were 
randomly selected from each sample local government area. For the low migration rate 
stratum, six states were randomly selected at the first stage; at the second stage, one local 
government area from each sample state were selected; at the third stage, two enumeration 
areas were randomly selected from each sample local government area. At the final stage of 
the sampling, irrespective of the state-level strata, households were selected from three strata 
of households – households without migrants, households with internal migrants and 
households with international migrants – through three different procedures, resulting in 20-
25 or 34 households per enumeration area being selected.  
Both stratification and disproportionate random sampling were employed to ensure that 
households with international migrants were adequately represented in the sample. Thus, the 
sample is not self-weighting, so weights were attached to the sampled units at each sampling 
stage. These four weights were then multiplied with each other to obtain the final sampling 
weight for each sample household and to make the sample nationally representative. The final 
73 
 
sampling weight is the inverse of the probability of a household being selected in the sample 
arising from the sampling design. (Zibah Consultants Ltd 2011:5-7, 15-17, 23-27) 
6.1.4. Effects of sampling designs of Migration and Remittances Household 
Surveys 
Due to the sampling designs adopted in each of the countries under study, the survey data are 
influenced by stratification, cluster sampling, and sampling weights. Each of these features 
affect the way the data should be used in the estimations, and ignoring them may result in bias 
in the estimates and/or their standard errors.  
First, taking stratification into account in estimations can reduce sampling variability 
compared to simple random sampling, whenever the means differ across strata. This is due to 
the strata being statistically independent of one another, making the variance dependant only 
on within-stratum variance, but not on between-stratum variance. It will have the most 
significant effect in making standard errors of estimations smaller when the stratum means are 
different from one another, and when the data is rather homogenous within the strata. (Deaton 
1997:13-4, 49) Despite detecting rather significant differences in means between the different 
strata defined at the first stages of all three sampling designs, due to practical difficulties 
stratification had to be ignored in the estimations of this study, leading possibly to higher 
standard errors, and consequently to more conservative estimates.  
Second, survey data from each of the countries is clustered, meaning that households and 
individuals are not sampled independently. For instance, in the four-stage sample design 
employed in Nigeria, the data is first clustered by states, then by so-called local government 
areas, and then by so-called enumeration areas. It is typical that clustering – in comparison to 
simple random sampling – increases the variance of estimated means and the standard errors 
of the least squares regression, since households within clusters tend to be similar to each 
other in their relevant features. In consequence, standard errors are scaled upwards and t-
values downwards, producing more conservative estimates compared to an estimation 
ignoring the cluster design. (Deaton 1997:52, 74-5) Thus, the clustering by different 
administrative areas at the first stages of the three sampling designs – in Uganda by 
enumeration areas, in Senegal by districts, and in Nigeria by states – is taken into account in 
the estimations by using clustered standard errors that relax the assumption of independence 
of observations within the clusters. The usage of these standard errors entails also the usage of 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (Baum 2006:138).  
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Finally, due to disproportionate sampling, each surveyed household in each of the countries 
under study represents a different number of households in the population, i.e. has a different 
sampling weight attached to it. By weighting the sample data, the sample design is “undone”: 
each group of households is properly represented, and unbiased estimates of means matching 
the population are obtained. Also the standard errors are affected by weighting. (Deaton 
1997:15, 48) However, there are different opinions about whether these sampling weights 
should be taken into account in estimations. Even though the case can be made that weighting 
should be ignored in regressions due to the weighted estimator often being inconsistent, 
sampling weights are taken into account in the estimations of this study: Referring to Kish 
and Frankel (1974), Deaton (1997:66-73) states that if the regression function itself is the 
main object of interest, and if it mainly attempts to study the relationships between variables 
by looking at some variable mean conditional on others, then weights should be used. This is 
indeed the case in this study. 
6.1.5. Limitations of data 
Due to the wide sample coverage of the surveys, and the careful sampling procedures, the data 
may be expected to be of rather high quality and to represent the Ugandan, the Senegalese and 
the Nigerian population well. However, Plaza et al. (2011:14) point out that sampling error 
may be of an issue, and there might be biases in the samples achieved, which occur if a 
section of the population is under-represented, or if some questions are not answered by a 
large proportion of people. Moreover, in terms of the Nigerian survey, Zibah Consultants Ltd 
(2011:27) note that there are both sampling and non-sampling errors present, arising from 
incorrect information given by the respondents, interviewer errors and data entry errors. In 
Uganda, some of the households selected could not be visited, and some households provided 
only incomplete information (Makere Statistical Consult Limited 2011:12). Lastly, the 
amount of detail about some topics may not be that high, as the surveys were not intended to 
provide “economic” statistics (Plaza et al. 2011:14). 
In terms of this study, this last issue is particularly evident: for instance, there is no data on 
the income of migrants or households, which are often the key determinants of remittances. It 
should also be noted that migrants themselves were not interviewed, but their former 
household members. Further, the occurrence of missing values for some variables is rather 
frequent, and the possibility of imprecise information undermine the representativeness and 
quality of the underlying data, as well as the internal validity of the estimations. The internal 
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validity may be weakened by several other factors, as well, which are discussed in more detail 
in section 6.4. 
6.2. Variables used in estimations 
As regards the data used in estimations, data on only household member migrants is utilised – 
the Migration and Remittances Household Surveys contain data on non-household member 
migrants and their remittances, as well – as the intention of this study’s estimations is to 
examine the determinants of remittances in a familial context. Many of the variables used in 
the estimations were not readily available in the data but needed to be constructed from other 
variables by the author, for instance by transforming variables with several discrete 
alternatives into a group of binary variables.  
In section 6.2.1, the estimation of the probability and amount of remittances is discussed: the 
dependent and the independent variables, as well as the identification variable of the 
Heckman selection model are elaborated on and justified, and the specifications of different 
models are presented. In section 6.2.2 and 6.2.3, the same is done for the estimations of the 
choice between official and unofficial remittance channels, and of the choice between 
international and internal migration, respectively. 
The variables used in the empirical analyses of this study are defined, and their non-weighted 
sample summary statistics are presented in appendix 1. It should be noted that from some of 
the households in each of the countries under study, data on more than one migrant was 
collected. Thus, some households appear in the data more than once.  
6.2.1. Estimation of probability and amount of remittances 
6.2.1.1. Dependent variables 
In the models for the probability and amount of remittances, the continuous dependent 
variable in the tobit model, in the Heckman selection model’s outcome equation and in the 
two-part model’s second equation is the logarithm of the amount of monetary remittances sent 
to the household during the preceding 12 months (named log amount remitted) – measured in 
each country’s local currency – and it does not include the value of in-kind remittances. As 
the linear non-zero amount of remittances has a highly skewed distribution, the logarithmic 
scale produces a more symmetric distribution and is more likely to have a normal error 
distribution. This is ultimately not the case, however. In the Heckman selection model’s 
participation equation and in the two-part model’s first equation, a binary dependent variable 
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indicating whether the migrant has sent any remittances during the preceding 12 months is 
used (named sends money).  
Estimations in which the continuous dependent variable included the value of in-kind 
remittances were also carried out: the results were rather similar to the estimates obtained 
with only monetary remittances, both in terms of the sign and the magnitude of the estimates 
as well as their significance levels, giving robustness to the estimations. Still, the value of in-
kind remittances was left out from the final estimations, as estimating this value over the 
course of 12 months is likely to be rather imprecise. In general, however, the information 
obtained with household surveys give a better picture of the true amount of remittances than 
official statistics, which record remittances sent only through official channels. 
6.2.1.2. Independent variables 
 
Migrant-related variables 
The independent variables appearing in the estimations may be divided into migrant- and 
recipient household-related variables. The migrant-related independent variables appearing in 
all estimations, with their names in parentheses, indicate the migrant’s age (age), whether he 
is male (sex), whether he is married (married), whether he lives alone (lives alone), whether 
he is the son or daughter of the household head at home (son), whether he is employed 
(employed), how long his migration has lasted (duration), whether he migrated for work 
(reason), and where he originated from (origin state/region). There are 17 origin states for 
Nigerian migrants, and 11 and 5 origin regions for Senegalese and Ugandan migrants, 
respectively. In addition, there are three migrant-related characteristics that are each described 
with four indicator variables, of which one acts as the reference group and is left out of the 
specifications to avoid exact multicollinearity. These variables indicate the level of schooling 
the migrant has completed (primary, secondary and tertiary – reference group has no 
education), the level of his occupation (professional, service and agriculture & crafts – 
reference group works in elementary occupations) and where he is currently residing (OECD, 
Africa and urban Uganda/Senegal/Nigeria – reference group resides in rural 
Uganda/Senegal/Nigeria).  
As mentioned in section 6.1.5, the data contains no information on the income level of the 
migrant, which is crucial in determining the probability and amount of remittances. Hence, 
some of the abovementioned independent variables need to act as proxies for this income. 
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Referring to the standard human capital model, in Agarwal and Horowitz’s (2002) study the 
migrant’s income is proxied with several variables indicating his education, the duration of 
his migration, his country of residence, and his gender. Also de la Brière et al. (2002:319) use 
a similar approach by referring to Mincer’s (1974) earnings function, and proxy the migrant’s 
income and asset position with the migrant’s gender, his age, his age squared, his education, 
the time he has spent in the migration location, the time he has spent in the migration location 
squared, a dummy variable indicating whether he is residing in the US, and a dummy variable 
for whether he has dependent children in his current country of residence. The usage of the 
last variable is explained by the fact that if the migrant has children in his current country of 
residence, the migrant is likely to divide his income between providing for his children and 
sending remittances back home (de la Brière et al. 2002:319). 
Following these lines, variables age, sex, lives alone, duration, primary, secondary, tertiary, 
OECD, Africa and urban Uganda/Senegal/Nigeria are used as proxies for the migrant’s 
income, which is expected to increase from the effect of these proxies. In addition, as it could 
be expected that income depends positively on employment and occupation, variables 
employed and professional, service, and agriculture & crafts are used as additional proxies 
for the migrant’s income. The effects of all of these variables may thus be interpreted as an 
indicator of the effect that the migrant’s income has on remittances. To note, specifications in 
which the migrant’s age and the duration of his migration were in their level and squared 
forms were also tested, but the coefficients of the squared terms were insignificant and mostly 
of the incorrect sign, and were thus left out of the final specification. The addition of the 
squared terms would have described how the migrant’s work experience in his migration 
location might have been related to his income in an inverse U-shaped manner. This, in turn, 
could have produced a similar relationship between these variables and the remittances he 
sends – however, this was not the case. 
In addition to their effects through the migrant’s income, the individual effects of some of the 
above-mentioned proxies should also be examined, as they are important indicators of some 
of the motives for remitting. Such are the variable duration, and those relating to the 
education level of the migrant: with the former, the presence of the altruistic and the insurance 
motive may be detected and distinguished from one another, while the latter group of 
variables is an important indicator of, and may distinguish between, the exchange and the 
investment motive.  
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Moreover, in the spirit of Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), the variable employed could 
also be seen as a proxy for the income risk the migrant is facing, and indicate whether the 
migrant attempts to insure himself with remittances. The authors predict that a migrant facing 
a lower income risk remits less than one facing a higher income risk, as the latter tries to 
ensure that he will receive support from his family back home in case he needs to return. 
Alternatively, remittances motivated by self-insurance may be accumulated as savings in the 
migrant’s home country that they can tap on in times of income insecurity.   
Recipient household-related variables 
The recipient household-related variables present in the estimations indicate the number of 
household members in the recipient household (size of HH), whether the recipient household 
owns any land or buildings (assets) and the recipient household’s expenditure during the last 
six months (expenditure). This expenditure is expressed in logarithms of local currency, 
includes expenditure on clothing and footwear, household appliances, mobile phone/internet 
bills, utilities, education, health, rent and loan/mortgage repayment, and excludes all more 
irregular purchases such as computers, luxury goods, weddings, land, housing and home 
improvement. While the size of the household acts mainly as a control variable, the recipient 
household’s assets are an important indicator of the inheritance motive. As there is no data on 
the long-run income of the recipient household, a proxy for it is the recipient household’s 
expenditure during the past six months. The recipient household’s income is a particularly 
important indicator of the exchange and investment motives. Whether the latter explains 
remittance behaviour of migrants is tested with separate estimations where the expenditure 
appears in its level and squared form in order to capture its U-shaped relationship to the 
dependent variable predicted by the investment motive (Rapoport and Docquier 2006:1159).  
Moreover, with the Senegalese data, variables indicating the number of international migrants 
from the same household (international migrants), the number of international migrants from 
the same household squared (international migrants^2) and whether the migrant received 
funding for his migration from his parents (parental funding) are included in an additional 
specification for the probability and amount of remittances. While the number of other 
migrants tests for the presence of the inheritance motive, the effect of parental funding on 
remittances gives insight into whether migrants are motivated by investment considerations 
and repaying the costs of their migration. Estimations testing the effect of the number of 
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internal migrants from the same household were also carried out, but it did not have a 
statistically significant impact on the probability or amount of remittances.  
With the Nigerian data, variables that indicate the level of the recipient household member’s 
occupation (professional HH member, service HH member and agriculture & crafts HH 
member), the level of schooling he has completed (primary HH member, secondary HH 
member and tertiary HH member) and whether he is employed (employed HH member) are 
included in an additional specification for the probability and amount of remittances. Each of 
these variables act as further proxies for the recipient household’s income. Even if this 
interviewed household member is not the primary recipient of the migrant’s remittances, it is 
likely that the presence of professionals or highly educated household members in the 
household, and their presumably higher income, affect the whole household’s income, and 
thus is likely to be accounted for by the migrant when he makes his remittance decision. 
Moreover, there is no data on any adverse short-run shocks on parental income, or variables 
that could acts as proxies of these shocks. Thus, their effect on remittances cannot be tested, 
which would be of value especially considering the hypotheses arising from the insurance 
motive. However, variable employed HH member found in the Nigerian data can be used as 
an indicator of the recipient household’s income risk, and its effect on remittances may signal 
whether the migrant and the recipient household have an insurance contract between them: if 
a household member is employed, i.e. the household does not face a severe income risk, under 
the insurance motive the household should receive less remittances.  
Interaction variables 
After the estimations of the probability and amount of remittances for all migrants, the two-
part model estimations are contrasted across genders and destinations of migrants, as it is 
reasonable to expect that migrants are heterogeneous, and different groups of migrants differ 
in their motives for remittances. To compare male and female migrants’ remittance behaviour, 
a dummy variable characterising male migrants, named male instead of sex for clarity, is 
interacted with variables OECD, tertiary, employed, assets of HH and expenditure of HH. The 
resulting interaction variables, named male*OECD, male*tertiary, male*employed, 
male*assets of HH and male*expenditure of HH, are then added to the “base specification” of 
the two-part model reviewed in section 6.2.1.4. Similarly, the possible difference in motives 
for remitting of between migrants residing in OECD countries and those residing in other 
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countries was separately examined with interaction variables named OECD*male, 
OECD*tertiary, OECD*employed, OECD*assets of HH and OECD*expenditure of HH.  
The variables tertiary, employed, assets of HH and expenditure of HH are chosen to be 
interacted because they are important signals of the various motives for remitting, as 
explained in chapter 2. It should be noted, however, that the specific prediction of the 
investment motive, i.e. the inverse U-shaped relationship between the recipient household’s 
expenditure (income) and remittances, cannot be meaningfully tested for in the specifications 
including the interaction variables. 
As elaborated on in section 5.3.3, in nonlinear models such as the probit, tobit, and Heckman 
selection model, the interpretation of interaction variables is not exactly straightforward, since 
the marginal effect of changing just the interaction variable does not equal the marginal effect 
of a change in both interacted variables. There is a way of handling this issue with probit 
models in Stata 11, enabling the inspection of the true interaction effects through the two-part 
model consisting of a separate probit and OLS estimation. (Norton et al. 2004:154-5) 
However, this is not the case, yet, with the tobit model and the Heckman selection model. To 
note, estimations were also performed by splitting the sample according to the gender and to 
the destination of the migrant, but this approach has the drawback of unreliable estimates due 
to the smaller sample size, and does not test properly the behavioural models behind different 
groups of migrants. 
6.2.1.3. Identification variable of Heckman selection model 
The identification variable of the Heckman selection model warrants some discussion. As 
mentioned in section 5.2.2, the model needs to be identified by having at least one variable in 
the participation equation that does not enter the outcome equation. This variable should 
affect significantly only the decision on whether to remit, and not the decision on the amount 
remitted. While such a variable is difficult to determine using theory, several alternatives were 
tested based on suggestions made in previous studies employing the Heckman selection 
model.  
The identifying variable chosen for this study is a binary variable indicating whether the 
migration has lasted for more than one year (duration > 1 year). This variable is used by 
Hoddinott (1992) and Agarwal and Horowitz (2002), who propose that it may take time for 
the migrant to settle in the new host country, resulting in a lag in the remittance flow 
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initiation. While this non-theoretical justification seems plausible in itself, the variable enters 
the participation equation significantly in the case of Senegal and Nigeria, and nearly 
significantly in the case of Uganda. Moreover, it did not affect the amount remitted 
statistically significantly, when included in an OLS estimation of the positive amount of 
remittances.  
Other identifying variables tested were binary variables for migrant living alone and for being 
the household head (see e.g. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006), and the origin state/region of 
the migrant (see e.g. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; Gubert 2002; Hoddinott 1992). A 
theoretical justification for the latter would be that the origin region of the migrant indirectly 
captures the transactions costs of remitting funds, as money transfer fees or travelling 
expenses associated with officially and unofficially sent remittances, respectively, vary with 
the geographic location of the recipient household (Gubert 2002:277, 286) While these 
identification variables entered some of the participation equations significantly, according to 
the Bayesian information criterion, having the duration variable as the identifying variable 
gives the best fit of the model for the Senegalese and Nigerian data.  
6.2.1.4. Empirical specifications 
The form of the specifications that follow conforms with, where possible, the list of variables 
in table 1, which summarises the predictions of models for motives for remitting. Starting 
with the specification of the tobit model, the “base specification” estimated in sections 7.1.1, 
7.2.1 and 7.3.1 for Uganda, Senegal and Nigeria, respectively, may be written as  
log amount remitted = α + β1*migrant’s income + β2*migrant’s education  
+ β3*time since arrival +  β4*migrant’s income risk + β5*control variables  
+ β6*recipient household’s income + β7*recipient household’s assets + ε, 
The dependent variable of the specification is continuous and indicates the logarithmic 
amount of remittances. The independent variables included in the specification, and their 
interpretation as proxies, are elaborated on in section 6.2.1.2.  
In terms of the Heckman selection model, the specification for the probability of remitting, 
i.e. for the participation equation is the following: 
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sends money = α + β1*migrant’s income + β2*migrant’s education + β3*time since arrival  
+ β4*migrant’s income risk + β5*control variables + β6*recipient household’s income  
+ β7*recipient household’s assets + θ*duration > 1 year + ε, 
where the identification variable duration > 1 year is utilised, and the dependent variable is 
binary indicating whether or not the migrant sends remittances. The outcome equation is 
specified similarly as the one for the tobit model: 
log amount remitted = α + β1*migrant’s income + β2*migrant’s education  
+ β3*time since arrival +  β4*migrant’s income risk + β5*control variables  
+ β6*recipient household’s income + β7*recipient household’s assets + ε. 
The equation specifications of the two-part model are the same as those of the Heckman 
selection model, but in the two-part model the variable duration > 1 year is not included in 
the first equation. As mentioned in section 6.2.1.2, additional specifications were estimated 
with the Senegalese and Nigerian data, but as they only add a few variables to the base 
specifications described above, it is not necessary to present these specifications here. 
6.2.2. Estimation of choice between official and unofficial remittance channels 
6.2.2.1. Dependent variable 
In the probit model for the choice between official and unofficial remittance channels, the 
binary dependent variable indicates whether or not the migrant used official channels for 
remitting (named channel). The channels regarded as official include the following: Western 
Union, Moneygram, other money transfer operators, postal money orders, direct transfers to 
bank account, banks, Forex, credit unions, and travel agencies. If the migrant sent remittances 
through informal individual agents, through friends or relatives, through couriers, brought 
remittances back home himself, or used a mobile phone, a pre-paid card, the internet or some 
other means for remitting, the channel was regarded as unofficial.  
Studies on the use of remittance channels reviewed in section 3.2 use a multinomial logit 
model, in which the dependent variable contains several discrete alternatives of remittance 
channels. This approach is not employed in this study for two reasons. First, the 17 different 
remittance channels recorded by the household surveys could not be plausibly grouped into 
three or more groups: either some channels would have had to be dropped altogether from the 
estimations, or a group of “other channels” would have become disproportionately large. The 
most reasonable grouping, and the grouping used in this study is therefore based on whether 
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the channels are considered to be official or not. Second, as there is no data on the 
characteristics of the different remittance channels, it is possible to examine only the effects 
of different migrant- and recipient household-related characteristics on the choice between 
these channels in the estimations. Thus, as there are no other known factors that could 
distinguish between the different remittance channels, the distinction between official and 
unofficial remittance channels must suffice in terms of examining the effects of migrant- and 
recipient household-related independent variables. 
6.2.2.2. Independent variables 
It is likely that similar independent variables as used in the estimation of the probability and 
amount of remittances determine the choice between official and unofficial remittance 
channels. The variables chosen also reflect the theoretical framework for remittance channels 
described in chapter 3. 
The independent variables in the estimation of the choice between official and unofficial 
remittance channels are precisely the same as those used in the estimation of the probability 
and amount of remittances, elaborated on in section 6.2.1.2. It is expected that the choice is 
affected by both migrant- and recipient household-related characteristics – especially by both 
the migrant’s and the recipient household’s incomes. As using official remittance channels 
usually entails costs or other requirements set by different remittance service providers, either 
the migrant or the recipient household may be excluded from using these channels in case 
their incomes are low (see e.g. Ngugi and Sennoga 2011:260; Agu 2011:209-10).  
Thus, attention should be paid to the effects of variables that act as proxies for the migrant’s 
and the recipient household’s incomes, discussed in section 6.2.1.2. In addition to the proxies 
of the recipient household’s income, variable assets of HH may also be considered as one, as 
it is likely to be positively correlated with the recipient household’s income. Moreover, at 
least in the context of Uganda it has been found that international remittances are usually sent 
through official channels: thus, the individual effects of variables OECD and Africa – not just 
the effects they have through their relationship with the migrant’s income – are of special 
interest, as well (Ngugi and Sennoga 2011:250). Also the hypotheses of Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo (2005:559-60) regarding the individual effects of different migrant- and recipient-
household characteristics mentioned in section 3.1 should be kept in mind when examining 
the estimation results. 
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In these estimations, differences between male and female migrants, or between international 
and internal migrants, are not inspected as is done in the estimations of the probability and 
amount of remittances. First, it is not clear which independent variables should have been 
chosen to be interacted in the way explained in section 6.2.1.2. Second, splitting the 
estimation sample into two according to the gender or the destination of the migrant would 
have resulted in unreliable estimates due to small sample size.  
6.2.2.3. Empirical specification 
Referring to the discussion in the previous section, the following specification is meant to 
highlight the effects to which specific attention should be paid when examining the estimation 
results in chapter 7. Thus, the probit model specification for the choice between remitting 
through official and unofficial channels may be expressed as  
channel = α + β1*migrant’s income + β2*migrant’s destination + β3*control variables  
+ β4*recipient household’s income + ε. 
To sum up, the dependent variable is binary and indicates whether the migrant resorts to 
official or unofficial remittance channels. The independent variables in the specification 
should be interpreted as described in the previous section.  
6.2.3. Estimation of choice between international and internal migration 
6.2.3.1. Dependent variable 
In the probit model for the choice between international and internal migration, the binary 
dependent variable indicates whether the migrant is sent abroad, i.e. to OECD or African 
countries, or to urban or rural parts of his home country (destination). Estimations in which 
the dependent variable indicated whether the migrant is sent to an OECD country or to an 
African country, including his home country, were also carried out, but their results were 
rather similar to the ones presented, and are not thus reported. Estimating a multinomial probit 
model, with which a choice between more than two alternative destinations could have een 
examined, could have also been possible, but the estimations could not be carried out due to 
non-convergence. 
6.2.3.2. Independent variables 
Regarding the estimation of the choice between international and internal migration, the 
variables are almost the same as those used in the estimation of the probability and amount of 
remittances, but the interpretation of some of them differs slightly from what has been stated 
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earlier. These interpretations, and the choice of the variables altogether, is guided by the 
model of migration decisions developed in chapter 4. 
Quite naturally, the independent variables in the specification do not contain the variables 
indicating the migrant’s current residence, as they form the dependent variable. Thus, 
variables age, sex, lives alone, duration, primary, secondary, tertiary, employed, professional, 
service and agriculture & crafts act as proxies for the migrant’s expected, in contrast to his 
actual, income. Especially the variable duration and those depicting the migrant’s occupation 
need to considered as potential, or intended states of the migrant, since the duration of 
migration nor the occupation of the migrant may not be known ex ante.  
As mentioned in chapter 4, the variables indicating the migrant’s education may reflect the 
possibly disparate chances of finding work, and the possibly disparate returns to education 
between different skill groups of migrants. These may be different depending on the migrant’s 
country of residence, as well. Also variables employed and reason should be interpreted in the 
light of the household’s perception of the migrant’s chances of finding work in his destination 
country. In terms of variable reason, if the migrant intends to work or search for work in the 
destination country, it is likely that he is sent to a location where the household perceives this 
to be most likely. In addition, the variable gives an indication of whether the migration of a 
household member is even considered as a way for the household to earn supplementary 
income in the form of remittances: this is likely to be the case when the migrant is sent 
outside the household to work. 
In turn, the recipient household’s expenditure still is a proxy for its income, but more 
specifically it reflects the household’s need for supplementary income in the form of 
remittances. The same goes for the variable size of HH, which is also related to the likelihood 
of sending a migrant outside the household in the first place, as discussed in section 4.2. Also 
the variable assets of HH is likely to demonstrate its effect, if any, through its presumably 
positive correlation with the recipient household’s income.  
In the specifications for Senegal and Nigeria, a couple of additional variables are included in 
the specifications. In the case of Senegal, variables international migrants and internal 
migrants indicate the number of other migrants residing abroad and in Senegal, respectively. 
It could be expected that the migrant is more likely sent abroad, if there already are migrants 
from the same household residing abroad. This may especially be the case if the household 
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intends to send the migrant to the same location as the previous one(s), as he would then have 
an existing social network to help him adjust to the new environment.   
In the case of Nigeria, variables primary in HH, secondary in HH, tertiary in HH, 
professional in HH, service in HH and agriculture & crafts in HH indicate the household’s 
education and occupation level. As mentioned in section 4.2, these variables are likely to 
affect the likelihood of the household sending a migrant in the first place, but they also reflect 
household’s need for supplementary income, i.e. remittances: as the levels of education and 
occupation tend to correlate positively with earnings, it could be expected that households 
with highly educated members, or members in professional level occupations are more able to 
sustain themselves and escape from destitution than households with less qualified members. 
In these estimations, differences between male and female migrants are not inspected as is 
done in the estimations of the probability and amount of remittances. First, it is not clear 
which independent variables should have been chosen to be interacted in the way explained in 
section 6.2.1.2. Second, splitting the estimation sample into two according to the gender of 
the migrant would have resulted in unreliable estimates due to small sample size. 
6.2.3.3. Empirical specification 
The probit model specification for the choice between international and internal migration 
may be expressed as  
destination = α + β1*migrant’s expected income + β2*migrant’s potential occupation  
+ β3*potential duration of migration + β4* likelihood of employment  
+ β5*control variables + β6*recipient household’s income + ε.  
In sum, the dependent variable is binary indicating whether the migrant is sent abroad or to 
another location within his home country. The independent variables and their interpretation 
are as described in the previous section, and those with a special interpretation have been 
brought to the fore in the specification. As mentioned, the specifications for Senegal and 
Nigeria include a few additional variables, but it is not necessary to present them separately.  
6.3. Characteristics of migrants and recipient households 
Table 2 summarises some of the main characteristics of migrants and recipient households in 
Uganda, Senegal and Nigeria, broken down by the destination country of migrants. The 
calculations are made by the author and are based on the Migration and Remittances 
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Household Survey data on Uganda, Senegal and Nigeria, and more particularly, on the 
samples used in the empirical estimations. In appendix 1, definitions and general summary 
statistics – means, standard deviations, maxima, minima and number of observations – are 
given for all variables used in the empirical estimations, except for the variables indicating the 
migrant’s origin state/region. The averages and proportions are unweighted, so they cannot be 
interpreted as statistics representing the entire population of the respective countries.  
Regarding table 2, it should first be noted that migration from Uganda, Senegal and Nigeria is 
primarily internal, and only from Senegal, more than a half migrate abroad. Interestingly, 
migration from Senegal and Nigeria to other African countries is less popular than migration 
to OECD countries. However, it should be remembered that the household surveys 
oversampled households with international migrants. In terms of migrant characteristics, 
migrants from all countries residing in OECD countries are slightly older on average than 
migrants residing in Africa, and especially Senegalese and Nigerian migrants are 
predominantly male. Regarding the migrants’ education level, most Ugandan and Nigerian 
migrants residing in OECD countries have completed either tertiary or secondary level 
education, while over a half of Senegalese migrants residing in OECD countries have not 
completed either of these.  
These differences in education levels are likely to be reflected also in the employment 
patterns of migrants residing in OECD countries: while about 77 percent of Ugandan and 
Nigerian migrants are employed, and 36 and 68 percent of them work in professional level 
occupations, respectively, 70 percent of Senegalese migrants are employed, and only 12 
percent of them work in professional level occupations. What is slightly peculiar, however, is 
that even though Nigerian migrants seem to fare really well employment- and occupation-
wise, only 45-63 percent of them migrated for work or search for one. 
When it comes to the characteristics of the recipient household, the large households in 
Senegal first catches the eye – these are mainly due to polygamy. However, the household 
size does not seem to vary much according to the destinations of migrants. There are no 
significant differences in the asset holdings of households with migrants in different 
destinations, but there are, however, quite distinct differences in the long-run expenditure of 
households: especially, households with migrants residing in an OECD country spend almost 
three times as much as households with migrants remaining in Uganda or Nigeria, and about 
two times as much as households with migrants who remain in Senegal. As the household’s 
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expenditure is a proxy for household’s income, this latter finding indicates that wealthier 
households are more likely to send migrants abroad than poorer ones, as the former have the 
liquidity required to fund long-distance migration. 
In terms of recipient household data available only for Nigeria or Senegal, interestingly, if a 
Nigerian migrant resides in an OECD country, it is more likely that at least one of his 
household members is highly educated or works in a professional occupation than if the 
migrant is residing in an African country, or in urban regions of Nigeria. Thus, the education 
and occupation levels of the household seem to affect international migration positively. In 
Senegal, about 70 percent of households have more than one migrant, regardless of the 
destination of the migrant under study. Not surprisingly, parents fund migrations to OECD 
countries more often than to closer destinations within Africa, as the costs of migration tend 
to rise with distance from home. 
Regarding the channels used for remitting, the data clearly indicates that the proportion of 
migrants using unofficial channels depends on where the remittances are sent from: while 
only 8-20 percent of all migrants residing in OECD countries use unofficial channels such as 
friends or couriers for remitting, as much as 80 percent of Senegalese migrants remaining in 
Senegal remit informally. This result is quite natural: visits back home by migrants or their 
friends are likely to be much cheaper and thus more frequent when the distance is shorter. 
Combined with the fact that migrants residing in OECD countries send larger remittances, 
also the relatively better security of official channels may be more important to these migrants 
than for migrants sending smaller remittances domestically. 
There are some differences between countries of origin and between destination countries of 
migrants in terms of the proportion of migrants sending remittances, and the amounts they 
send. Firstly, migrants from all countries residing in OECD countries are more likely to remit 
than migrants residing within Africa. However, only about half of Ugandan migrants residing 
in OECD countries remit, while the proportion is around 70 and 80 percent in Nigeria and 
Senegal, respectively. Secondly, migrants from all countries residing in OECD countries 
remit more – conditional on that they remit at all – than migrants residing within Africa. 
Nigerian migrants in OECD countries stand out as the ones remitting the most on average, 
around $2,600 in the previous 12 months, while Ugandan migrants within Uganda send only 
approximately $161 on average. These differences are likely to reflect the different wages 
paid to migrants in different destination countries. 
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  Table 2. Characteristics of migrants and recipient  
                households by migration destination 
Characteristics/destination      Uganda Senegal Nigeria 
     
Destination (%)     
OECD  7 30 17 
Africa  11 18 6 
Internal  81 47 75 
     
Age (average)     
OECD  31 38 33 
Africa  30 36 28 
Internal  28 33 27 
     
Gender (% male)    
OECD  56 79 71 
Africa  66 86 75 
Internal  53 75 61 
     
Education (% tertiary)   
OECD  58 16 58 
Africa  24 5 28 
Internal  17 14 28 
     
Education (% secondary)   
OECD  28 30 39 
Africa  26 14 47 
Internal  22 19 45 
     
Employed (%)    
OECD  77 70 77 
Africa  69 82 73 
Internal  51 67 59 
     
Profession (% professional)   
OECD  36 12 68 
Africa  20 5 46 
Internal  14 15 45 
     
Reason (% work)   
OECD  85 76 54 
Africa  80 84 63 
Internal  62 65 45 
     
Number of HH members  
OECD  5 12 6 
Africa  5 12 5 
Internal  6 11 6 
 
           Table 2. continued 
Characteristics/destination Uganda Senegal Nigeria 
     
HH owns assets (% yes)   
OECD  83 95 88 
Africa  80 97 82 
Internal  90 96 85 
     
HH long-run expenditure ($US)   
OECD  1433 1020 724 
Africa  458 502 588 
Internal  495 501 264 
     
Education in HH (% tertiary)   
OECD    36 
Africa    22 
Internal    19 
     
Profession in HH (% professional)  
OECD    46 
Africa    33 
Internal    29 
     
More than one migrant from HH (%)  
OECD   70  
Africa   68  
Internal   69  
     
Migration funded by parents (%)  
OECD   59  
Africa   39  
Internal   43  
     
Channel (% unofficial)   
OECD  8 11 20 
Africa  41 36 33 
Internal  79 80 54 
     
Migrant remitted (% yes)   
OECD  49 78 72 
Africa  32 64 45 
Internal  25 56 44 
     
Amount remitted ($US)  
OECD  1730 1749 2590 
Africa  557 834 1083 
Internal  161 549 431 
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6.4. Threats to internal validity  
When estimated coefficients of variables in a regression are unbiased and consistent and their 
standard errors yield confidence intervals with the desired confidence level, a study based on 
the analysis of this regression is said to be internally valid. What might render a study 
internally invalid are omitted variable bias, misspecification of the functional form of the 
regression function, sample selection, simultaneous causality, and errors in variables (Stock 
and Watson 2007:316). Some of these points have arisen in the above sections, but here, first 
four of them are elaborated on from the point of view of the validity of the estimations. The 
errors in variables and where they arise from is explained in section 6.1.5.  
6.4.1. Omitted variables 
Omitted variables bias arises when the regression does not include a variable that is both the 
determinant of the dependent variable, and is correlated with one or more of the included 
independent variables. When it comes to determinants of the probability and amount of 
remittances, such variables are, most importantly, the migrant’s and the recipient household’s 
income: both of them are likely to correlate with their proxies mentioned in section 6.2.1.2, 
and are highly likely to affect remittances. Other omitted variables are those depicting shocks 
to the recipient household’s income, such as community-level information on droughts or 
floods, which could affect remittances through the insurance motive, and be correlated with 
the recipient household’s expenditure.  
Also variables related to the migrant’s community back home, or to his status and community 
in his current country of residence would be of interest. Examples of the home-community 
characteristics could be the migrant’s community membership (Massey and Basem 1992) or 
the social prestige of the migrant’s clan (Azam and Gubert 2005): these could both determine 
remittances and be correlated with the migrant’s state or region of origin. In turn, Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2006) study the effects on remittances of a variety of variables related to 
the migrant’s status and community in his country of residence, such as his legal status, fringe 
benefits on his job, duration of his work experience and the extent of his social networks – 
these are likely to correlate with the overall duration of the migration and with the migrant’s 
occupation, for instance.   
Not only could the inclusion of the above-mentioned omitted variables improve the internal 
validity of the analysis, but they would also extend its scope and provide valuable insight into 
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several aspects of the context remittances occur in. However, due to lack of specific enough 
data, these kinds of variables, or instruments for them, could not be constructed. In terms of 
the migrant’s and the recipient household’s incomes, proxies have to be relied upon, as 
discussed in section 5.2.1.2. 
Also the model for the choice of between official and unofficial remittance channels may 
suffer from omitted variable bias arising from the lack of variables describing the relative 
prices and other characteristics of the different remittance channels, such as their speed, 
reliability and convenience: studies mentioned in section 3.2 have found that these factors 
clearly affect the choice between different channels, and they are also likely to be associated 
with the migrant’s country of residence. Even though an effort has been made by the World 
Bank (2012b) to measure and record the prices of using different official channels in distinct 
remittance corridors, in terms of the countries under study, data is still lacking: for 
remittances from Nigeria and Uganda, no price data exists, and for remittances from Senegal, 
price data has been recorded only for the corridor Senegal-Mali. In addition, there is no 
variable nor data describing the recipient household’s access to different remittance channels, 
such as data on the relative rurality of the household: as mentioned in section 3.2, several 
studies have found this to be an important determinant of the choice between remittance 
channels, and it is likely to be correlated with the origin state or region of the migrant. 
Similarly, from the specification for the choice between international and internal migration 
variables might be omitted. Such variables are a measure of the relative costs of migrating to 
different countries, and a measure of the relative chance of getting employed in different 
countries. While both of the variables may determine the choice of the migration destination, 
the cost of remitting may be associated with the origin state or region of the migrant, and the 
chance of getting employed with the migrant’s education and the level of occupation he is 
aiming to work at. However, these kinds of measures, or plausible instruments for them, could 
not be found or obtained, or could only be crudely estimated, which is why they are absent 
from the estimations. 
6.4.2. Misspecification of functional form of regression function 
It could be possible that the functional form of the estimated regression function is different 
from the true functional form of the population regression function, in which case the 
estimator of the partial effect of change in one of the independent variables will often be 
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biased. In terms of this study, in the models for the probability and amount of remittances, 
this situation could arise from two sources.  
Firstly, as mentioned in section 6.2.1.2, wage theory implies that the effects of the migrant’s 
age and the duration of his migration may have an inverse U-shaped relationship to the 
probability and amount of remittances, in which case also the squared terms of these 
independent variables should be included in the estimated specification. In addition, related to 
the investment motive, a similar relationship may exist between the recipient household’s 
long-run income, proxied by its long-run expenditure, and remittances.  
To address these possibilities, the data on the migrant’s age, on the duration of his migration, 
and on the recipient household’s expenditure were each plotted in turn against the amount of 
remittances. In addition, specifications including the squared terms of these variables were 
estimated. However, neither of these efforts provided support for the inclusion of the squared 
terms to the “base specifications” described in section 6.2.1.4, and the relationship of these 
variables to remittances is more likely to be linear.  
Secondly, misspecification could arise from the wrong logarithmic transformation of the 
continuous dependent variable, i.e. the amount of remittances. As mentioned in section 
6.2.1.1, the amount of remittances is expressed in its logarithmic form due to the linear non-
zero amount of remittances having a highly skewed distribution – the logarithmic scale 
produces a more symmetric distribution and is more likely to have a normal error distribution. 
The same applies to the independent variable indicating the recipient household’s long-run 
expenditure, which is also transformed to its logarithm. 
6.4.3. Sample selection 
Sample selection bias becomes a problem when data availability is influenced by a selection 
process that is related to the values of the dependent variable. The selection process may 
cause correlation between the error term and the independent variables, leading to biased 
estimators. This is a relevant concern especially when it comes to the models for the 
probability and amount of remittances. 
Firstly, this bias may arise from the fact that migrants self-select themselves to the group of 
remitters in a non-random way, and consequently, remittances can only be observed for 
migrants actually remitting. This issue may be addressed with the estimation methods 
discussed in chapter 4, but they may not do away with the sample selection bias altogether: 
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for instance, in the case of the Heckman selection model, the non-random selection entails a 
fundamental identification problem, so the validity of any solution will depend on the validity 
of the assumptions that are made. Yet, these assumptions can only be partly tested. (Verbeek 
2008:245)  
Secondly, the sampling methods employed in each of the countries under study should be 
investigated more closely to see whether they are related to the value of the dependent 
variable. In Nigeria, households with migrants were systematically oversampled from the 
beginning of the four-stage sampling procedure: more states with a high migration rate than 
those with a low migration rate were selected to the sample at the first stage, and more local 
government areas from the states with a high migration rate than those from the states with a 
low migration rate were selected to the sample at the second stage. At the fourth and last stage 
of sampling it was found that the original listing and sampling procedure of households would 
not yield a sufficient number of households with international migrants, so new procedures to 
oversample households with international migrants relative to others, and households with 
internal migrants relative to those with no migrants, were developed. (Zibah Consults Ltd 
2011:6-7, 15-7) Also in Uganda, households with migrants were oversampled relative to those 
with no migrants, with a goal of selecting 4 households with international, 3 households with 
internal, and 3 household with no migrants from the 200 enumeration areas. If this goal could 
not be satisfied, for instance due to the lack of households with international migrants, priority 
was given to households with migrants, either international or internal. (Makerere Statistical 
Consult Limited 2011:6) In Senegal, census districts with a high migration rate were favoured 
over those with a low migration rate in the selection process, and households with migrants 
were oversampled relative to those with no migrants (The World Bank and CRES 2009:3-4)  
The oversampling of households with migrants may certainly introduce bias: the factors that 
determine whether the household sends a migrant – migrant characteristics and household 
income and assets, for instance – may be similar to the factors determining whether or how 
much the migrant remits when having migrated, meaning that whether someone is migrant is 
in part determined by the omitted variables in the error term in the remittance equations. 
Hence, the fact that someone is a migrant and thus appears in the data set suggests that, all 
else equal, the error terms in the remittance equations are positive (on average) and could be 
correlated with the independent variables. In addition, the statistical findings discussed in 
section 6.3 imply that in each of the countries under study, international migrants, both in 
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OECD and other African countries, are more likely to remit, and remit more than internal 
migrants. Thus, also the oversampling of households with international migrants relative to 
others, may cause further sample selection bias.  
6.4.4. Simultaneous causality 
Endogeneity means that the independent variables are correlated with the error term of the 
equations, and leads to estimators being biased and inconsistent. Particularly, the problem of 
simultaneous causality, which is a form of endogeneity, may arise: the independent variables 
have an impact on the dependent variable, but simultaneously, the dependent variable may 
affect some of the independent variables. (Verbeek 2008:138-9)  
It is not likely that any of the migrant-related variables are endogenous, but some of the 
recipient household-related variables may suffer from this problem. In particular, it is possible 
that remittances sent by the migrant affect the expenditure and thus the income of the 
recipient household, and if the remittances are significant in size, they may affect the land and 
other asset holdings of the recipient household, as well. Moreover, remittances may be used 
for funding the education and/or migration of other household members, thus affecting 
variables indicating the recipient household’s expenditure, education level, and the number of 
migrants it sends.  
These hypotheses receive some support from findings from the data made by Plaza et al. 
(2011:22). For instance in Nigeria, 22.1 percent of international and 19.6 percent of intra-
African remittances were spent on education, which may render the variables depicting both 
the recipient household’s expenditure and its education level endogenous. Moreover, 
especially in Nigeria, a large proportion of remittances is used to purchase land (24.8 percent 
of international and 16.6. percent of intra-African remittances), and in Senegal, 7.0 percent of 
international remittances are spent on the construction of new buildings, meaning that also the 
variable indicating the recipient household’s assets may be endogenous. (Ibid.) 
The relative endogeneity of the recipient household’s expenditure and land and other assets 
was tested crudely in the base specification for each country by adding these variables 
separately to such tobit, Heckman and two-part model specifications that included only the 
presumably exogenous independent variables. If the coefficient values of the exogenous 
variables had been altered significantly by this addition, it would have been likely that the 
added variables would have been endogenous, or at least more endogenous than the already 
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included variables. As the coefficients of the exogenous variables did not change that 
drastically, the possible endogeneity of the variables indicating the recipient household’s 
expenditure and assets does not pose a significant problem.  
Regarding the additional specifications for Nigeria and Senegal, the same test was carried out 
for the variables describing the recipient household’s education level and the number of other 
international migrants from the same household. In the case of Nigeria, adding the education 
level to specifications with only exogenous variables did cause relatively large changes in the 
coefficients of the exogenous variables, while in the Senegalese case, adding the number of 
other international migrants did not change the coefficients of the exogenous variables 
practically at all. Thus, it is likely that the variable indicating the recipient household’s 
education level is relatively endogenous. This could have be corrected for only by finding an 
instrument variable that is correlated with the endogenous variable but not with the dependent 
variable: such variables, however, could not be found, so the results of the additional 
specification for Nigeria should be interpreted with caution.  
Endogeneity is also a problem when considering the dependent variables of the estimations. It 
is probable that the decision on whether to remit and on how much to remit, whether to use 
official or unofficial remittance channels, and whether to migrate internationally or internally 
are determined by similar independent variables. These dependent variables are also likely to 
determine one another, i.e. they are endogenous: if, for instance, the channel used for 
remitting were included as a determinant of the probability and amount of remittances, the 
latter would most likely also affect the former at the same time, and the resulting coefficient 
estimates would most likely be biased and inconsistent (see also Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 
2005). For this reason, the reduced form of the model is estimated, i.e. the endogenous 
variables of the channel used for sending remittances and the amount of remittances are 
modelled separately and expressed as functions of the same or similar exogenous variables 
and unobservable error terms, as shown in sections 6.2.1.4 and 6.2.2.3.  
7 Empirical Results 
This chapter discusses the results of the different empirical estimations carried out for this 
study and how they reflect their respective theoretical frameworks outlined in chapters 2, 3 
and 4. The results obtained with the three models for the probability and amount of 
remittances – the tobit model, the Heckman selection model and the two-part model – are 
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examined and compared with one another, and the results obtained with the two-part model 
for each country are contrasted across genders and destinations of migrants. Also, the results 
obtained with the probit model for the choice between official and unofficial remittance 
channels, and for the choice between international and internal migration, are analysed.  
These results are reviewed for each country separately in sections 7.1 through 7.3, starting 
with Uganda. Section 7.4 summarises and compares these findings. In appendix 2, the tobit 
and probit coefficient estimates of the country-wise estimations of the probability and amount 
of remittances are compared, as it implies whether the tobit model is appropriate for the 
estimation. Appendix 4 gives the estimation results for Senegal obtained with the CLAD 
estimation of the probability and amount of remittances. 
To facilitate the interpretation of the tables containing the estimation results, all of the tables 
presented in the following sections have a similar structure. The coefficient estimates and 
standard errors of the independent variables are presented first, and the statistical significance 
of the coefficients are indicated with ***, ** or * for the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent 
significance levels, respectively. As heteroskedasticity and non-normality were detected with 
the specification tests discussed in chapter 4, heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered standard 
errors are reported – the clustering has been done according to the primary sampling units of 
the samples of each country. To save space, the effects of the origin region or state of the 
migrant are not individually displayed. In most of the tables, also the joint significance of 
dummy variables indicating the migrant’s education, occupation, residence and origin region 
are given below the estimates for the individual independent variables. In addition, the 
goodness-of-fit measure, and some other model statistics, for the respective model are 
reported at the bottom of these tables. 
In the estimations for the probability and amount of remittances, the average marginal effects 
of the independent variables on the probability of remitting and on the conditional expected 
logarithmic amount remitted, i.e. [ ] ikii xyyE ∂>∂ /0 , are reported. In the probit estimations of 
the choice of remittance channel and the choice of migration destination, the average marginal 
effects of the independent variables on the probability of using official channels and on the 
probability of migrating internationally are reported, respectively. Anything appearing in the 
tables but not accounted for here will be explained in the context of the table in question.  
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7.1. Estimation results for Uganda 
In sections 7.1.1, 7.1.2 and 7.1.3, the tobit, Heckman selection and two-part model results for 
the determinants of the probability and amount of remittances in Uganda are presented and 
discussed, respectively. In section 7.1.4, these results are contrasted across genders and 
destinations of migrants. In section 7.1.5, the probit model results for the determinants of the 
choice between official and unofficial remittance channels are investigated, and in section 
7.1.6, the probit model results for the determinants of the choice between international and 
internal migration are examined.  
7.1.1. Tobit model for probability and amount of remittances 
The estimation results of the tobit model are presented in table 3. The coefficients of the 
independent variables indicating whether the migrant is married, whether he has completed 
secondary or tertiary education, whether he currently resides in an OECD country or in the 
urban regions of Uganda, whether he is employed in the service sector, whether he migrated 
for work, whether he is employed, and whether he is living alone are statistically significantly 
different from zero. Moreover, the variables indicating the migrant’s education, his current 
residence and his origin area are jointly statistically significant. 
Looking at the partial effects, the probability of remitting and on the amount remitted are 
most strongly, and positively, affected by whether the migrant is currently residing in an 
OECD country, whether he has completed tertiary education, and whether he is employed. 
Migrants residing in an OECD country have a 26.3 percent higher probability of remitting, 
and they remit on average 394 percent more than migrants living in rural regions of Uganda. 
In turn, migrants having completed tertiary education have a 17.0 percent higher probability 
of remitting, and remit about 215 percent more than those with no education, and employed 
migrants have a 20.7 percent higher probability of remitting, and remit about 217 percent 
more than unemployed ones.  
In terms of the motives for remitting, an increase in the migrant’s income seems to increase 
both the probability and amount of remittances, as the proxies for the income – residing in 
OECD countries, having a higher education, and living alone – are all positively associated 
with remittances. However, this result does not discriminate that well between the different 
motives for remitting, and it only rules out the insurance motive, which predicts that the 
migrant’s income should not have a direct effect on remittances. In turn, the fact that the 
migrant’s education affects remittances positively may be an indication of either the strategic 
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or the investment motive. Under the strategic motive, the highly-educated migrant may be 
bribing less-educated family members with remittances to persuade them to stay home (Stark 
1995). Under the investment motive, remittances act as repayments of loans on investments 
made in the migrant’s education (Rapoport and Docquier 2006:1156). 
      Table 3. Tobit model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda 
 
Independent  
Variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on  
the probability of 
remitting 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
Sex 0.8650 1.2440 0.0204 0.2447 
Married 2.7487* 1.5872 0.0652 0.7810 
Son 0.5743 1.5415 0.0134 0.1625 
Age 0.1224 0.0790 0.0029 0.0348 
Primary 2.0674 1.6214 0.0487 0.6041 
Secondary 4.8995*** 1.5233 0.1176 1.4961 
Tertiary 6.7967*** 1.7647 0.1695 2.1483 
Duration -0.0779 0.1046 -0.0018 -0.0221 
OECD 10.7303*** 2.8266 0.2634 3.9354 
Africa 2.5089 2.3606 0.0600 0.7554 
Urban Uganda 5.9273*** 1.8519 0.1382 1.6134 
Professional 1.8115 2.6913 0.0434 0.5314 
Service 4.5916* 2.3802 0.1127 1.3736 
Agriculture & Crafts 3.4601 2.5175 0.0819 1.0520 
Reason 6.9863*** 1.8022 0.1655 1.7746 
Employed 8.4466*** 2.6646 0.2065 2.1734 
Alone 3.8235*** 1.2152 0.0916 1.1281 
Size of HH -0.1701 0.2574 -0.0040 -0.0484 
Assets of HH 3.5558 2.5481 0.0802 0.9282 
Expenditure of HH -0.2057 0.2707 -0.0048 -0.0585 
Constant -34.3434*** 5.6887   
 Joint significance  
  F Prob > F  
 Education 5.59 0.0008  
 Residence 6.81 0.0002  
 Occupation 1.73 0.1586  
 Origin region 5.21 0.0004  
 Model statistics  
 N 1092  
 Uncensored 340  
 Sigma 10.8982  
 Log pseudolikelihood -4708228.5  
 Pseudo-R2 0.1237  
 F 13.51  
 Prob > F 0.0000  
   
The results suggest that Ugandan migrants are not motivated by a possible inheritance, as the 
recipient household’s assets do not affect remittances significantly. Moreover, the prediction 
by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006:229) that migrants facing a larger income risk remit 
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more in order to insure themselves is not supported by the results: in contrast, migrants who 
face a smaller risk, i.e. are employed, are more likely to remit and remit more than 
unemployed ones. However, as the employment status of the migrant is also a proxy for his 
income, the positive effect of being employed on remittances is, in this respect, in line with 
most of the motives for remitting. This view is backed up by the finding that also the intention 
of migrants to work in their destination country affects remittances positively.    
7.1.2. Heckman selection model for probability and amount of remittances 
In table 4, the Heckman selection model results for the likelihood of remitting and for the 
amount remitted are presented. In terms of the overall purposefulness of the Heckman 
selection model, the correlation coefficient rho between the error terms of the participation 
and the outcome equation is significant as indicated by the chi-squared –statistic for rho at the 
bottom of the table. Thus, the null hypothesis of independent equations can be rejected, and 
the participation equation should be taken into account when estimating the outcome 
equation. However, this conclusion should not be regarded as definite, as the model is based 
on a bivariate normality assumption whose validity may be questioned, as discussed in section 
5.2.1. Moreover, it should be noted that the identification variable indicating whether the 
migration has lasted for more than a year is statistically insignificant, suggesting that it may 
not be the best choice for an identification variable.  
Comparing the Heckman selection model estimates to those of the tobit model, the same 
variable coefficients that were statistically significant in the tobit model are also significant in 
the participation equation of the Heckman selection model, and have the same signs as those 
in the tobit model. The outcome equation of the Heckman selection model, on the other hand, 
displays a rather different pattern in terms of the statistical significance of the variable 
coefficients than the participation equation, or the tobit model: the coefficients of variables 
indicating whether the migrant is the son or daughter of the household head at home, his age, 
whether he is residing in an OECD or an African country, whether he lives alone, and what 
the recipient household’s long-run expenditure is prove to be significant. 
Thus, there are only two independent variables whose coefficients are statistically significant 
in both the participation and the outcome equation, indicating whether the migrant is residing 
in an OECD country, and whether he is living alone. Interestingly, the latter affects the 
probability of remittances positively, but the amount remitted negatively. The variables 
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indicating the migrant’s education and his current residence are jointly statistically significant 
in both equations.  
 Table 4. Heckman selection model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent  
Variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on 
the probability of 
remitting Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
Sex 0.0978 0.1269 0.0235 -0.2555 0.2011 -0.1883 
Married 0.2831* 0.1615 0.0687 0.0172 0.2163 0.2116 
Son 0.0567 0.1628 0.0136 -0.6765*** 0.2328 -0.6375 
Age 0.0094 0.0077 0.0023 0.0312** 0.0124 0.0376 
Primary 0.1776 0.1547 0.0429 -0.0630 0.2854 0.0576 
Secondary 0.4721*** 0.1534 0.1168 -0.0393 0.2955 0.2753 
Tertiary 0.7595*** 0.1679 0.1982 0.5584 0.4095 1.0536 
Duration -0.0078 0.0108 -0.0019 -0.0322 0.0273 -0.0375 
OECD 0.8332*** 0.3131 0.2145 1.5156** 0.6307 2.0373 
Africa 0.2181 0.2398 0.0536 1.0149* 0.6084 1.1615 
Urban Uganda 0.5343*** 0.1792 0.1270 0.0773 0.3576 0.4494 
Professional 0.1232 0.2869 0.0301 0.0338 0.4049 0.1176 
Service 0.5079* 0.2794 0.1287 -0.5825 0.4480 -0.2420 
Agriculture & Crafts 0.3312 0.2753 0.0806 -0.3216 0.3784 -0.1004 
Reason 0.5903*** 0.1745 0.1395 0.3734 0.4973 0.7928 
Employed 0.8375*** 0.2663 0.2028 -0.4185 0.3706 0.1771 
Alone 0.3969*** 0.1304 0.0975 -0.4744** 0.2318 -0.2064 
Size of HH -0.0112 0.0279 -0.0027 -0.0317 0.0450 -0.0394 
Assets of HH 0.3780 0.2657 0.0855 -0.1657 0.3852 0.1023 
Expenditure of HH -0.0349 0.0271 -0.0084 0.1187** 0.0499 0.0947 
Duration > 1 year 0.2814 0.1721 0.0661    
Constant -3.4901*** 0.5629  11.8932*** 1.2579  
 Joint significance Joint significance 
  Chi2 Prob > Chi2  Chi2 Prob > Chi2 
 Education 23.58 0.0000 Education 3.07 0.3803 
 Residence 12.78 0.0051 Residence 14.22 0.0026 
 Occupation 4.72 0.1933 Occupation 2.73 0.4359 
 Origin region 20.13 0.0005 Origin region 31.67 0.0000 
   Model statistics   
   N 1092   
   Uncensored 339   
   
Log 
pseudolikelihood -3111285.0   
   Chi2 159.82   
   Prob > Chi2 0.0000   
   Rho -0.6365   
   Rho = 0: Chi2 5.18   
   
Rho = 0:  
Prob > Chi2 0.0228   
  
Comparing the partial effects of the independent variables on the probability of remitting in 
the Heckman selection model to those in the tobit model, the magnitudes and signs of the 
effects prove to be rather similar to one another. For instance, according to the Heckman 
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selection model, employed migrants are 20.3 percent more likely to remit than unemployed 
ones, and migrants having completed tertiary education are about 19.8 percent more likely to 
remit than migrants with no education. The corresponding effects estimated by the tobit 
model are 20.7 percent and 17.0 percent, respectively. 
The partial effects of the independent variables on the conditional expected logarithmic 
amount remitted differ somewhat in the two models. In the Heckman selection model, the 
effects of whether the migrant is residing in an OECD country or in an African country, and 
whether he is the son of the household head are the largest ones of the statistically significant 
variables. Migrants residing in an OECD country remit about 204 percent more than migrants 
residing in rural areas of Uganda, which is a significantly smaller effect than the 394 percent 
suggested by the tobit model. In turn, migrants residing in African countries remit about 116 
percent more than migrants residing in rural areas of Uganda, while the sons and daughters of 
household heads remit about 64.6 percent less than migrants with some other relationship to 
the household head. 
In terms of the motives for remitting, the statistically significant variable coefficients in the 
participation equation have the same implications as the results obtained with the tobit model, 
and suggest that a variety of motives may be driving remittance behaviour of Ugandan 
migrants through the effects that the migrant’s income and education have on remittances. An 
interesting finding in the outcome equation, however, is the positive effect that the recipient 
household’s long-run expenditure has on the amount remitted. This variable proxies the 
recipient household’s long-run income and its partial effect on remittances suggests that a one 
percent increase in the recipient household’s income is associated with about a 9.5 percent 
increase in remittances.  
This result implies that Ugandan migrants may be motivated by exchange or investment 
considerations. Under the exchange motive, the likelihood of remitting may be affected 
negatively and the amount remitted positively by the recipient household’s income: here, 
however, the former effect is statistically insignificant (Cox 1987:519). Under the investment 
motive, a positive relationship between remittances and the recipient’s long-run income 
appears when migration is constrained, but should become negative when migration is 
unconstrained (Rapoport and Docquier 2006:1159). This inverse U-shaped relationship 
between the variables, however, does not receive support from additional estimations. Yet, the 
investment motive cannot be disregarded altogether because of the positive effect that the 
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migrant’s secondary and tertiary education have on the probability of remitting – under the 
exchange motive, education should affect remittances negatively, as educated migrants are 
less inclined to return home than uneducated ones (Ibid:1164). 
7.1.3. Two-part model for probability and amount of remittances 
The two-part model’s probit estimation of the likelihood of remitting and the OLS estimation 
of the conditional logarithmic amount remitted are presented table 5. However, as the 
correlation coefficient rho in the Heckman selection model reviewed in the previous section is 
significant, the participation and the outcome equation are not independent of one another, 
and the OLS estimation of the conditional logarithmic amount remitted is likely to be 
inconsistent. Nonetheless, the two-part model estimation results provide a good robustness 
check for the Heckman selection model estimation results, which is why they are presented 
and briefly compared to those discussed in the previous section. 
Not surprisingly, the probit coefficient estimates and the related partial effects display a 
similar pattern in their signs and magnitudes as the coefficient estimates and partial effects in  
the Heckman selection model’s participation equation. The OLS estimates, however, differ 
somewhat in their signs and magnitudes from the estimates in the Heckman selection model’s 
outcome equation, arising most likely from the different estimation methods and assumptions 
of the two models. Yet, the semi-elasticities, or the partial effects on the conditional expected 
logarithmic amount remitted obtained with the two-part model and with the Heckman 
selection model are quite similar to one another. In terms of the statistical significance of the 
variable coefficients, there are some differences between the probit estimates and the 
participation equation, and between the OLS estimates and the outcome equation of the 
Heckman selection model. 
None of the above-mentioned differences, however, contradict the conclusions made earlier, 
so the implications of the two-part model results in terms of the motives for remitting are the 
same as discussed in the two previous sections. The Heckman selection model results should 
be more relied upon, anyways, due to the likelihood of remitting and the amount remitted 
being dependent of one another. 
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 Table 5. Two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on 
the probability of 
remitting Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
Sex 0.0674 0.1294 0.0166 -0.1951 0.1826 -0.1951 
Married 0.2752 0.1696 0.0682 0.1398 0.2072 0.1398 
Son 0.0400 0.1640 0.0098 -0.6455*** 0.2175 -0.6455 
Age 0.0089 0.0079 0.0022 0.0373*** 0.0118 0.0373 
Primary 0.1712 0.1614 0.0422 0.0812 0.2856 0.0812 
Secondary 0.4406*** 0.1525 0.1114 0.2277 0.2808 0.2277 
Tertiary 0.7181*** 0.1765 0.1914 0.9490** 0.4437 0.9490 
Duration -0.0049 0.0109 -0.0012 -0.0374 0.0261 -0.0374 
OECD 0.8123** 0.3174 0.2136 2.0798*** 0.5445 2.0798 
Africa 0.1278 0.2354 0.0318 1.1343* 0.6385 1.1343 
Urban Uganda 0.5136*** 0.1854 0.1249 0.4645 0.2908 0.4645 
Professional 0.2158 0.2715 0.0546 0.1640 0.4131 0.1640 
Service 0.4921* 0.2704 0.1274 -0.2995 0.3891 -0.2995 
Agriculture & Crafts 0.2961 0.2704 0.0736 -0.1826 0.3378 -0.1826 
Reason 0.5866*** 0.1649 0.1420 0.8182 0.4999 0.8182 
Employed 0.8132*** 0.2607 0.2021 0.0588 0.3607 0.0588 
Alone 0.3715*** 0.1367 0.0931 -0.2798 0.2209 -0.2798 
Size of HH -0.0094 0.0263 -0.0023 -0.0384 0.0417 -0.0384 
Assets of HH 0.3820 0.2695 0.0881 0.0557 0.3288 0.0557 
Expenditure of HH -0.0302 0.0282 -0.0074 0.1046** 0.0513 0.1046 
Constant -3.2101*** 0.5653  9.0196*** 0.9229  
 Joint significance Joint significance 
  Chi2 Prob > Chi2  F Prob > F 
 Education 19.62 0.0002 Education 1.56 0.2041 
 Residence 13.09 0.0044 Residence 6.02 0.0008 
 Occupation 4.10 0.2512 Occupation 0.51 0.6743 
 Origin region 22.12 0.0002 Origin region 7.59 0.0000 
 Model statistics Model statistics 
 N 1097 N 340 
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -1481099.8 R2 0.4226 
 Pseudo-R2 0.2891 Root MSE 1.3218 
 
7.1.4. Two-part model for probability and amount of remittances by gender and 
destination 
It may be reasonably assumed that migrants are not a homogeneous group, and differ in their 
motives for remitting. Thus, in this section the results of the two-part model are contrasted 
across genders and destinations separately by using the interaction variables described in 
section 6.2.1.2. Yet, it should be kept in mind that in the case of Uganda, the OLS estimates 
of the two-part model are likely to be inconsistent, as the decisions on whether to remit and on 
how much to remit are not independent of one another. 
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To save space, in the following tables, the coefficient estimates and standard errors are 
displayed only for those variables with which variables male and OECD are interacted. Partial 
effects on the probability of remitting and on the conditional logarithmic amount remitted are 
not explicitly displayed in the tables: the former effect would be miscalculated by Stata 11, 
and the latter effect is equal to the coefficient estimate obtained with the OLS estimation. In 
the tables, below the standard but misleading probit model, the true mean interaction effects 
of the interaction variables, their mean standard errors and mean z-statistics calculated with 
the correct method are reported. In addition, in figures 1 through 10 in appendix 3, the true 
interaction effects and statistical significances of the interaction variables in the probit 
estimations are displayed.  
In table 6, the results by gender are presented. In the probit estimation, the coefficients for 
non-interacted variables tertiary and employed are statistically significant. However, none of 
the interaction effects are statistically significant, but this result may be misleading. 
According to the mean interaction effects, the effects are, on average, positive for all 
interaction variables except for the interaction male*employed, and all of them are, on 
average, statistically insignificant. Looking at figures from 1 to 5 in appendix 3, the 
interaction effects are both positive and negative depending on the predicted probability of the 
dependent variable, and the effects tend to have either a wave shape or an inverse U-shape. In 
terms of the statistical significance of the interaction effects, none of them are statistically 
significant on the 5 percent significance level for any of the observations.  
In the OLS estimation, the amount of remittances respond statistically significantly to whether 
the migrant is residing in an OECD country, whether he has completed tertiary level 
education, and to what the recipient household’s long-run expenditure is. These are 
statistically significant also in the two-part model estimation for all migrants. In addition, the 
effects of interaction variables male*OECD and male*tertiary are statistically significant, 
meaning that remittances of male migrants are differently affected by their residence and 
education level than those of female migrants. 
Firstly, as the variable male*OECD is positive, male migrants respond more in terms of their 
remittances to their residence being an OECD country than female migrants: while residing in 
OECD countries is associated with about a 143 percent increase in remittances among female 
migrants, the increase is 142.78 + 95.81 = 238.59 percent among male migrants. As residing 
in an OECD country is one of the proxies for the migrant’s income and is likely to increase 
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this income, the result implies that male migrants are willing to share a larger proportion of 
their increased income with their families back home than female migrants are. This may 
suggest that male migrants are more altruistic towards their families than female migrants, but 
is consistent with other motives, except for the insurance motive, for remittances, as well.  
Table 6. Partial two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda by gender 
    Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent variable Coefficient Robust std. err. Coefficient Robust std. err. 
Male -0.5239 0.6272 0.4422 1.2443 
OECD 0.5615 0.3511 1.4278** 0.6248 
Male*OECD 0.4651 0.4050 0.9581* 0.5260 
Tertiary 0.6299*** 0.1916 1.5772*** 0.4858 
Male*Tertiary 0.1033 0.2370 -0.8840* 0.4630 
Employed 0.7719** 0.3297 0.3680 0.4859 
Male*Employed 0.0682 0.2830 -0.4744 0.5353 
Assets of HH 0.3672 0.3794 0.1630 0.3596 
Male*Assets of HH 0.0926 0.4190 0.0251 0.5038 
Expenditure of HH -0.0465 0.0311 0.1165** 0.0547 
Male*Expenditure of HH 0.0318 0.0389 -0.0041 0.0711 
 Mean interaction effects   
 Mean Std. err. z   
Male*OECD 0.1074 0.1318 0.8160   
Male*Tertiary 0.0130 0.3087 0.0082   
Male*Employed -0.0239 0.3022 -0.1262   
Male*Assets of HH 0.0073 0.2387 -0.0106   
Male*Expenditure of HH 0.0080 0.1016 0.0788   
 Model statistics Model statistics 
 N 1097 N 340 
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -1477497.2 R2 0.4374 
 Pseudo R2 0.2908 Root MSE 1.3153 
 
Secondly, the other statistically significant interaction variable, male*tertiary, implies that 
male migrants increase their remittances less in response to their tertiary level education than 
female migrants, but the effect is not negative: while tertiary education increases remittances 
by 158 percent among female migrants, the increase among male migrants is only 157.72 – 
88.40 = 69.32 percent. In terms of the motives for remitting, remittances responding 
positively to the level of education is consistent with the strategic and the investment motive. 
However, as the variable indicating the recipient household’s long-run expenditure, a proxy 
for its long-run income, is statistically significant and affects the amount of remittances 
positively, it is more likely for the investment motive to be at work. The stronger influence of 
this motive on female migrants could arise from the possibility that the tertiary education of 
females – not likely to be more expensive in monetary terms than that of males – has entailed 
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higher opportunity costs to the household than that of males, increasing the value of the 
educational loans given to females and the amount of remittances needed to compensate for 
these. It could also be that female migrants have less bargaining power than male migrants 
relative to the recipient household, resulting in poorer terms of loan repayment for female 
migrants.  
In table 7, the results by destinations of migrants are presented. According to the standard 
probit model, non-interacted variables tertiary and employed have statistically significant 
coefficients, like in the two-part model estimation for all migrants. Yet, none of the 
interaction effects are statistically significant, but this result may be misleading. In turn, the 
mean interaction effects imply that all the effects are on average positive, except for the effect 
of the interaction OECD*expenditure of HH, and all of them are, on average, statistically 
insignificant. Looking at figures from 6 to 10 in appendix 3, the interaction effects 
demonstrate wide variation across the different predicted probabilities of the dependent 
variable, and either a wave shape or an inverse U-shape. Regarding the statistical significance 
of the interaction effects, only for a few observations the interaction effects of the interactions 
OECD*tertiary and OECD*employed are statistically significant on the 5 percent significance 
level.  
For the interaction OECD*tertiary, the significant observations correspond to migrants with a 
predicted probability of remitting of 35 percent and 65 percent: the interaction effect is 
slightly less than 2.5 percentage points for the group around 35 percent, and from a good 2 to 
2.5 percent for the group around 65 percent. For the interaction OECD*employed, the 
significant observations correspond to migrants with a predicted probability of remitting of 
30, 60 and 80 percent: the interaction effect for these groups is from about 2.5 to 3 percentage 
points. Because the interaction effects are statistically significant only for such a few 
observations, any conclusions drawn from them in terms of the motives for remitting might be 
misleading. 
In the OLS estimation, the statistically significant non-interacted variables indicate whether 
the migrant has competed tertiary education and what the recipient household’s long-run 
expenditure is – significant also in the two-part model estimation for all migrants. The 
interaction variables that are statistically significant are OECD*employed and 
OECD*expenditure of HH, meaning that in terms of the effects of being employed and the 
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recipient household’s expenditure, the behaviour of migrants residing in OECD countries is 
significantly different from that of migrants residing in African countries. 
Table 7. Partial two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda by destination 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent variable Coefficient Robust std. err. Coefficient Robust std. err. 
Male 0.0420 0.1367 -0.2421 0.1953 
OECD -0.3555 1.3699 0.9901 1.6095 
OECD*Male 0.6423 0.4111 0.6095 0.3986 
Tertiary 0.6875*** 0.1819 0.9333** 0.4682 
OECD*Tertiary 0.7094 0.5649 0.5332 0.7905 
Employed 0.8018*** 0.2651 -0.0587 0.3703 
OECD*Employed 0.9052 0.7339 1.8897** 0.9385 
Assets of HH 0.4018 0.3158 0.0335 0.3131 
OECD*Assets of HH 0.4191 0.7075 0.4901 0.8998 
Expenditure of HH -0.0250 0.0288 0.1355** 0.0557 
OECD*Expenditure of HH -0.0535 0.0776 -0.1384** 0.0657 
 Mean interaction effects   
 Mean Std. err. z   
OECD*Male 0.1529 0.1606 0.8833   
OECD*Tertiary 0.1731 0.4319 0.5432   
OECD*Employed 0.2250 0.5490 0.6200   
OECD*Assets of HH 0.0840 0.3805 0.2393   
OECD*Expenditure of HH -0.0050 0.2911 -0.0077   
 Model Statistics Model Statistics 
 N 1097 N 340 
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -1475828.3 R2 0.4327 
 Pseudo R2 0.2916 Root MSE 1.3207 
 
The effect of OECD*employed is positive, while the sole effect of being employed is 
negative, though insignificant. Thus, among migrants residing in OECD countries, being 
employed is associated with an increase in remittances, while the remittances of migrants 
residing in African countries are unaffected by whether they are employed or not. This result 
is in contrast to the self-insurance hypothesis by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006:229) who 
suggest that migrants under a larger income risk, i.e. unemployed migrants, remit more than 
migrants with less income risk. But, if the employment status of the migrant is interpreted as a 
proxy for the migrant’s income, the result is consistent with the various motives predicting 
remittances to increase with the migrant’s income. 
The effect of the recipient household’s expenditure, a proxy for its income, and that of its 
interaction with the variable male are almost counteracting: while among migrants residing in 
African countries, remittances increase on average by 13.6 percent for a one percent increase 
in the recipient household’s income, among migrants residing in OECD countries remittances 
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decrease very slightly. This result could mean that while migrants residing in African 
countries may have some exchange or investment arrangements with their families back 
home, similar contracts may not exist between migrants in OECD countries and their families. 
Alternatively, the bargaining power of migrants in OECD countries relative to the recipient 
household could be higher than that of migrants in African countries, resulting in better 
contractual terms for migrants in OECD countries. It should be noted, however, that the effect 
of tertiary level education on the probability and amount of remittances is positive for both 
groups of migrants, suggesting that the presence of the investment motive may be more likely 
than that of the exchange motive.  
7.1.5. Probit model for choice between official and unofficial remittance 
channels 
The probit estimation results for the choice between official and unofficial remittance 
channels are presented in table 8. The coefficients of variables indicating whether the migrant 
is the son or daughter of the household head, whether he has completed tertiary level 
education, the duration of his migration, whether he is residing in an OECD or in an African 
country or in urban Uganda, and whether he has migrated for work are statistically significant. 
The coefficients of variables indicating the migrant’s education, his current residence and his 
origin region are jointly statistically significant. 
Of the significant variables, whether the migrant is residing in an OECD or an African 
country, and whether he has completed tertiary education have the largest partial effects on 
the probability of using official channels: migrants residing in OECD countries have a 64.2 
percent higher, and migrants residing in African countries have a 44.3 percent higher 
probability of using official remittance channels than migrants residing in rural regions of 
Uganda, and migrants having completed tertiary education have a 27.5 percent higher 
probability of using official remittance channels than migrants with no education.  
The result that international migrants residing in OECD and African countries are more likely 
to use official remittance channels than domestic ones gets support from Ngugi and Sennoga 
(2011:250), who find that international remittances are more often sent through official 
channels than domestic ones. Moreover, most official remittance service providers are located 
in urban centres of Uganda, which may at least partly explain why migrants residing in these 
regions are also more likely to remit officially than migrants in rural regions. Also, as these 
locations are expected to affect the migrant’s income positively, migrants residing in the 
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above-mentioned locations may have better access to official channels and not be as liquidity 
constrained in their choice between remittance channels as migrants in rural Uganda. In 
addition, as shown in section 7.1.2, migrants residing abroad tend to send larger remittances 
and thus may value the reliability of official channels more than migrants remitting from rural 
Uganda. 
  Table 8. Probit model for choice between official and unofficial  
  remittance channels in Uganda 
Independent  
Variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
probability of using 
official channels 
Sex -0.0501 0.2814 -0.0066 
Married 0.1439 0.2640 0.0188 
Son -0.7734*** 0.2926 -0.1050 
Age -0.0127 0.0194 -0.0017 
Primary -0.5751 0.5577 -0.0677 
Secondary 0.3122 0.4433 0.0414 
Tertiary 1.6667*** 0.3580 0.2747 
Duration -0.0484** 0.0209 -0.0064 
OECD 3.3009*** 0.6163 0.6423 
Africa 2.3768*** 0.5868 0.4428 
Urban Uganda 1.1057*** 0.4122 0.1074 
Professional 0.1197 0.4794 0.0161 
Service -0.1451 0.4556 -0.0189 
Agriculture & Crafts -0.0382 0.5744 -0.0050 
Reason 2.1696*** 0.5900 0.1601 
Employed -0.5062 0.4458 -0.0722 
Alone 0.0355 0.2958 0.0047 
Size of HH -0.0186 0.0557 -0.0024 
Assets of HH -0.2656 0.6932 -0.0372 
Expenditure of HH 0.1145 0.0698 0.0150 
Constant -5.0449*** 1.4146  
Joint significance 
 Chi2 Prob > Chi2 
Education 27.86 0.0000 
Residence 34.55 0.0000 
Occupation 0.57 0.9022 
Origin region 36.13 0.0000 
Model statistics 
 N 337  
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -239474.79  
 Pseudo-R2 0.5217  
 
It is also quite intuitive why education increases the probability of using official channels: as 
income tends to increase with education, educated migrants are likely to have better access to 
and to be less liquidity constrained when choosing their remittance channel than less-educated 
migrants. In addition, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2005:560) hypothesise that educated 
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migrants are more likely to understand the operational principles of banks better and to hold 
bank accounts than less-educated ones – as banks are an official remittance channel, this may 
indeed partially explain the result. However, the duration of migration having a negative 
effect on the probability of using official channels goes against the authors’ hypothesis of a 
longer work experience abroad increasing the likelihood of using banks (Ibid.). 
7.1.6. Probit model for choice between international and internal migration 
Table 9 displays the probit estimation results for the choice between international and internal 
migration.  
 Table 9. Probit model for choice between international and internal  
   migration from Uganda 
Independent 
variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
probability of sending 
the migrant abroad 
Sex 0.1041 0.1678 0.0156 
Married -0.0713 0.1462 -0.0108 
Son -0.2493 0.1602 -0.0400 
Age 0.0079 0.0065 0.0012 
Primary -0.2632 0.1950 -0.0372 
Secondary -0.1412 0.2182 -0.0205 
Tertiary 0.1728 0.2555 0.0280 
Duration 0.0062 0.0111 0.0009 
Professional 0.0554 0.2381 0.0086 
Service 0.1558 0.1895 0.0248 
Agriculture & Crafts -0.1251 0.2230 -0.0180 
Reason 0.3109* 0.1779 0.0435 
Employed 0.1235 0.2555 0.0183 
Alone -0.0299 0.1557 -0.0045 
Size of HH -0.0303 0.0322 -0.0046 
Assets of HH -0.1510 0.2038 -0.0249 
Expenditure of HH 0.0634 0.0480 0.0096 
Constant -2.2854 0.5932  
Joint significance 
 Chi2 Prob > Chi2 
Education 5.25 0.1546 
Occupation 1.58 0.6634 
Origin region 22.28 0.0002 
Model statistics 
 N 1093  
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -956138.27  
 Pseudo-R2 0.1114  
 
Only one variable, the reason for migration being work or search for work, explains 
statistically significantly the choice between international and internal migration. Its effect is 
positive, implying that the household may perceive the employment opportunities of other 
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African countries and OECD countries to be better than those of Uganda, and thus prefers to 
send migrants abroad. In turn, if the migrant’s reason for migration is something else than 
work – education, for instance – remittances could be expected to be rather small, and the 
household may not even consider migration as a way for it to receive supplementary income. 
In this case, migration costs might become the most decisive factor in the decision on the 
location of the migrant, and the household may prefer other regions of Uganda, involving 
lower migration costs, to locations abroad. 
7.2. Estimation results for Senegal 
In sections 7.2.1, 7.2.2 and 7.2.3, the tobit, Heckman selection and two-part model estimation 
results for the determinants of the probability and amount of remittances in Senegal are 
presented and discussed, respectively. These results are contrasted across genders and 
destinations of migrants in section 7.2.4. In section 7.2.5, the effects of other migrants and 
parental funding on the probability and amount of remittances are discussed. The probit 
model results for the determinants of the choice between official and unofficial remittance 
channels are investigated in section 7.2.6, and in section 7.2.7, the probit model results for the 
determinants of the choice between international and internal migration are examined. The 
CLAD estimation results for the probability and amount of remittances in Senegal are 
presented in appendix 4, and may be compared to the tobit, Heckman selection and two-part 
model estimation results. It should be noted at the outset that variable employed is omitted 
from all of the estimations, as it is perfectly collinear with variable professional. 
7.2.1. Tobit model for probability and amount of remittances  
The estimation results of the tobit model are presented in table 10. Variables whose 
coefficient is statistically significant indicate whether the migrant is married, whether he has 
completed primary education, whether he is residing in an OECD country, whether he 
migrated for work, whether he is living alone, and what the recipient household’s long-run 
expenditure is. In addition, the coefficients for variables indicating the current residence of the 
migrant and his origin region are jointly statistically significant.  
When it comes to the partial effects of the significant variables, the probability of remitting 
and the conditional expected logarithmic amount remitted are most significantly affected by 
whether the migrant migrated for work, whether he is residing in an OECD country, and 
whether he has completed primary education. Interestingly and contrary to the two other 
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variables, having completed primary education has a negative effect on remittances. These 
migrants have a 4.8 percent lower probability of remitting, and they remit about 149 percent 
less than migrants with no education. In turn, migrants residing in OECD countries have 
almost an 11 percent higher probability of remitting, and remit about 340 percent more than 
migrants residing in rural regions of Senegal. When it comes to migrants intending to work or 
to search for work, they have a 12.5 percent higher probability of remitting, and remit about 
387 percent more than those not intending to work.  
    Table 10. Tobit model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
Independent variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on 
the probability of 
remitting 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
Sex 2.2464 1.4040 0.0556 1.7250 
Married 1.3561** 0.6513 0.0336 1.0414 
Son 1.3284 0.8759 0.0329 1.0201 
Age 0.0183 0.0782 0.0005 0.0141 
Primary -1.9380* 1.1064 -0.0479 -1.4883 
Secondary 0.8265 0.8756 0.0204 0.6346 
Tertiary 0.5879 2.2267 0.0145 0.4515 
Duration 0.0739 0.0699 0.0018 0.0567 
OECD 4.4296*** 1.4932 0.1096 3.4016 
Africa 1.0313 1.6771 0.0255 0.7920 
Urban Senegal 1.9281 1.3465 0.0477 1.4806 
Professional -2.4419 1.6295 -0.0604 -1.8752 
Service 0.8269 0.8550 0.0204 0.6350 
Agriculture & Crafts -0.9631 1.0202 -0.0238 -0.7396 
Reason 5.0403*** 1.7524 0.1247 3.8706 
Employed (omitted)    
Alone 1.6753** 0.8407 0.0415 1.2865 
Size of HH -0.0502 0.0494 -0.0012 -0.0385 
Assets of HH 2.7354 2.5131 0.0677 2.1006 
Expenditure of HH 1.0371*** 0.3791 0.0257 0.7964 
Constant -19.3349*** 6.2524   
Joint significance 
  F Prob > F  
 Education 1.74 0.1565  
 Residence 3.86 0.00093  
 Occupation 1.91 0.1266  
 Origin region 5.59 0.0000  
 Model statistics  
 N 991  
 Uncensored 761  
 Sigma 5.5656  
 Log pseudolikelihood -1893771.5  
 Pseudo-R2 0.0539  
 F 332.21  
 Prob > F 0.0000  
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The results demonstrate the positive effect that the migrant’s income has on remittances, as 
the variables indicating that the migrant resides in an OECD country and that he lives alone, 
both proxies for the migrant’s income, affect remittances positively and significantly. This 
result, however, only excludes the insurance motive, and is in line with all other motives for 
remitting. Yet, the negative impact of education on remittances may indicate that the 
exchange motive in particular may be behind migrants’ remittance behaviour: educated 
migrants are less likely to return home, and thus remit less than uneducated ones  (Rapoport 
and Docquier 2006:1164). However, as the effects of secondary and tertiary education, though 
insignificant, are positive, further support for this conclusion is needed. 
This support is provided by the finding that the recipient household’s long-run expenditure, a 
proxy for its long-run income, has a positive effect on remittances, suggesting that migrants 
may be driven by the exchange motive or the investment motive, since the other motives are 
consistent with the recipient’s long-run income having a negative or no effect on remittances. 
However, the investment motive is characterised by the migrant’s education having a positive 
effect on remittances, and by an inverse U-shaped relationship between the recipient 
household’s income and remittances. As neither of these predictions hold true here, the results 
seem to imply that the prime concern of Senegalese migrants is to enter into exchange 
contracts with the recipient households and to compensate for the services performed by them 
with remittances.  
The above implication needs to be qualified, however. Under the exchange motive, the 
probability and the amount of remittances should be inversely correlated, meaning that the 
probability of remittances should be negatively affected by the recipient household’s income 
(Cox 1987:518). Yet, in the tobit model the partial effects of the recipient’s long-run income 
on the probability of remitting and on the conditional expected logarithmic amount remitted 
are constrained to have the same sign, so further inspection of the Heckman selection model’s 
coefficient estimates and partial effects is needed to determine, whether the inverse 
correlation holds true. 
7.2.2. Heckman selection model for probability and amount of remittances 
The results obtained with the Heckman selection model are presented in table 11. As the 
statistical significance of the correlation coefficient rho indicates, the participation and the 
outcome equation are not independent of one another, meaning that the participation equation 
should be taken into account when estimating the outcome equation. Also the coefficient of 
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the identification variable duration > 1 year is significant in the participation equation. 
However, the Heckman selection model is based on a bivariate normality assumption whose 
validity may be questioned. 
Comparing the Heckman selection model estimates to those of the tobit model, the 
significance and signs of the variable coefficients in the Heckman selection model’s 
participation equation are similar to those in the tobit model. However, while the coefficients 
of variables indicating whether the migrant is male and whether he is the son of the household 
head are statistically significant in the participation equation, they are insignificant in the tobit 
model. Conversely, the coefficient of the variable indicating whether the migrant has 
completed primary education is statistically insignificant in the participation equation, but 
significant in the tobit model. 
 The outcome equation, on the other hand, displays a completely different pattern of statistical 
significances than the participation equation, or the tobit model: in the outcome equation, 
coefficients of variables indicating the duration of migration, whether the migrants is residing 
in African countries or in urban regions of Senegal, whether he works in an agricultural or 
crafts occupation, and the size of his former household are statistically significant. There are 
thus no variables whose coefficients are statistically significant in both the participation and 
the outcome equation. However, coefficients of variables indicating the migrant’s current 
residence, his occupation and his origin region are jointly statistically significant in both 
equations. 
The partial effects implied by the Heckman selection model are not too similar to those 
obtained with the tobit model. Of the significant variables of the participation equation, the 
probability of remitting is most significantly affected by whether the migrant resides in an 
OECD country, whether he migrated for work, and whether he is male: migrants residing in 
OECD countries have a 14.4 percent higher probability of remitting than migrants residing in 
rural regions of Senegal ,and migrants migrating for work have a 20.5 percent higher 
probability of remitting than migrants migrating for other purposes – the corresponding 
percentages in the tobit model are 11 percent and 12.5 percent. From the significant variables 
of the outcome equation, variables indicating whether the migrant lives in an African country 
or in urban regions of Senegal have the largest partial effects on the conditional expected 
logarithmic amount remitted, and both of these effects are negative: they remit on average 
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40.9 percent and 59.1 percent less, respectively, than migrants residing in rural regions of 
Senegal.  
Table 11. Heckman selection model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent  
Variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on 
the probability of 
remitting Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
Sex 0.5788*** 0.2248 0.1407 -0.0797 0.2710 0.1360 
Married 0.3461* 0.1773 0.0841 0.2127 0.2049 0.3417 
Son 0.3634** 0.1796 0.0884 -0.0774 0.1707 0.0580 
Age 0.0028 0.0191 0.0007 0.0092 0.0077 0.0103 
Primary -0.3694 0.2673 -0.0898 -0.0670 0.2214 -0.2047 
Secondary 0.1698 0.2483 0.0413 -0.0368 0.2322 0.0265 
Tertiary 0.2519 0.5212 0.0613 -0.0667 0.5087 0.0272 
Duration -0.0075 0.0177 -0.0018 0.0275*** 0.0106 0.0247 
OECD 0.5903** 0.2876 0.1435 0.3919 0.2620 0.6119 
Africa 0.0383 0.3778 0.0093 -0.4235* 0.2376 -0.4092 
Urban Senegal 0.4883 0.3008 0.1187 -0.7725*** 0.2293 -0.5905 
Professional -0.4762 0.3576 -0.1158 0.4871 0.3577 0.3096 
Service 0.2354 0.1956 0.0572 0.0186 0.1465 0.1063 
Agriculture & Crafts -0.2867 0.2301 -0.0697 0.4537** 0.2250 0.3468 
Reason 0.8420*** 0.3119 0.2047 0.3179 0.2710 0.6317 
Employed (omitted)   (omitted)   
Alone 0.3967** 0.2228 0.0965 0.1930 0.2026 0.3409 
Size of HH -0.0104 0.0138 -0.0025 -0.0184* 0.0112 -0.0223 
Assets of HH 0.6813 0.4635 0.1657 0.0777 0.3929 0.3316 
Expenditure of HH 0.2473** 0.1164 0.0601 0.0689 0.0910 0.1611 
Duration > 1 year 0.4622** 0.1882 0.1124    
Constant -5.4812*** 1.6494  11.1963*** 1.5869  
 Joint significance Joint significance 
  Chi2 Prob > Chi2  Chi2 Prob > Chi2 
 Education 5.03 0.1697 Education 0.11 0.9904 
 Residence 7.83 0.0496 Residence 33.90 0.0000 
 Occupation 11.33 0.0101 Occupation 7.20 0.0657 
 Origin region 16.41 0.0886 Origin region 100.79 0.0000 
 Model statistics 
   N 991   
   Uncensored 761   
   
Log 
pseudolikelihood -1065504.0   
   Chi2 .   
   Prob > Chi2 .   
   Rho -0.8363   
   Rho =  0: Chi2 7.75   
   
Rho = 0:  
Prob > Chi2 0.0054   
 
In terms of the motives for remitting, the results seem to take away support from the exchange 
motive implied by the results of the tobit model, as the effect of the recipient household’s 
long-run expenditure, a proxy for its long-run expenditure, has a statistically significant and 
116 
 
positive impact on the probability of remitting. This should not be the case: the probability of 
remitting should decrease with the recipient household’s income, as the likelihood of the 
remittance transfers being mutually beneficial decreases (Cox 1987:518). Moreover, the 
coefficient of the variable indicating whether the migrant has completed primary education is 
insignificant in both the participation and the outcome equation, contrary to the tobit model, 
further undermining the exchange motive.  
There are a couple of interesting results in terms of significant variables in the outcome 
equation: the number of former household members affects the amount of remittances 
negatively, and the duration of migration has a positive effect on the amount of remittances. 
In terms of the number of household members, it could be expected that the larger the 
household is, the higher is its need for additional income and remittances, especially if the 
household is mainly composed of dependants not able to work. However, if the household 
have a high proportion of members that are able to work, remittances from migrants may not 
be as needed as in the former case and may even decrease remittances, which could be the 
case in Senegal. 
In terms of the duration of migration, none of the motives are consistent with the probability 
and amount of remittances increasing with the duration of migration. The duration may, 
however, be interpreted as a proxy for the professional experience the migrant gains during 
his migration, and thus as a proxy for his income. Even though it is often expected that 
income first increases and then decreases with the worker’s age and experience, this inverse 
U-shaped relationship is not supported by additional estimations.  Thus, the positive effect of 
the duration of migration is in line with the general notion of a higher income of the migrant 
increasing the probability and amount of remittances, which is consistent with all motives for 
remitting, except for the insurance motive. This result is further supported by the effect of 
working in an agricultural or crafts occupation, a further proxy for the migrant’s income, 
being positive on the amount of remittances. However, two contrasting findings cast some 
doubt to these conclusions: migrants residing in Africa and in urban regions of Senegal, 
where incomes could be expected to be higher, remit less than migrants residing in rural 
regions of Senegal.  
7.2.3. Two-part model for probability and amount of remittances 
The two-part model’s probit estimation of the likelihood of remitting and the OLS estimation 
of the conditional logarithmic amount remitted are presented table 12. However, as the 
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correlation coefficient rho in the Heckman selection model is significant, the participation and 
the outcome equation are not independent of one another, and the OLS estimation of the 
logarithmic amount remitted is likely to be inconsistent. Still, the two-part model estimation 
results are briefly compared to the Heckman selection model estimation results. 
Table 12. Two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent  
Variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on 
the probability of 
remitting Coefficient 
Robust 
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
Sex 0.5081* 0.2789 0.1220 0.0807 0.2344 0.0807 
Married 0.3100* 0.1615 0.0744 0.3029* 0.1662 0.3029 
Son 0.3380* 0.1966 0.0812 0.0326 0.1854 0.0326 
Age 0.0012 0.0205 0.0003 0.0113** 0.0052 0.0113 
Primary -0.4230* 0.2544 -0.1016 -0.2335 0.2343 -0.2335 
Secondary 0.2132 0.2449 0.0512 0.0295 0.1787 0.0295 
Tertiary 0.1136 0.4912 0.0273 -0.0554 0.4574 -0.0554 
Duration 0.0103 0.0178 0.0025 0.0324*** 0.0092 0.0324 
OECD 0.8980*** 0.3301 0.2157 0.7000*** 0.2578 0.7000 
Africa 0.1472 0.3640 0.0354 -0.3585 0.2364 -0.3585 
Urban Senegal 0.4851* 0.2726 0.1165 -0.6070*** 0.2099 -0.6070 
Professional -0.5842* 0.3423 -0.1403 0.2298 0.3294 0.2298 
Service 0.2642 0.2397 0.0634 0.1096 0.1451 0.1096 
Agriculture & Crafts -0.2337 0.2469 -0.0561 0.3471* 0.1947 0.3471 
Reason 0.8681** 0.3480 0.2085 0.7305*** 0.2073 0.7305 
Employed (omitted)   (omitted)  (omitted) 
Alone 0.3798* 0.2293 0.0912 0.3315* 0.1771 0.3315 
Size of HH -0.0063 0.0145 -0.0015 -0.0210** 0.0094 -0.0210 
Assets of HH 0.6255 0.5139 0.1502 0.3265 0.3734 0.3265 
Expenditure of HH 0.2221** 0.1065 0.0533 0.1589* 0.0804 0.1589 
Constant -5.0627*** 1.6429  8.4285*** 1.2905  
 Joint significance Joint significance 
  Chi2 Prob > Chi2  F Prob > F 
 Education 5.48 0.1401 Education 0.37 0.7750 
 Residence 9.69 0.0214 Residence 18.12 0.0000 
 Occupation 7.21 0.0656 Occupation 1.18 0.3227 
 Origin region 39.16 0.0000 Origin region 10.08 0.0000 
 Model statistics Model statistics 
 N 991 N 761 
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -304281.3 R2 0.5992 
 Pseudo-R2 0.1942 Root MSE 0.99508 
 
The signs and magnitudes of the probit estimates are rather similar to those of the Heckman 
selection model’s participation equation. In terms of statistical significance, however, there 
are a three variables – those indicating whether the migrant has completed primary level 
education, whether he resides in urban regions of Senegal and whether he works in a 
professional level occupation – whose coefficients statistically significant in the probit model 
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but not in the Heckman selection model’s participation equation. When it comes to the OLS 
estimates, there are several differences in the signs, magnitudes and statistical significances of 
the variable coefficients when compared to the Heckman selection model’s outcome equation. 
The partial effects of the independent variables on the probability of remitting and on the 
conditional expected logarithmic amount remitted, however, are rather similar in the two-part 
model and in the Heckman selection model.  
The differences between the two models’ estimates may arise precisely from the finding that 
the decision to remit and the decision on how much to remit are not independent from one 
another, and thus require an estimation method like the Heckman selection model that account 
for this phenomenon. Despite these differences, however, none of the results of the two-part 
model contrast the conclusions made earlier in terms of the motives for remitting. Thus, the 
results of the two-part model are not discussed further, and the results of Heckman selection 
model should be primarily referred to. 
7.2.4. Two-part model for probability and amount of remittances by gender and 
destination 
In this section, the results obtained with the two-part model in the previous section are 
contrasted across genders and destinations separately. In table 13, the results by gender are 
presented. In addition, in figures 11 through 15 in appendix 5, the correct interaction effects 
and statistical significances of the interaction variables in the probit model are presented. Yet, 
it should be kept in mind that the OLS estimates of the two-part model are likely to be 
inconsistent, as the decisions on whether to remit and on how much to remit are not 
independent of one another.  
In the probit estimation, non-interacted variables OECD and expenditure of HH have 
statistically significant coefficients, like in the two-part model estimation for all migrants. In 
addition, the interactions male*OECD and male*assets of HH are statistically significant, but 
these results may be misleading. According to the mean interaction effects, the former effect 
is, on average, negative, while the latter is negative, but both of them are, on average, 
statistically insignificant. Looking at figures 11 and 14 in appendix 5 implies that, however, 
for some observations, the interaction effects of these variables are statistically significant. 
The interaction effect of interaction male*OECD is both negative and positive depending on 
the predicted probability of the dependent variable, while the interaction effect of interaction 
male*assets of HH is positive but varies widely. In terms of their statistical significance, for 
119 
 
quite many observations the effect of interaction male*OECD is statistically significant on the 
5 percent significance level: these observations correspond to migrants with a variety of 
predicted probabilities of remitting, and to both positive and negative interaction effects. For 
the interaction male*assets of HH, the observations for which the interaction effect is 
statistically significant correspond to migrants with a good 60 percent predicted probability of 
remitting, and for them, the interaction effect is from around 2 to 2.5 percent. However, no 
conclusions should be made from these findings due to the low incidence of statistically 
significant interaction effects.  
      Table 13. Partial two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal by gender 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent variable Coefficient Robust std. err. Coefficient Robust std. err. 
Male 3.1312 3.2085 -1.1082 1,3781 
OECD 1.9156*** 0.5016 2.0368*** 0,4963 
Male*OECD -1.0754** 0.5423 -1.4333*** 0,3965 
Tertiary -0.1338 0.6009 -0.9280** 0,4071 
Male*Tertiary 0.1757 0.7227 0.9581* 0,5565 
Employed (omitted)  (omitted)  
Male*Employed (omitted)  (omitted)  
Assets of HH -1.0111 0.7599 1.3560*** 0,2529 
Male*Assets of HH 1.6897* 0.9200 -1.2259*** 0,4003 
Expenditure of HH 0.5504** 0.2235 -0.0747 0,1194 
Male*Expenditure of HH -0.3408 0.2394 0.2412** 0,1157 
 Mean interaction effects   
 Mean Std. err. z   
Male*OECD -0.2103 0.8791 -0.5042   
Male*Tertiary 0.0198 0.1535 0.1364   
Male*Employed (omitted)     
Male*Assets of HH 0.1986 1.6301 0.2221   
Male*Expenditure of HH -0.0114 1.8169 0.0083   
 Model statistics Model statistics 
 N 991 N 761 
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -297450.12 R2 0.6127 
 Pseudo-R2 0.2123 Root MSE 0.9809 
 
In the OLS estimation, remittances respond statistically significantly to whether the migrant is 
residing in an OECD country, whether he has completed tertiary level education and whether 
the recipient household owns any land or buildings. Only the first one of these is statistically 
significant in the two-part model estimation for all migrants. In addition, the effects of 
interactions male*OECD, male*tertiary and male*assets of HH are also statistically 
significant, meaning that the remittance behaviour of male migrants is significantly different 
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from that of female migrants when it comes to the effects of residing in OECD countries, 
education and the recipient household’s assets. 
Firstly, male migrants residing in OECD countries increase their remittances less in response 
to their residence than female migrants do: residing in an OECD country is associated with an 
average 204 percent increase of remittances among female migrants, but the increase among 
male migrants is only 203.68 – 143.33 = 60.35 percent. As residing in an OECD country is 
one of the proxies for the migrant’s income and likely to increase this income, the result 
implies that female migrants are willing to share a larger proportion of their increased income 
with their families back home than male migrants. While this could be interpreted as female 
migrants being more altruistic towards their families than male migrants, the result is 
consistent with other motives for remittances, as well, except for the insurance motive.  
Secondly, while remittances of female migrants respond negatively to them having completed 
tertiary level education, the effect is slightly positive among male migrants. Education having 
a negative impact on remittances may be a sign of the exchange motive: highly-educated 
female migrants, being less inclined to return home than less-educated ones, are likely to send 
smaller remittances. However, as the effect of the recipient household’s long-run expenditure, 
a proxy for its long-run income, on the probability of remitting is positive and statistically 
significant – and as its effect on the amount of remittances is statistically insignificant – 
among female migrants, this conclusion should be regarded with caution. In contrast, 
remittances of male migrants increase with education, implying that male migrants may be 
motivated by the strategic or the investment motive. However, as the effect of the interaction 
variable male*expenditure of HH on remittances is positive, the latter motive is more 
probable, and male migrants may send remittances to repay educational loans they have 
received from their former households.   
Thirdly and lastly, remittances respond positively to whether the household owns any 
inheritable assets, but the response of male migrants’ remittances is much smaller than that of 
female migrants’ remittances: while the recipient household owning assets is associated with 
a 136 percent increase in remittances among female migrants, the increase among male 
migrants is only 135.60 – 122.59 = 13.01 percent. What this result implies is that female 
migrants are more concerned about the possible inheritance they will receive, and hence 
increase their remittances more than male migrants.           
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In table 14, the results by destinations of migrants are presented. In addition, in figures 16 
through 20 in appendix 5 the correct interaction effects and statistical significances of the 
interaction variables in the probit model are presented. The statistically significant non-
interacted variable coefficients in the probit estimation – male, OECD and expenditure of HH 
– are significant also in the two-part model estimation for all migrants. However, none of the 
interaction variables are statistically significant, but this result may be misleading. The mean 
interaction effects indicate that the effects of interactions OECD*male and 
OECD*expenditure of HH are on average negative, while the effects of the interactions 
OECD*tertiary and OECD*assets of HH are on average positive – all of them are, however, 
on average statistically insignificant.  
    Table 14. Partial two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal by destination 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent variable Coefficient Robust std. err. Coefficient Robust std. err. 
Male 0.8259*** 0.3072 0.5818*** 0.2173 
OECD 3.5875** 3.6764 2.9959* 1.6688 
OECD*Male -1.2554 0.5081 -1.1680*** 0.3835 
Tertiary -0.2657 0.4813 1.3508** 0.5611 
OECD*Tertiary 0.6261 0.6669 -2.1380*** 0.6922 
Employed (omitted)  (omitted)  
OECD*Employed (omitted)  (omitted)  
Assets of HH 0.1487 0.6024 0.4290 0.3900 
OECD*Assets of HH 1.2183 0.9565 -0.7007 0.4923 
Expenditure of HH 0.2777*** 0.0991 0.1741* 0.0946 
OECD*Expenditure of HH -0.2199 0.2741 -0.0394 0.1309 
 Mean interaction effects   
 Mean Std. err. Z   
OECD*Male -0.2389 0.2352 -1.5875   
OECD*Tertiary 0.0699 0.4841 0.2022   
OECD*Employed (omitted)     
OECD*Assets of HH 0.0881 1.5119 -0.0239   
OECD*Expenditure of HH -0.0669 1.8362 -0.0584   
 Model statistics Model statistics 
 N 991 N 761 
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -296973.86 R2 0.6181 
 Pseudo-R2 0.2136 Root MSE 0.9741 
 
The figures from 16 to 20 in appendix 5 show that the interaction effects vary widely across 
the different predicted probabilities of the dependent variable. However, looking at the 
statistical significance of the interaction effects, the figures imply that for some observations, 
the interaction OECD*male and the interaction OECD*assets of HH are statistically 
significant. The interaction effect of interaction OECD*male is significant and negative for 
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observations corresponding to migrants with a variety of predicted probabilities of remitting. 
In turn, the interaction effect of interaction OECD*assets of HH is statistically significant for 
only a few observations corresponding to migrants with a predicted probability of remitting 
around 80 percent: for these observations, the interaction effect is around 5 percentage points 
or slightly less than zero percentage points. Still, since for most observations the above 
interaction effects are insignificant, no robust conclusions can be drawn from the findings. 
In the OLS estimation, the effects of variables indicating whether the migrant is male, 
whether he resides in an OECD country, whether he has completed tertiary level education 
and what the recipient household’s long-run expenditure is are statistically significant. Of 
these variables, only variables OECD and expenditure of HH have statistically significant 
coefficients in the two-part model estimation for all migrants. Also the effects of interaction 
variables OECD*male and OECD*tertiary are statistically significant, meaning that when it 
comes to the effects of education and being male, migrants residing in OECD countries 
behave significantly differently from migrants residing in African countries. 
The interaction between the migrant being male and residing in an OECD country is negative. 
Among migrants residing in African countries, being male is associated with an 58.2 percent 
increase in remittances. However, among migrants residing in the OECD countries, being 
male is associated with a decrease of 116.80 – 58.18 = 58.62 percent in remittances.  
The effect of education on remittances of migrants residing in OECD countries is interesting, 
as they respond negatively to the completion of tertiary level education: tertiary education 
decreases remittances of migrants residing in OECD countries by 213.80 – 135.08 = 78.72 
percent. However, tertiary education among migrants residing in African countries is 
associated with an increase in remittances. In terms of the motives for remitting, this result 
suggests that migrants residing in OECD countries, being less likely to return home due to 
their higher education, may decrease their remittances to the recipient households. While this 
kind of behaviour is consistent with the exchange motive, the behaviour of migrants residing 
in African countries falls under the investment motive, and they may send remittances at least 
partly to repay educational loans they have received from their former households. These 
conclusions are further supported by the positive effect that the recipient household’s 
expenditure, a proxy for its income, has on the amount of remittances. However, its effect on 
the probability of remittances is positive and statistically significant, as well, which is 
inconsistent with the exchange motive. 
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7.2.5. Effects of other migrants and parental funding from recipient household 
on probability and amount of remittances   
As mentioned in section 6.2.1.2, with the Senegalese data it was possible to test whether the 
number of international migrants from the same household and whether receiving funding for 
migration from parents affect migrants’ decisions on whether to remit and how much to remit. 
The tobit, Heckman selection and two-part model estimations including these variables were 
carried out, and the coefficient estimates, standard errors and partial effects of the newly-
included variables are presented in appendix 6, and are briefly discussed here.  
First, the coefficient of the variable indicating the number of international migrants from the 
same household is positive but insignificant in the tobit model, but the coefficient of the 
variable squared is negative and significant – the coefficients are jointly statistically 
significant. The same is true in the Heckman selection model’s participation equation, and in 
the two-part model’s first equation. Second, the variable indicating whether the migrant’s 
parents have funded the migration is statistically insignificant according to all estimations.  
What the first result implies is that in Senegal, the number of international migrants from the 
same household first increase, and then decrease the probability of the migrant remitting to 
the household. Rapoport and Docquier (2006:1161) suggest the possibility of this kind of a 
relationship between the number of migrants and the amount of remittances: first, the 
competition between migrants from the same household increase remittances, but later on, the 
effect of competition is offset by the decreasing probability of the migrant receiving an 
inheritance. This kind of behaviour thus seems to indicate that migrants may be motivated by 
a possible inheritance, and are more likely to remit when there are only a small number of 
international migrants from the same household. The second result suggests that migrants do 
not consider the investment their parents have made in their migration when they make their 
remittance decisions, meaning that the investment motive and loan repayment is not driving 
their remittance behaviour. This finding is supported by earlier estimations, as well, where the 
coefficient of the variable indicating the recipient household’s assets is insignificant.  
7.2.6. Probit model for choice between official and unofficial remittance 
channels 
The probit estimation results for the choice between official and unofficial remittance 
channels are presented in table 15. The coefficients of variables indicating the whether the 
migrant is male, whether he is the son or daughter of the household head, the duration of his 
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migration, whether he is residing in an OECD country or in urban regions of Senegal are 
statistically significant. In addition, the coefficients of variables indicating the migrant’s 
current residence and his origin region are jointly statistically significant.  
Of the significant variables, the largest partial effects on the probability of using official 
channels are induced by whether the migrant is residing in an OECD country or in the urban 
regions of Senegal, and whether the migrant is male. The two latter effects are negative: 
Migrants residing in urban regions of Senegal have an 11.3 percent lower probability of using 
official channels for remitting than migrants residing in rural regions of Senegal, while male 
migrants have a 8.6 percent lower probability of doing so than female migrants.  
     Table 15. Probit model for choice between official and unofficial  
               remittance channels in Senegal 
Independent  
variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
probability of using 
official channels 
Sex -0.6777* 0.3493 -0.0861 
Married 0.4032 0.2932 0.0512 
Son 0.5769** 0.2470 0.0733 
Age 0.0017 0.0139 0.0002 
Primary -0.1840 0.3337 -0.0234 
Secondary -0.3563 0.2643 -0.0453 
Tertiary 0.7440 0.5016 0.0945 
Duration 0.0300* 0.0174 0.0038 
OECD 2.1980*** 0.4490 0.2793 
Africa 0.5469 0.4950 0.0695 
Urban Senegal -0.8924** 0.4300 -0.1134 
Professional -0.6531 0.4070 -0.0830 
Service 0.1561 0.2595 0.0198 
Agriculture & Crafts -0.0823 0.2930 -0.0105 
Reason 0.5146 0.4513 0.0654 
Employed (omitted)   
Alone 0.1302 0.2265 0.0165 
Size of HH -0.0104 0.0154 -0.0013 
Assets of HH 0.1900 0.4778 0.0241 
Expenditure of HH 0.1537 0.1280 0.0195 
Constant -3.4651** 1.6270  
Joint significance 
 Chi2 Prob > Chi2 
Education 6.24 0.1005 
Residence 172.06 0.0000 
Occupation 3.80 0.2834 
Origin region 100.47 0.0000 
Model statistics 
 N 782  
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -130687.97  
 Pseudo-R2 0.6509  
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In terms of the residence of the migrant, it could have been expected that as urban regions 
tend to be better covered by banks and money transfer operators than rural ones, urban 
migrants would be more inclined to use these official services for sending their remittances 
than rural migrants: this is not the case here, however. Yet, the result that remittances from 
OECD countries are preferably sent officially is a rather expected one, and may imply that 
migrants residing in OECD countries value the usually better reliability of official channels 
more than migrants residing in rural regions of Senegal. Also, as this variable may be 
interpreted as a proxy for the migrant’s income, and is expected to increase this income, 
migrants residing in OECD countries may not be as liquidity constrained in their choice 
between remittance channels as migrants in rural regions of Senegal, and are likely to have a 
better access to official channels. Regarding the result that male migrants are more likely to 
resort to unofficial channels than female migrants, it may be that male migrants are less risk-
averse than female migrants and thus ready to take the risks associated with remitting 
unofficially. 
7.2.7. Probit model for choice between international and internal migration 
Table 16 displays the probit estimation results for the choice between international and 
internal migration. The specification estimated here is slightly different from the one 
estimated with the Ugandan data, as it includes independent variables indicating the number 
of other international and internal migrants from the same household. 
The choice of sending the migrant abroad is statistically significantly and positively affected 
by the migrant’s age, whether he is married, whether he is likely to work in a service level or 
in an agricultural or crafts occupation, whether he intends to work or search for work, the 
assets of the recipient household, and the number of international migrants from the same 
household. In turn, the choice of sending the migrant abroad is statistically significantly and 
negatively associated with whether the migrant has completed primary education, the 
intended duration of his migration, whether he is likely to work in a professional level 
occupation, the size of his former household, and the number of internal migrants from the 
same household. In addition, the occupation-, migrant-, and origin region-related variable 
coefficients are also jointly statistically significant. 
The results imply that migrants that are more likely sent abroad form a relatively experienced 
group: they are likely to be older, married, and intend to work or at least search for work in 
their country of destination. The finding that the sending household’s assets affect the 
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probability of international migration positively is an expected one, as wealthier households 
are likely to be in a better financial position to fund the higher costs associated with travelling 
abroad than poorer ones. In contrast, as pointed out in section 4.1, the size of the household 
may have a negative effect on sending the migrant abroad, as larger households need to 
satisfy higher consumption needs than smaller ones, and may not have the spare funds needed 
to cover the costs of international migration. 
  
              Table 16. Probit model for choice between international and internal  
                            migration from Senegal 
Independent  
variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
probability of sending 
the migrant abroad 
Sex 0.1595 0.2963 0.0196 
Married 0.4102* 0.2390 0.0503 
Son 0.0509 0.2436 0.0062 
Age 0.0322*** 0.0105 0.0039 
Primary -0.7053** 0.3288 -0.0865 
Secondary 0.1750 0.2271 0.0215 
Tertiary -0.2210 0.4703 -0.0271 
Duration -0.0211** 0.0107 -0.0026 
Professional -0.7419** 0.3710 -0.0910 
Service 0.5059* 0.2257 0.0621 
Agriculture & Crafts 0.5147* 0.3088 0.0632 
Reason 0.4790* 0.2683 0.0588 
Employed (omitted)   
Alone -0.3003 0.2193 -0.0368 
Size of HH -0.0411** 0.0204 -0.0050 
Assets of HH 0.6654* 0.3597 0.0468 
Expenditure of HH 0.0098 0.0802 0.0012 
International migrants 1.4453*** 0.2371 0.1773 
Internal migrants -0.5752*** 0.0914 -0.0706 
Constant -2.1814 1.2922  
Joint significance 
 Chi2 Prob > Chi2 
Education 5.49 0.1394 
Occupation 12.25 0.0066 
Other migrants 46.64 0.0000 
Origin region 88.28 0.0000 
Model statistics 
 N 992  
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -152319.4  
 Pseudo-R2 0.6882  
 
Also the positive effect of the number of international migrants from the same household has 
a rather intuitive explanation: if there is a household member, or several of them, already 
abroad, the household may perceive the risk of sending another one abroad to be smaller. 
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Especially, if the household decides to send the new migrant to the same destination as the 
other one, he will have an existing social network there to facilitate his adjustment to the new 
environment. Most likely for the same reason, the number of internal migrants from the same 
household affects international migration negatively, and the household may prefer to send 
the new migrant to the destination it has sent the previous one(s), i.e. to other parts of Uganda.  
The negative effect of the migrant having primary education, and the negative effect of the 
migrant having the potential to work in professional level occupations on the probability of 
sending the migrant abroad, is interesting. In terms of the effect of the migrant’s education, 
the household may regard the migrant with only primary education as not having that good 
chances of finding employment in international job markets, and thus prefers to send him only 
to other parts of Senegal. Also, the return to a low level of education abroad may not be much 
better than within Senegal to make it profitable for the household to consider sending a 
poorly-educated migrant abroad. Moreover, the reason for migration among migrants with 
low education may not even be to work, but to obtain further education. In this case, the 
household may not even aim at receiving supplementary income in the form of remittances, 
and thus may prefer to send migrants to closer locations with lower migration costs. Indeed, if 
migrants do not intend to work in their country of destination, the results above indicate that 
they are less likely sent abroad.  
When it comes to the potential occupation of the migrant, it could be expected that a migrant 
who could work in professional level occupations would more likely be sent abroad where he 
could reap the full monetary benefits of his aptitude, as wages are presumably higher abroad 
than in Senegal. However, as hypothesised in section 4.2, it could also be possible that this 
potential of the migrant of being a professional level worker could only be realised within 
Senegal, as employers elsewhere might not be able to recognise his potential and skills, or 
would not regard the qualifications of the migrant as highly as Senegalese employers. Thus, 
high-skill migrants could end up working in occupations requiring less skills than they 
actually have. This latter hypothesis does seem to receive some support, as the potential of 
working in a professional level occupation affect the probability of sending a migrant abroad 
negatively. 
In contrast, the recognition of the migrant’s skills and qualifications may be easier or not as 
relevant abroad regarding lower-level occupations such as those in the service or agricultural 
sector, and thus migrants suitable for these occupations could actually work in these 
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occupations and get the higher international wage offered for these jobs. This hypothesis is 
also supported by the results, as the effect of the potential of working in a service level and 
agricultural and crafts occupation is positive on the probability of sending the migrant abroad.  
7.3. Estimation results for Nigeria 
In sections 7.3.1, 7.3.2 and 7.3.3, the tobit, Heckman selection and two-part model estimation 
results for the determinants of the probability and amount of remittances are presented and 
discussed, respectively. These results are contrasted across genders and destinations of 
migrants in section 7.2.4. In section 7.2.5, the effects of the recipient household’s education, 
occupation and employment on the probability and amount of remittances are discussed. The 
probit model results for the determinants of the choice between official and unofficial 
remittance channels are investigated in section 7.2.6, and in section 7.2.7, the probit model 
results for the determinants of the choice between international and internal migration are 
examined. 
7.3.1. Tobit model for probability and amount of remittances 
The tobit estimation results are presented in table 17. Remittances are statistically 
significantly affected by whether the migrant is male, whether he is married, whether he is the 
son or daughter of the household head, whether he has completed tertiary education, the 
duration of his migration, whether he currently resides in an OECD or an African country or 
in urban regions of Nigeria, whether he works in a professional level occupation, whether he 
migrated for work, whether he is employed, and the recipient household’s assets. Moreover, 
the coefficients of variables indicating the migrant’s education, his current residence, his 
occupation and his origin state are jointly statistically significant. 
Of these variables, the ones that have the strongest partial effect on the probability of 
remitting are whether the migrant is employed, and whether he is currently residing in an 
OECD country or in urban regions of Nigeria. While employed migrants have a 26.3 percent 
higher probability of remitting than unemployed ones, migrants residing in OECD and in 
African countries have a 14.5  and a 12.8 percent higher probability of remitting, respectively, 
than those residing in rural areas of Nigeria.  
In terms of the partial effects on the conditional expected logarithmic amount remitted, 
residing in another African country and having completed tertiary education also have a 
considerable effect: migrants residing in African countries remit on average 307 percent more 
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than migrants residing in rural areas of Nigeria, and migrants having completed tertiary 
education remit on average 246 percent more than migrants with no education. 
Table 17. Tobit model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
   
Independent  
Variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on 
the probability of 
remitting 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
Sex 1.5752* 0.8783 0.0567 1.1016 
Married 1.3787* 0.4754 0.0454 0.9904 
Son 2.3139** 0.9150 0.0742 1.6704 
Age 0.0005 0.0257 0.0000 0.0003 
Primary 1.7221 1.4556 0.0515 1.2781 
Secondary 2.3630 1.4881 0.0757 1.724 
Tertiary 3.3007*** 1.2819 0.1002 2.4578 
Duration 0.0753** 0.0337 0.0024 0.0543 
OECD 6.0603*** 1.9615 0.1451 4.8357 
Africa 3.8902** 1.8945 0.0963 3.0696 
Urban Nigeria 3.3497* 1.8924 0.1280 2.2758 
Professional 1.9104*** 0.7298 0.0621 1.3883 
Service 1.0429 0.7707 0.0329 0.7635 
Agriculture & Crafts -0.0741 0.9214 -0.0024 -0.0534 
Reason 1.0521* 0.5786 0.0360 0.7496 
Employed 5.5005*** 1.1592 0.2628 3.401 
Alone 0.3800 0.4665 0.0123 0.2748 
Size of HH -0.0915 0.0790 -0.0029 -0.066 
Assets of HH -0.8971** 0.4263 -0.0276 -0.661 
Expenditure of HH -0.0837 0.2436 -0.0027 -0.0604 
Constant -8.4331 5.7350   
Joint significance 
  F Prob > F  
 Education 3.95 0.0082  
 Residence 10.48 0.0000  
 Occupation 4.70 0.0029  
 
Origin 
state 31019.46 0.0000  
 Model statistics  
 N 920  
 Uncensored 643  
 Sigma 4.7369  
 Log pseudolikelihood -5047819.4  
 Pseudo-R2 0.1115  
 F .  
 Prob > F .  
 
Clearly, the migrant’s income has a significant positive effect on remittances, especially 
through the proxy variable indicating the migrant’s current residence, but also through the 
migrant’s employment status and level of education and occupation – these effects again rule 
out the insurance motive. Also the positive effect of the duration of migration, a proxy for the 
migrant’s working experience and thus for his income, on remittances is in line with the 
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above conclusion. However, this positive effect goes against the altruistic motive, which 
predicts remittances to decrease alongside fading altruistic feelings towards the recipient 
household (Rapoport and Docquier 2006:1153). The migrant’s education having a positive 
effect on remittances suggest that migrants may be driven by the strategic or the investment 
motive: the educated migrant may be either bribing less-educated family members to stay 
home, or repaying educational loans his former household has given him in the past (Stark 
1995:93; Rapoport and Docquier 2006:1156).  
However, none of the motives for remittances, least of all the inheritance motive, are 
consistent with the recipient household’s assets having a negative impact on remittances, 
which is found in these estimations. Yet, if these assets are interpreted as a proxy for the 
recipient household’s long-run income, the negative effect could be an indication of a variety 
of motives. In turn, the positive effect that employment has on remittances goes against the 
suggestion made by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006:229), according to whom migrants 
facing a higher income risk, e.g. unemployed migrants, should remit more than those facing a 
lower income risk in order to insure themselves.  
7.3.2. Heckman selection model for probability and amount of remittances 
The estimation results obtained with the Heckman selection model are presented in table 18. 
In contrast to the results obtained for Uganda and Senegal, the correlation coefficient rho is 
insignificant: the null hypothesis of independent equations cannot be rejected, and the 
participation equation and the outcome equation are likely to not be dependent of one another. 
Thus, OLS estimates of the independent variable coefficients are likely to be consistent. For 
this reason, the two-part model results are more deeply discussed and compared to results of 
the Heckman selection model in the following section, and here, only the statistical 
significance of the variable coefficients in the Heckman selection model is reviewed. 
In the participation equation, the coefficients of variables indicating whether the migrant is 
married, whether he is the son or daughter of the household head, whether he has completed 
tertiary level education, whether he resides in OECD countries or in urban regions of Nigeria, 
whether he migrated for work, whether he is employed, and whether his migration has lasted 
for more than one year, are statistically significant. In the outcome equation, variables 
indicating whether the migrant is male, whether he is married, whether he has completed 
primary, secondary or tertiary level education,  the duration of his migration, whether he lives 
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alone, the size of his former household, and what the recipient household’s long-run 
expenditure is, have statistically significant coefficients. 
  Table 18. Heckman selection model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent  
variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on 
the probability of 
remitting Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
Sex 0.3264 0.2606 0.0620 0.3017** 0.1464 0.3127 
Married 0.2554** 0.1079 0.0520 0.3587* 0.1996 0.3669 
Son 0.7696*** 0.1965 0.1543 0.0923 0.1789 0.1168 
Age 0.0053 0.0071 0.0010 -0.0180 0.0115 -0.0179 
Primary 0.0675 0.3335 0.0133 1.3521** 0.6714 1.3542 
Secondary 0.3083 0.3363 0.0604 1.5311** 0.6182 1.5407 
Tertiary 0.6025** 0.2830 0.1187 1.6101** 0.6552 1.6283 
Duration 0.0103 0.0096 0.0020 0.0207* 0.0121 0.0211 
OECD 1.2694*** 0.4615 0.2104 0.8666 0.6760 0.8985 
Africa 0.6599 0.4302 0.1149 0.5969 0.7505 0.6148 
Urban Nigeria 0.7106* 0.3819 0.1497 -0.2004 0.7104 -0.1758 
Professional 0.5246** 0.2144 0.1065 0.2142 0.2137 0.2307 
Service 0.1553 0.2562 0.0305 0.1028 0.1864 0.1077 
Agriculture & Crafts 0.0222 0.2978 0.0044 0.0800 0.2487 0.0807 
Reason 0.3523*** 0.0890 0.0741 0.0928 0.3212 0.1044 
Employed 1.3843*** 0.3588 0.3375 0.3901 0.2690 0.4467 
Alone -0.0388 0.1635 -0.0077 0.3219** 0.1301 0.3206 
Size of HH -0.0092 0.0295 -0.0018 -0.0582** 0.0267 -0.0584 
Assets of HH -0.3335 0.2150 -0.0626 -0.0235 0.2091 -0.0334 
Expenditure of HH -0.0915 0.0863 -0.0183 0.1072** 0.0430 0.1043 
Duration > 1 year 0.5398* 0.3081 0.1178   0.0193 
Constant -2.3641* 1.3823  6.9341*** 0.9667  
 Joint significance Joint significance 
  Chi2 Prob > Chi2  Chi2 Prob > Chi2 
 Education 6.21 0.1016 Education 7.24 0.0647 
 Residence 10.29 0.0163 Residence 83.25 0.0000 
 Occupation 12.13 0.0069 Occupation 1.12 0.7723 
 Origin state 7.6*10^6 0.0000 Origin state 6.2*10^5 0.0000 
 Model statistics 
   N 918   
   Uncensored 640   
   
Log 
pseudolikelihood -3182148.0   
   Chi2 .   
   Prob > Chi2 .   
   Rho -0.0689   
   Rho = 0: Chi2 1.50   
   
Rho = 0:  
Prob > Chi2 0.2212   
 
7.3.3. Two-part model for probability and amount of remittances 
The two-part model’s probit estimation of the likelihood of remitting and the OLS estimation 
of the conditional logarithmic amount remitted are presented table 19. Comparing these 
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results to those obtained with the Heckman selection model, the probit and OLS estimates are 
very similar in their statistical significance, signs and magnitude to the Heckman selection 
model estimates, giving robustness to the results and indicating that the OLS estimates are 
indeed likely to be consistent.  
  Table 19. Two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent  
variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on 
the probability of 
remitting Coefficient 
Robust 
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
Sex 0.3565 0.2539 0.0775 0.3188** 0.1429 0.3188 
Married 0.2917*** 0.1104 0.0607 0.3529 0.2086 0.3529 
Son 0.8042*** 0.1735 0.1623 0.1016 0.1886 0.1016 
Age 0.0051 0.0074 0.0009 -0.0176 0.0118 -0.0176 
Primary 0.1035 0.3179 0.0121 1.3743* 0.6925 1.3743 
Secondary 0.3592 0.3178 0.0612 1.5500** 0.6499 1.5500 
Tertiary 0.6553** 0.2717 0.1209 1.6425** 0.6926 1.6425 
Duration 0.0159** 0.0078 0.0032 0.0220* 0.0126 0.0220 
OECD 1.3197*** 0.4535 0.2173 0.9175 0.7011 0.9175 
Africa 0.6899 0.4217 0.1202 0.6276 0.7754 0.6276 
Urban Nigeria 0.7452** 0.3751 0.1617 -0.1718 0.7353 -0.1718 
Professional 0.4978** 0.2256 0.0970 0.2268 0.2139 0.2268 
Service 0.1966 0.2488 0.0343 0.0942 0.1925 0.0942 
Agriculture & Crafts 0.0079 0.2970 -0.0002 0.0753 0.2505 0.0753 
Reason 0.3051*** 0.0833 0.0620 0.1091 0.3357 0.1091 
Employed 1.4097*** 0.3598 0.3510 0.4158 0.2858 0.4158 
Alone -0.0310 0.1574 -0.0075 0.3206** 0.1323 0.3206 
Size of HH -0.0102 0.0287 -0.0017 -0.0574* 0.0274 -0.0574 
Assets of HH -0.3413* 0.2015 -0.0731 -0.0293 0.2145 -0.0293 
Expenditure of HH -0.0895 0.0840 -0.0196 0.1034** 0.0456 0.1034 
Constant -2.0505 1.3834  6.8118*** 1.0395  
 Joint significance Joint significance 
  Chi2 Prob > Chi2  F Prob > F 
 Education 6.95 0.0735 Education 2.17 0.1313 
 Residence 11.35 0.0100 Residence 27.65 0.0000 
 Occupation 10.40 0.0154 Occupation 0.41 0.7463 
 Origin state 1.5*10^7 0.0000 Origin state 27692.47 0.0000 
 Model statistics Model statistics 
 N 949 N 643 
 Log pseudolikelihood -762042.49 R2 0.5387 
 Pseudo-R2 0.3927 Root MSE 1.2274 
 
Only the variables indicating whether the migrant has completed tertiary education and the 
duration of his migration enter both equations significantly. Also the variables indicating the 
migrant’s current residence and his origin region are jointly statistically significant in both 
equations. Comparing the probit and OLS estimates to the tobit estimates, the pattern of the 
statistical significance and signs of the tobit coefficient estimates follows quite closely the 
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pattern of the probit coefficient estimates, with a few exceptions. However, the pattern of the 
statistical significance of the OLS estimates differs quite clearly from that of the tobit 
estimates: for instance, the coefficients of variables indicating whether the migrant lives 
alone, the number of former household members, and what the recipient household’s long-run 
expenditure is are statistically significant in the two-part model’s equation for the amount 
remitted, but insignificant in the tobit model. Conversely, while all the coefficients of 
variables relating to the migrant’s current residence are statistically significant in the tobit 
model, they are all insignificant in the two-part model’s equation for the amount remitted. 
In terms of the partial effects, the magnitudes of partial effects on the likelihood of remitting 
and on the conditional expected logarithmic amount remitted obtained with the two-part 
model are very similar to those obtained with the Heckman selection model. However, there 
are rather big differences between the magnitudes of partial effects on the probability of 
remitting obtained with the two-part model and those obtained with the tobit model, even 
though the pattern of their relative magnitude is similar. For instance, according to the two-
part model, employed migrants have a 34.4 percent higher probability of remitting than 
unemployed ones, compared to the 26.3 percent implied by the tobit model. Moreover, while 
migrants residing in OECD countries have a 21.4 percent higher probability of remitting than 
migrants residing in rural Nigeria, the corresponding probability is only 14.5 percent 
according to the tobit model. 
When it comes to the partial effects of the statistically significant variables on the conditional 
expected logarithmic amount remitted, differences between the partial effects obtained with 
the two-part model and the tobit model are notable, as well. In the two-part model, the largest 
semi-elasticities are for the variables indicating whether the migrant has completed primary, 
secondary or tertiary education: migrants having completed tertiary level education remit on 
average 164 percent more than migrants with no education – the corresponding figures for 
migrants with secondary or primary level education are 155 and 137 percent, respectively. 
According to the tobit model, migrants with tertiary level education remit on average 246 
percent more than migrants with no education.    
As the pattern of the statistical significance and signs of the variable coefficients in the two-
part model’s equation for the likelihood of remittances is similar to that of the tobit model, 
similar inferences to those made in section 7.3.1 in terms of the motives for remittances may 
be made. For its part, the two-part model’s equation for the amount remitted gives further 
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support to some of the previous conclusions. For instance, several proxies for the migrant’s 
income – the migrant’s gender, his education, the duration of his migration and his living 
situation – again have a positive effect on the amount of remittances, which is consistent with 
all of the motives for remitting, except for the insurance motive. Moreover, the positive effect 
of education is even more pronounced in the two-part model’s equation for the amount 
remitted than in the tobit model, and signifies the likely presence of either the strategic or the 
investment motive. The latter motive is supported by the positive effect that the recipient 
household’s long-run expenditure, a proxy for its long-run income, has on remittances. 
However, the prediction of the investment motive, i.e. the inverse U-shaped relationship 
between remittances and recipient household long-run income in the constrained region of 
migration, does not receive support from additional estimations (Rapoport and Docquier 
2006:1159). 
7.3.4. Two-part model for probability and amount of remittances by gender and 
destination 
In this section, the results obtained in the previous section are contrasted across genders and 
destinations separately. Table 20 displays the results by gender, and in figures 21 through 25 
in appendix 7, the correct interaction effects and statistical significances of the interaction 
variables in the probit model are presented.  
According to the standard probit model, the non-interacted variables OECD, tertiary and 
employed have statistically significant coefficients, like in the two-part model estimation for 
all migrants. The effects of interactions male*tertiary and male*assets of HH are statistically 
significant, but these results may be misleading. The mean interaction effects of both of these 
variables are, on average, negative but insignificant. But, according to figures 22 and 24 in 
appendix 7, the effects of both of these vary widely, and for the interaction male*tertiary, for 
some observations the interaction effect is positive.  
Looking at the correct statistical significances of the interactions, interaction effects of 
interactions male*OECD, male*tertiary and male*employed are statistically significant for 
some observations. The interaction effect of interaction male*OECD is statistically significant 
for a wide variety of observations with different predicted probabilities of remitting, and the 
interaction effects vary widely between -4 and 4 percentage points. The significant interaction 
effects of interactions male*tertiary and male*employed are for observations that correspond 
mainly to migrants with the predicted probability of remitting of nearly 100 and 80 percent, 
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respectively. The interaction effect of the interaction male*tertiary for the statistically 
significant group varies from zero to around -4 percentage points, while the interaction effect 
of the interaction male*employed for the statistically significant group is around -5 and 5 
percentage points. As the above effects are significant only for a relatively few observations, 
no robust conclusions from them should be made.  
      Table 20. Partial two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria by gender  
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent variable Coefficient Robust std. err. Coefficient Robust std. err. 
Male 3.1148 2.4956 2.4872** 1.1149 
OECD 1.0494** 0.4494 0.7633 0.7692 
Male*OECD 0.1950 0.1493 0.1456 0.2480 
Tertiary 1.1816*** 0.4056 2.1141** 0.7394 
Male*Tertiary -0.5831* 0.3230 -0.5521*** 0.1324 
Employed 1.3272*** 0.4065 0.5281 0.4933 
Male*Employed 0.0863 0.5310 -0.1704 0.4814 
Assets of HH 0.1597 0.3731 -1.2440** 0.5847 
Male*Assets of HH -0.6014* 0.3140 1.2624** 0.5909 
Expenditure of HH 0.0738 0.1908 0.3452*** 0.1095 
Male*Expenditure of HH -0.1952 0.2197 -0.2679** 0.1266 
 Mean interaction effects   
 Mean Std. err. z   
Male*OECD 0.0545 0.2769 0.4784   
Male*Tertiary -0.0688 2.0010 -0.0406   
Male*Employed 0.1836 3.0535 0.2262   
Male*Assets of HH -0.0978 0.5014 -0.2913   
Male*Expenditure of HH -0.0435 0.4788 -0.1338   
 Model statistics Model statistics 
 N 949 N 643 
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -754564.46 R2 0.5467 
 Pseudo-R2 0.3987 Root MSE 1.2218 
 
In the OLS estimation, the effects of variables indicating whether the migrant is male, 
whether he has completed tertiary level education, the recipient household’s assets, and what 
the recipient household’s expenditure is are statistically significant. Of these variables, 
variable assets of HH is statistically insignificant in the two-part model estimation for all 
migrants. Additionally, the interactions male*tertiary, male*assets of HH and 
male*expenditure of HH are also statistically significant, meaning that when it comes to the 
effects of education, household assets and expenditure, remittance behaviour of male migrants 
is significantly different from that of female migrants.  
The results imply that both male and female migrants increase their remittances in response to 
their higher education, but male migrants less so than female ones: while tertiary education 
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increases remittances by 211 percent among female migrants, the effect among male migrants 
is only 211.41 – 55.21 = 156.2 percent. This behaviour is consistent with the strategic and the 
investment motive, the latter one being more probable as the effect of the recipient 
household’s expenditure on remittances is positive for both groups of migrants. Thus, it is 
likely that both male and female migrants are repaying their educational loans to their former 
households with remittances. However, as is the case in Uganda, the stronger response among 
female migrants may arise because the education of females may have entailed higher 
opportunity costs to the recipient household than that of males, or because females may have 
less bargaining power relative to the recipient households than males. 
Interestingly, while female migrants respond negatively to whether their households own any 
inheritable assets, among male migrants the effect is just positive. Thus, female migrants do 
not seem to care about the possibility of inheriting, but male migrants do consider this when 
making their remittances decisions. 
When it comes to the effect of recipient household’s long-run expenditure, a proxy for its 
long-run income, male migrants respond to it positively, but significantly less than female 
migrants: while a one percent increase in the recipient household’s expenditure is associated 
with a 34.5 percent increase in the amount of remittances among female migrants, the 
corresponding increase among male migrants is only 34.52 – 26.79 = 7.73 percent. This 
relative magnitude of these effects is similar to that of the effects of the migrant’s education 
on the two groups of migrants, and together they suggest that it is the investment motive that 
quite likely motivates the remittance behaviour of male, and especially female, migrants.  
In table 21, the results by destination are presented, and in figures 26 through 30 in appendix 
7 the correct interaction effects and statistical significances of the interaction variables in the 
probit model are presented. In the probit estimation, the non-interacted variables tertiary and 
employed are statistically significant, like in the two-part model estimation for all migrants. 
None of the interaction effects are statistically significant according to the standard probit 
model, but this result may be misleading. The mean interaction effects, in turn, suggest that 
all the interaction effects are, on average, negative, except for the effect of the interaction 
variable OECD*expenditure of HH, and that all of them are, on average, statistically 
insignificant. Looking at the figures from 26 to 30 in appendix 7, the interaction effects vary 
widely across the different values of the predicted probability of the dependent variable, and 
tend to have either a wave shape or an inverse U-shape. When it comes to the statistical 
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significance of the interaction effects, only for a few observations, the effect of the interaction 
OECD*employed is statistically significant. These observations correspond to migrants with a 
good 90 percent predicted probability of remitting, and the interaction effect for these 
migrants is around -4 percentage points. Due to the sparse incidence of statistical significance, 
no conclusions should be drawn from this finding. 
   Table 21. Partial two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria by destination 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent variables Coefficient Robust std. err. Coefficient Robust std. err. 
Male 0.3550 0.2673 0.2881 0.2035 
OECD 1.4173 1.3653 -1.4995 2.6017 
OECD*Male -0.1073 0.2133 0.0521 0.2406 
Tertiary 0.6396** 0.2755 1.6739** 0.7057 
OECD*Tertiary -0.0873 0.3509 -0.0914 0.2588 
Employed 1.5415*** 0.4575 0.5061 0.4691 
OECD*Employed -0.8647 0.6496 -0.7195 0.8579 
Assets of HH -0.2856 0.2183 -0.0597 0.2089 
OECD*Assets of HH -0.3197 0.3155 0.4327 0.4661 
Expenditure of HH -0.0953 0.0928 0.0559 0.0645 
OECD*Expenditure of HH 0.0920 0.0973 0.2375 0.1519 
 Mean interaction effects   
 Mean Std. err. z   
OECD*Male -0.0597 0.0849 -0.7137   
Male*Tertiary -0.0946 1.1419 -0.1644   
OECD*Employed -0.2598 2.3740 -0.2094   
OECD*Assets of HH -0.0022 0.8169 0.0457   
OECD*Expenditure of HH 0.0225 0.5233 0.0542   
 Model statistics Model statistics 
 N 949 N 643 
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -758440.86 R2 0.5431 
 Pseudo-R2 0.3956 Root MSE 1.2267 
 
According to the OLS estimation, the only variable that is statistically significant indicates 
whether the migrant has completed tertiary level education – significant also in the two-part 
model estimation for all migrants – which affects the amount of remittances positively and 
thus implies the presence of either the strategic or the investment motive. As none of the 
interaction variables are statistically significant, no significant differences in the remittance 
behaviour of migrants are likely to arise due to their different locations.  
7.3.5. Effects of education, occupation and employment in recipient household 
on probability and amount of remittances 
As mentioned in section 6.2.1.2, with the Nigerian data it was possible to test whether the 
education or occupation level, or the employment of a former household member affect the 
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migrant’s decisions on whether to remit and how much to remit. The tobit model, Heckman 
selection model and two-part model estimations including these variables were carried out, 
and the estimates, standard errors and partial effects of the newly-included variables are 
presented in appendix 8, and briefly discussed here.  
In the tobit model, the coefficient of the variable indicating whether a household member has 
completed primary education is negative and statistically significant, but all of the other tested 
coefficients are insignificant. The same result is obtained in the Heckman selection model’s 
participation equation and in the two-part model’s equation for the likelihood of remitting. 
The coefficients of variables referring to the household member’s education and occupation 
level are jointly statistically insignificant according to all estimation methods. It is thus the 
decision on whether to remit that is affected by the one significant variable, and it is reflected 
also in the result obtained with the tobit model. 
Whether a former household member of the migrant has completed primary education affects 
the migrant’s decision on whether to remit negatively. If the household member’s education 
level is interpreted as a proxy for the recipient household’s income, this result would imply 
that Nigerian migrants are less likely to remit when a former household member is more 
educated and is thus more likely to have a higher income. When combined with the finding 
that the recipient household’s long-run expenditure affects the amount of remittances 
positively according to the Heckman selection model and the two-part model reviewed in 
sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3, respectively, this result gives support to the exchange motive, under 
which these inversely related effects are possible to reconcile. However, as the variables 
indicating the education level of the household member are jointly statistically insignificant, 
this implication should be regarded with caution. 
7.3.6. Probit model for choice between official and unofficial remittance 
channels 
The probit estimation results for the choice between official and unofficial channels are 
presented in table 22. The coefficients of variables indicating whether the migrant has 
completed primary, secondary or tertiary level of education, whether he works in a 
professional occupation, the size of his former household, and what the recipient household’s 
long-run expenditure is are statistically significant. The coefficients of variables indicating the 
migrant’s education, his current residence, his occupation and his origin state are jointly 
statistically significant. 
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Of the significant variables, the variables indicating the migrant’s education level have the 
largest partial effects on the probability of using official channels: migrants who have 
completed tertiary, secondary or primary level of education have a 39.5, 28.0 and 18.8 percent 
higher probability of remitting through official channels than migrants with no education, 
respectively. In addition, a one percent increase in the recipient household’s expenditure is 
associated with a 5.6 percent increase in the likelihood of remitting officially. 
  Table 22. Probit model for choice between official and unofficial  
               remittance channels in Nigeria 
Independent  
variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
probability of using 
official channels 
Sex 0.0331 0.1381 0.0069 
Married 0.1030 0.2152 0.0216 
Son 0.2003 0.1836 0.0416 
Age -0.0033 0.0094 -0.0007 
Primary 1.0680*** 0.1828 0.1882 
Secondary 1.5798*** 0.1869 0.2796 
Tertiary 1.7611*** 0.2475 0.3952 
Duration 0.0246 0.0157 0.0052 
OECD 0.3048 0.5741 0.0656 
Africa 0.3557 0.5574 0.0738 
Urban Nigeria -0.4666 0.5440 -0.1019 
Professional 0.7623** 0.3142 0.1719 
Service 0.2087 0.2980 0.0432 
Agriculture & Crafts -0.4165 0.3552 -0.0898 
Reason 0.3336 0.1700 0.0700 
Employed 0.2699 0.3612 0.0573 
Alone 0.0558 0.1391 0.0117 
Size of HH -0.0655*** 0.0233 -0.0138 
Assets of HH -0.1142 0.2030 -0.0239 
Expenditure of HH 0.2650*** 0.0974 0.0557 
Constant -5.2714*** 1.3013  
Joint significance 
 Chi2 Prob > Chi2 
Education 36.31 0.0000 
Residence 12.89 0.0049 
Occupation 13.52 0.0036 
Origin state 9849.85 0.0000 
Model statistics 
 N 674  
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -593253.63  
 Pseudo-R2 0.4497  
 
The results are rather plausible. As explained in the context of Uganda, educated migrants are 
likely to have a higher income than less-educated ones, and may thus have better access to 
official remittance channels and not be liquidity constrained when it comes to their choice 
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between different remittance channels. Also, as shown in section 7.3.3, educated migrants are 
likely to remit larger amounts than less-educated migrants and thus may value the reliability 
safety often associated with official channels. The same reasoning applies also to the result 
that migrants working in professional level occupations are more likely to remit officially.  
The findings that the recipient household’s higher long-run expenditure and smaller size are 
associated with a higher probability of sending remittances through official channels are also 
likely to reflect the better access that these kinds of recipient households may have to official 
money transfer operators. Agu (2011:209-10) provides some support for this hypothesis: even 
though remittance recipients do not usually need to have an (costly) account with a remittance 
service provider in order to receive remittances, banks offering remittance services require the 
recipient to provide a selected means of identification – an international passport, national 
driver’s licence, or national identity card, for instance – upon the collection of remittances. 
Employee identity cards generally do not suffice on their own, and some further identification 
items such as utility bills are often required to supplement these.  
Due to this practice, some segments of Nigerians may be excluded from official remittance 
services: self-employed workers, employees in the informal sector, or casually employed 
workers in the formal sector rarely have any identity cards and may not be able to provide the 
supplementary documents, either. Moreover, many low-income individuals do not have the 
liquidity to acquire the required means of identification, and thus ask remittances to be sent to 
a third party go-between who meets the identification requirements. However, these 
arrangements are sometimes based only on social capital, and some go-betweens may demand 
a fee for collecting the remittances, making the possibility of fraud rather likely. (Ibid.) Thus, 
households with a better income, and with smaller consumption needs are likely to be more 
able to obtain the needed means of identification and thus more likely to have access to 
official remittance service providers than poorer and larger households.  
7.3.7. Probit model for choice between international and internal migration 
Table 23 displays the probit estimation results for the choice between international and 
internal migration. The specification estimated here is slightly different from the one 
estimated with the Ugandan data and Senegalese data, as the Nigerian data permits the 
estimation of the effects of independent variables indicating the education and occupation 
level of a former household member.  
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From table 23 it can be seen that only whether the migrant is the son or daughter of the 
household head, and whether he has completed secondary or tertiary education, affect the 
choice of the migrant’s residence statistically significantly. Even though the education and 
occupation levels of the household are not individually statistically significant, they are 
jointly statistically significant, as are the variables indicating the migrant’s education level 
and his state of origin. 
         Table 23. Probit model for choice between international and internal 
         migration from Nigeria 
Independent  
Variable Coefficient 
Robust std. 
err. 
Partial effect on the 
probability of sending  
the migrant abroad 
Sex 0.0517 0.1268 0.0122 
Married 0.1120 0.1147 0.0267 
Son -0.330*** 0.1236 -0.0788 
Age 0.0076 0.0114 0.0018 
Primary 0.0729 0.1850 0.0176 
Secondary 0.6573*** 0.1893 0.1592 
Tertiary 0.6597*** 0.2224 0.1607 
Duration 0.0192 0.0139 0.0046 
Professional -0.1558 0.2795 -0.0373 
Service 0.0298 0.1616 0.0071 
Agriculture & Crafts -0.2470 0.2090 -0.0561 
Reason -0.2113 0.1588 -0.0516 
Employed 0.2723 0.4213 0.0614 
Alone 0.0286 0.1137 0.0068 
Size of HH -0.0280 0.0293 -0.0067 
Assets of HH 0.6262 0.5115 0.1301 
Expenditure of HH -0.0176 0.0574 -0.0042 
Primary in HH 0.0399 0.2197 0.0096 
Secondary in HH 0.0558 0.1632 0.0134 
Tertiary in HH 0.2560 0.1753 0.0629 
Professional in HH -0.1685 0.1855 -0.0398 
Service in HH -0.3756 0.2511 -0.0835 
Agriculture & Crafts in HH 0.2249 0.2391 0.0546 
Constant -2.5274 0.9559  
Joint significance 
 Chi2 Prob > Chi2 
Education 24.67 0.0000 
Occupation 2.18 0.5362 
Education in HH 8.70 0.0335 
Occupation in HH 23.05 0.0000 
Origin state 20822.75 0.0000 
Model statistics 
 N 802  
 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -792068.88  
 Pseudo-R2 0.2306  
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While the son or daughter of the household head is less likely sent abroad than other 
household members, the probability of sending the migrant abroad increases with the 
migrant’s education. It could be that households prefer to send sons and daughters merely to 
other parts of Nigeria, where they are more easily reached in case they are needed by their 
parents at home. Moreover, household heads are likely to have more control over their own 
children than over other household members. Also the sons and daughters may prefer this 
arrangement, as their loyalty towards the household head may be higher than that of other 
household members.  
When it comes to the reason for a higher education affecting the probability of international 
migration positively, it may be that the household considers better-educated migrants to have 
better chances to find employment in international job markets than less-educated ones, as 
hypothesised in section 4.2. Also, the returns to education abroad for better-educated migrants 
may be markedly better than within Nigeria, making international migration a more attractive 
option. Moreover, as education is positively correlated with remittances, the likelihood of 
larger remittances is higher when a better-educated migrant is sent abroad. Thus, in this case it 
seems that when a highly-educated migrant is sent abroad instead of a less-educated one, the 
high cost of international migration is outweighed by the potential the highly-educated 
migrant has in terms of earning a higher income, and by the higher likelihood of larger 
remittances.   
7.4. Summary and discussion of findings 
This section summarises the findings made in sections 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 and establishes 
whether there are any differences in the motives for remitting, in the determinants of the 
choice between official and unofficial remittance channels, and in the determinants of the 
choice between international and internal migration between Ugandan, Senegalese and 
Nigerian migrants. 
7.4.1. Motives for remitting  
When it comes to Ugandan migrants, the results obtained with the tobit, Heckman selection 
and two-part model for all migrants seem to suggest that the migrants remittances behaviour 
is most likely motivated by exchange or investment considerations. On one hand, the positive 
effect the recipient household’s long-run income has on the amount of remittances is 
consistent with both of the motives. However, neither the negative effect of the variable on 
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the probability of remittances, nor the inverse U-shaped relationship between the variable and 
remittances, are found to be statistically significant. On the other hand, the education level of 
migrants affecting remittances positively is in line with the investment motive, under which 
migrants repay the investments their families have made in their education. It is found that 
remittances increase with migrants’ income, which can be reconciled with a variety of 
motives for remitting. There are no indications of inheritance or self-insurance driving the 
migrants’ remittances.  
In terms of the amount remitted, there are some differences between Ugandan male and 
female migrants, as well as between migrant residing in OECD countries and in African 
countries. First, remittances of male migrants increase more with their current residence being 
an OECD country than those of female migrants, but increase less with their education than 
those of female migrants. These results imply that male migrants, though possibly being more 
altruistic towards their former households, may also have a better bargaining position relative 
to their former households than female migrants. Second, remittances of migrants residing in 
OECD countries are barely influenced by the recipient household’s long-run income, while its 
effect is positive on the remittances of migrants residing in African countries. This may 
suggest that migrants in African countries may have some exchange or investment 
arrangements with their families back home that migrants in OECD countries do not. 
As for Senegalese migrants, their motives for remittances are rather ambiguous. Similarly to 
Ugandan migrants, remittances of Senegalese migrants increase with migrants’ income, but 
otherwise, the results of different estimation methods give slightly different and inconsistent 
results. Even though the amount of remittances responds positively to the recipient 
household’s long-run income, suggesting that the migrants may be driven by the exchange or 
the investment motive, further substantial support for these motives is lacking. However, the 
effect of the education level of migrants is negative, giving some support to the exchange 
motive: educated migrants are less inclined to return home and thus remit less than 
uneducated ones. Moreover, there is evidence that Senegalese migrants are also concerned 
with possible inheritance, as the relationship between remittances and the number of other 
migrants is inversely U-shaped. 
One possible reason for the ambiguity of the results for Senegalese migrants is that there are 
rather significant differences between male and female migrants, and between migrants 
residing in OECD countries and in African countries in terms of the amount they remit. In 
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contrast to what was found among Ugandan migrants, remittances of male migrants increase 
less in response to their residence being and OECD country. Moreover, while remittances of 
males increase in response to their education level, those of female migrants decrease. In 
addition, remittances of male migrants respond less positively to the assets of the recipient 
household than those of female migrants, and respond positively to the expenditure of the 
recipient household. In conclusion, in terms of the motives for remitting, Senegalese male 
migrants may be considered to be less altruistic and less affected by possible inheritance than 
female migrants, and while male migrants are concerned about repaying their educational 
loans, educated female migrants send smaller remittances as they are less likely to return 
home than uneducated ones.  
Moreover, being male affects negatively the amount of remittances of migrants residing in 
OECD countries, while the effect is opposite among migrants residing in African countries. 
Similarly, migrants residing in OECD countries decrease their remittances in response to their 
education, while migrants in African countries increase them. This result suggests that 
Senegalese migrants residing in OECD countries, being less inclined to return home due to 
their high education, may decrease their remittances to their former households, while 
migrants residing in African countries are possibly repaying their educational loans they have 
received in the past with remittances. 
Regarding Nigerian migrants, remittances and migrants’ income are again positively 
associated, which is consistent with most of the motives for remitting. Similarly to Ugandan 
and Senegalese migrants, remittances increase with the recipient household’s long-run 
income, but further substantial support to either the exchange motive or the investment motive 
is lacking. Yet, the exchange motive receives some support from the finding that the 
probability of sending remittances is negatively affected by a former household member’s 
education level, a proxy for the recipient household’s income. The education level of 
migrants, however, having a positive effect on remittances suggests that remittances are 
intended to act as repayment of educational loans, so the results are rather inconclusive. What 
Nigerian migrants do not seem to be concerned about are possible inheritance or self-
insurance.   
There are some differences between Nigerian male and female migrants in terms of their 
remittance behaviour. Male migrants respond less positively to their higher education level 
and to the expenditure of the recipient household than female migrants. This suggests that 
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Nigerian male migrants may have higher bargaining power relative to their former households 
than female migrants, and are thus able to enjoy better contractual terms than female migrants 
when it comes to repayment of educational loans. In addition, while remittances of female 
migrants decrease with the assets of the recipient household, those of male migrants are barely 
affected. According to the estimations, there are no significant differences in remittance 
behaviour between Nigerian migrants residing in OECD countries and those residing in 
African countries. 
The above findings from Uganda, Senegal and Nigeria seem to vindicate what has been found 
in previous studies of motives for remittances. On one hand, different groups of migrants tend 
to have different motives and concerns influencing their remittance behaviour, and on the 
other hand, it is likely that within any one migrant, several different motives for remitting 
coexist. Similarly to studies reviewed in section 2.8, the generally presumed altruistic motive 
does not receive explicit support in any of the countries under study, and more self-interested 
concerns and contractual arrangements between migrants and their families seem to override 
the purely altruistic ones (see e.g. Lucas and Stark 1985; Cox et al. 1998; de la Brière et al. 
2002). On the whole, too, previous research seems to have reached the conclusion that 
remittances tend to be part of informal, social, intra-family arrangements. Still, altruism 
should not be refuted altogether, as it is often a precondition for any contract-like arrangement 
to arise in the first place. (Rapoport and Docquier 2006:1171) 
In terms of the empirical execution of the estimations, none of the methods alone is perfect, 
and all of them entail weaknesses that may not be corrected for, as discussed in chapter 5. 
However, using them all together and comparing the results obtained with them, a certain 
degree of robustness may be reached that none of the methods would have reached alone. 
Especially the Heckman selection model and the two-part model provide valuable insight into 
how the decisions on whether to remit and on how much to remit may be influenced 
differently by the same variables.  
Even though the Ugandan, Senegalese and Nigerian datasets were rather encompassing in 
their scope, the estimations would have provided more reliable results, if better and additional 
variables could have been utilised. For instance, when it came to the migrant’s and the 
recipient household’s income – probably two of the most important determinants of 
remittances – proxies had to be relied upon. Further, the presence of the insurance motive 
could have been better examined had there been a proxy for some kind of an income shock to 
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the household. Also the possibility of examining the effects of the migrant’s home-
community characteristics and the effects of the migrant’s status and community in his 
country of residence on remittances would have deepened and extended the scope of the 
analysis. 
7.4.2. Choice between official and unofficial remittance channels 
Ugandan migrants that are highly-educated or reside in OECD or African countries migrants 
are particularly more likely to use official remittance channels. The latter results is supported 
by previous research finding that international remittances are mainly sent through official 
channels, possibly due to their usually better reliability and security (Ngugi and Sennoga 
2011:250). Also, both residing abroad and education are expected to increase migrants’ 
income: thus, migrants residing abroad or with a better education are likely to have better 
access to official remittance channels and to be less liquidity constrained in their choice of 
remittance channel. Moreover, migrants residing abroad also tend to remit more, and thus 
may value the safety of official channels more than migrants remitting from rural Uganda. 
Among Senegalese migrants, female migrants and migrants residing in OECD countries are, 
in particular, more likely to use official remittance channels. The former result may suggest 
that male migrants may be less risk-averse than female migrants and thus more likely to resort 
to unofficial remittance channels. The latter result, on the other hand, may imply that the 
access migrants have to different remittance channels, the liquidity constraints they face, and 
the relative reliability of the channels are important in determining the choice between official 
and unofficial remittance channels. However, migrants residing in urban regions of Senegal 
are less likely to remit officially, contrary to what could be assumed.  
When it comes to Nigerian migrants, more educated migrants, and migrants whose former 
households have a higher long-run income are, in particular, more likely to use official 
remittance channels. The latter effect may arise from the fact that wealthier households tend 
to have a better access to official money transfer operators than poorer ones and do not thus 
constrain the choice that migrants from these households make regarding remittance channels 
(Agu 2011:209-10).  
The results partly reflect previous research that has been done in the field (see e.g. Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo 2005). However, due to lack of data, the examination in this study was 
restricted to migrant- and recipient household-related characteristics determining the choice 
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between different channels. What would have especially improved the analysis would have 
been the possibility to incorporate a measure of the relative prices of using different 
remittance channels, as well as measures of the relative risk, reliability and accessibility of 
these channels.  
7.4.3. Choice between international and internal migration 
In Uganda, the decision to send a migrant abroad is influenced positively by his intention to 
work, implying that the employment opportunities of countries abroad are perceived to be 
better than those of Uganda. In addition, when the reason for migration is work, migration is 
likely to be considered as a way for the household to receive supplementary income. This may 
not be the case when the reason for migration is education, for instance. 
In turn, Senegalese migrants are more likely to be sent abroad especially if the household has 
already sent other international migrants, or if migrants are likely to end up working in a 
service level or agricultural and crafts occupations. The former result implies that 
international migration may be perceived to be less risky when there already are other 
migrants abroad. In turn, the latter effect suggests that the skills of migrants suitable for 
lower-level occupations are more easily recognised, or less relevant, in international job 
markets than the skills required for more demanding occupations: less-skilled migrants may 
thus be better able reach the occupations they have the skills for than migrants with better 
skills. In addition, international migration is more likely when the sending household is 
wealthier or smaller. 
In terms of Nigerian migrants, more educated migrants are more likely sent abroad, as they 
may have better chances to succeed in international job markets and have better returns to 
their education than less educated migrants. In addition, sons and daughters of household 
heads are less likely sent abroad, which may be preferred by both the sending household and 
migrants themselves: in Nigeria, they will be closer to their families in case support is needed 
back home. Moreover, household heads are likely to have more control over their own 
children than over other household members. 
These findings seem to support the newly-developed model for migration decisions elaborated 
on in chapter 4, and vice versa. On one hand, the choice of variables for the estimations was 
guided by the theory, and on the other hand, some of the variables being statistically 
significant in the estimations gave support to the plausibility and predictions of the theory. 
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Like the other estimations, these estimations would have also benefited from the inclusion of 
some additional variables, such as a measure of the relative costs of migrating to different 
countries, and a measure of the relative chance of getting employed in different countries. 
However, these kinds of measures could not be found or constructed.  
8 Conclusions 
The objective of this study was to increase and deepen the existing knowledge of remittances 
to developing countries by providing a comprehensive theoretical and empirical economic 
analysis of three distinct research questions in the context of Uganda, Senegal and Nigeria. 
These questions addressed particularly the sending of remittances: first, the determinants of 
the probability and amount of remittances were examined to provide insight into the migrants’ 
motives for remitting. Second, the determinants of the migrants’ choice between official and 
unofficial channels were investigated to gain a better understanding of how the different 
features of the remittance markets in the countries under study are reflected in this choice. 
Third, the role of migrants’ families and expected remittances in intra-household decisions 
regarding migration was modelled theoretically, and the choice between international and 
internal migration was studied empirically, to attain a better conception of intra-household 
decision making dynamics and the resultant migration patterns.  
The empirical results of this study imply that there are a variety of motives influencing the 
remittance behaviour of Ugandan, Senegalese and Nigerian migrants. Not only may the 
motives differ between different groups of migrants from different countries, but several 
motives may also coexist within one individual. Similarly to previous research, the generally 
presumed altruistic motive is not explicitly supported by the estimations in any of the 
countries under study, and more self-interested concerns and contractual arrangements 
between migrants and their families – the exchange and investment motives, more specifically 
– seem to override the purely altruistic ones.  
A diversity of factors also affects the migrants’ decision on whether to use official or 
unofficial channels, as well as their choice between international and internal migration. In 
terms of the first choice, especially residing in an OECD country and having obtained a high 
level of education have a positive effect on the probability of using official channels: the 
former is supported by results from Uganda and Senegal, the latter by those from Uganda and 
Nigeria. Other factors affecting the choice are more country-specific. The choice between 
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international and internal migration, on the other hand, is determined by several factors that 
differ across the countries under study, including considerations regarding, inter alia, the 
migrants’ reason for migration, their education and potential occupation. These findings 
reflect well the new model developed to depict the intra-household decisions on migration. 
This study contributed to the existing remittance literature in several ways. Addressing both 
the theoretically modelled motives for remitting and the channels for remitting makes the 
analysis of this study more comprehensive than that of many previous studies. Also, the novel 
model for migration decisions introduced in this study brings forth especially the role of 
households in these decisions more explicitly than existing models do.  
In the future, the knowledge of remittances and their dynamics could be quite significantly 
improved by more comprehensive and better-quality data. For instance, the estimations of this 
study – among others – would have benefited from data on several, rather crucial variables. 
However, even though the lack of data could be overcome, estimations could still be biased 
by endogeneity. An interesting way of dealing with these issues, adopted by Osili (2007) in 
his study on Nigerian migrants in Chicago, would be to collect a matched sample of migrants 
and their households, through which both the possible endogeneity of variables, and the 
possible omitted variable bias arising from lacking data on relevant migrant- or household-
related characteristics, could be addressed (Ibid.:451-2). In addition, the existing data on 
official and unofficial remittance markets and channels, and specifically on the costs of 
remittances sent through different channels, could be improved in both quantity and quality. 
This data could then facilitate policy makers in both remittance-sending and remittance-
receiving countries to devise policies that would develop the financial services around 
remittances and strengthen the financial systems of especially remittance-receiving countries.  
Understanding the sending of remittances – migrants’ motivations for remitting, the use of 
official and unofficial remittance channels, and the factors affecting households’ decisions  on 
migration, inter alia – is crucial for developing countries to be able to realise the 
developmental potential remittances possess. With its comprehensive analysis of sending 
remittances to Uganda, Senegal and Nigeria, this study increases the knowledge of the 
different aspects of sending remittances, and by so doing is relevant in aligning remittance 
markets better with the actual needs and motives of remitters; in facilitating the more efficient 
mobilisation of remittances through official channels; and in enabling the developmental 
impacts of remittances to expand and intensify further. 
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Appendix 1. Summary statistics of variables used in estimations 
 
 Table 24. Definitions and sample summary statistics of variables used in estimations for Uganda 
Variable Definition N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Max Min 
Log amount remitted (all 
obs.)  
The amount of monetary remittances as logarithms of local currency 
1639 3.4452 5.5908 17.0344 0 
Log amount remitted 
(only positive obs.) 
The amount of monetary remittances as logarithms of local currency 
460 12.2755 1.7061 17.0344 8.2940 
Sends money  Dummy variable indicating whether sends monetary remittances, 1 if 
yes 1645 0.2827 0.4504 1 0 
Channel Dummy variable indicating channel used for remitting, 1 if official  455 0.3297 0.4706 1 0 
Destination Dummy variable indicating destination of migrant, 1 if an OECD or 
African country other than Uganda 1584 0.1761 0.3811 1 0 
Sex Dummy variable indicating sex of migrant, 1 if male 1645 0.5550 0.4971 1 0 
Married Dummy variable indicating marital status of migrant, 1 if married 1645 0.4294 0.4951 1 0 
Son Dummy variable indicating relationship of migrant to the household 
head, 1 if son or daughter 1645 0.6195 0.4857 1 0 
Age Age of migrant 1645 28.4444 10.7046 87 0 
Primary Dummy variable indicating education level completed by migrant 
before migration, 1 if primary 1645 0.2547 0.4358 1 0 
Secondary Dummy variable indicating education level completed by migrant 
before migration, 1 if secondary 1645 0.2377 0.4258 1 0 
Tertiary Dummy variable indicating education level completed by migrant 
before migration, 1 if tertiary 1645 0.2164 0.41192 1 0 
No Education Dummy variable indicating education level completed by migrant 
before migration, 1 if no education 1645 0.2912 0.4544 1 0 
Duration Duration of migration in years 1517 6.0982 6.6365 60 0 
Duration > 1 year Dummy variable indicating duration of migration, 1 if more than a 
year 1517 0.7864 0.4100 1 0 
OECD Dummy variable indicating current residence of migrant, 1 if an 
OECD country 1590 0.0667 0.2495 1 0 
Africa Dummy variable indicating current residence of migrant, 1 if an 
African country other than Uganda 1590 0.1088 0.3115 1 0 
Urban Uganda Dummy variable indicating current residence of migrant, 1 if urban 
regions of Uganda 1590 0.5522 0.4974 1 0 
Rural Uganda Dummy variable indicating current residence of migrant, 1 if rural 
regions of Uganda 1590 0.2686 0.4433 1 0 
Professional Dummy variable indicating occupation of migrant, 1 if manager or 
professional worker 1645 0.1587 0.3655 1 0 
Service Dummy variable indicating occupation of migrant, 1 if service or 
clerical worker 1645 0.2006 0.4006 1 0 
Agriculture & Crafts Dummy variable indicating occupation of migrant, 1 if agricultural or 
crafts worker 1645 0.1033 0.3045 1 0 
Elementary & Other Dummy variable indicating occupation of migrant, 1 if assembler or 
elementary worker  1645 0.5374 0.4975 1 0 
Reason Dummy variable indicating reason for migration, 1 if work or search 
for work 1557 0.6590 0.4742 1 0 
Employed Dummy variable indicating employment of migrant, 1 if employed 1645 0.5514 0.4975 1 0 
Alone Dummy variable indicating living situation of migrant, 1 if lives alone 1645 0.2881 0.4530 1 0 
Size of HH Number of household members at origin   1645 5.6036 3.1171 16 1 
Assets of HH Dummy variable indicating assets of household, 1 if owns land or 
buildings 1753 0.8688 0.3377 1 0 
Expenditure of HH (all 
obs.) 
Expenditure of household during previous six months as logarithms of 
local currency 1314 12.7317 2.3428 17.1384 0 
Expenditure of HH (only 
positive obs.) 
Expenditure of household during previous six months as logarithms of 
local currency 1292 12.9485 1.6652 17.1384 6.9078 
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 Table 25. Definitions and sample summary statistics of variables used in estimations for Senegal 
Variable Definition N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Max Min 
Log amount remitted (all 
obs.)  
The amount of monetary remittances as logarithms of local currency 
2187 7.8435 6.0848 16.0562 0 
Log amount remitted 
(only positive obs.) 
The amount of monetary remittances as logarithms of local currency 
1382 12.4122 1.3628 16.0562 8.5172 
Sends money  Dummy variable indicating whether sends monetary remittances, 1 if 
yes 2187 0.6319 0.4824 1 0 
Channel Dummy variable indicating channel used for remitting, 1 if official  1440 0.5451 0.4981 1 0 
Destination Dummy variable indicating destination of migrant, 1 if an OECD or 
African country other than Senegal 2170 0.5069 0.5001 1 0 
Sex Dummy variable indicating sex of migrant, 1 if male 2277 0.7795 0.4147 1 0 
Married Dummy variable indicating marital status of migrant, 1 if married 2207 0.6575 0.4747 1 0 
Son Dummy variable indicating relationship of migrant to the household 
head, 1 if son or daughter 2207 0.5578 0.4968 1 0 
Age Age of migrant 2277 34.2156 12.3575 99 0 
Primary Dummy variable indicating education level completed by migrant 
before migration, 1 if primary 2207 0.1676 0.3736 1 0 
Secondary Dummy variable indicating education level completed by migrant 
before migration, 1 if secondary 2207 0.2198 0.4142 1 0 
Tertiary Dummy variable indicating education level completed by migrant 
before migration, 1 if tertiary 2207 0.1296 0.3359 1 0 
No Education Dummy variable indicating education level completed by migrant 
before migration, 1 if no education 2207 0.4830 0.4998 1 0 
Duration Duration of migration in years 2207 7.3262 7.5899 69 0 
Duration > 1 year Dummy variable indicating duration of migration, 1 if more than a 
year 2207 0.8061 0.3955 1 0 
OECD Dummy variable indicating current residence of migrant, 1 if an 
OECD country 2170 0.3189 0.4661 1 0 
Africa Dummy variable indicating current residence of migrant, 1 if an 
African country other than Senegal 2170 0.1880 0.3908 1 0 
Urban Senegal Dummy variable indicating current residence of migrant, 1 if urban 
regions of Senegal 2170 0.4313 0.4953 1 0 
Rural Senegal Dummy variable indicating current residence of migrant, 1 if rural 
regions of Senegal 2170 0.0618 0.2408 1 0 
Professional Dummy variable indicating occupation of migrant, 1 if manager or 
professional worker 1569 0.1192 0.3241 1 0 
Service Dummy variable indicating occupation of migrant, 1 if service or 
clerical worker 1569 0.2900 0.4539 1 0 
Agriculture & Crafts Dummy variable indicating occupation of migrant, 1 if agricultural or 
crafts worker 1569 0.1989 0.3992 1 0 
Elementary & Other Dummy variable indicating occupation of migrant, 1 if assembler or 
elementary worker  1569 0.3920 0.4883 1 0 
Reason Dummy variable indicating reason for migration, 1 if work or search 
for work 2207 0.7222 0.4480 1 0 
Employed Dummy variable indicating employment of migrant, 1 if employed 2207 0.7109 0.4534 1 0 
Alone Dummy variable indicating living situation of migrant, 1 if lives alone 2199 0.2792 0.4487 1 0 
Size of HH Number of household members at origin   2277 11.133 6.8972 44 1 
Assets of HH Dummy variable indicating assets of household, 1 if owns land or 
buildings 2277 0.9570 0.2030 1 0 
Expenditure of HH (all 
obs.) 
Expenditure of household during previous six months as logarithms of 
local currency 2277 12.1883 1.1194 15.0221 0 
Expenditure of HH (only 
positive obs.) 
Expenditure of household during previous six months as logarithms of 
local currency 2276 12.1937 1.0901 15.0221 7.4384 
Migrants Number of international migrants from same household 2277 1.4146 1.7581 12 0 
Parental funding Dummy variable indicating whether parents of migrant have funded 
migration, 1 is yes 2194 0.4795 0.4997 1 0 
International migrants Number of international migrants from same household 2277 1.4146 1.7581 12 0 
Internal migrants Number of internal migrants from same household 2277 1.3882 1.6522 10 0 
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Table 26. Definitions and sample summary statistics of variables used in estimations for Nigeria 
Variable Definition N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Max Min 
Log amount remitted (all 
obs.)  
The amount of monetary remittances as logarithms of local currency 
3041 4.9666 5.4098 16.7059 0 
Log amount remitted 
(only positive obs.) 
The amount of monetary remittances as logarithms of local currency 
1427 10.5840 1.7009 16.7059 4.6052 
Sends money Dummy variable indicating whether sends monetary remittances, 1 if 
yes 3155 0.4865 0.4999 1 0 
Channel Dummy variable indicating channel used for remitting, 1 if official  1532 0.5522 0.4974 1 0 
Destination Dummy variable indicating destination of migrant, 1 if an OECD or 
African country other than Senegal 3293 0.2408 0.4276 1 0 
Sex Dummy variable indicating sex of migrant, 1 if male 3328 0.6451 0.4785 1 0 
Married Dummy variable indicating marital status of migrant, 1 if married 3304 0.4452 0.4971 1 0 
Son Dummy variable indicating relationship of migrant to the household 
head, 1 if son or daughter 3330 0.5605 0.4964 1 0 
Age Age of migrant 3296 28.4463 10.8829 99 1 
Primary Dummy variable indicating education level completed by migrant 
before migration, 1 if primary 3235 0.1422 0.3493 1 0 
Secondary Dummy variable indicating education level completed by migrant 
before migration, 1 if secondary 3235 0.4451 0.4971 1 0 
Tertiary Dummy variable indicating education level completed by migrant 
before migration, 1 if tertiary 3235 0.3329 0.4713 1 0 
No Education Dummy variable indicating education level completed by migrant 
before migration, 1 if no education 3235 0.0798 0.2710 1 0 
Duration Duration of migration in years 3216 5.6035 5.6843 55 0 
Duration > 1 year Dummy variable indicating duration of migration, 1 if more than a year 3216 0.8750 0.3308 1 0 
OECD Dummy variable indicating current residence of migrant, 1 if an OECD 
country 3293 0.1755 0.3805 1 0 
Africa Dummy variable indicating current residence of migrant, 1 if an African 
country other than Nigeria 3293 0.0653 0.2471 1 0 
Urban Nigeria Dummy variable indicating current residence of migrant, 1 if urban 
regions of Nigeria 3293 0.6562 0.4750 1 0 
Rural Nigeria Dummy variable indicating current residence of migrant, 1 if rural 
regions of Nigeria 3293 0.1029 0.3039 1 0 
Professional Dummy variable indicating occupation of migrant, 1 if manager or 
professional worker 2161 0.5016 0.5001 1 0 
Service Dummy variable indicating occupation of migrant, 1 if service or 
clerical worker 2161 0.2226 0.4161 1 0 
Agriculture & Crafts Dummy variable indicating occupation of migrant, 1 if agricultural or 
crafts worker 2161 0.1189 0.3238 1 0 
Elementary & Other Dummy variable indicating occupation of migrant, 1 if assembler or 
elementary worker 2161 0.1569 0.3638 1 0 
Reason Dummy variable indicating reason for migration, 1 if work or search for 
work 3312 0.4795 0.4997 1 0 
Employed Dummy variable indicating employment of migrant, 1 if employed 3220 0.6295 0.4830 1 0 
Alone Dummy variable indicating living situation of migrant, 1 if lives alone 3272 0.3359 0.4775 1 0 
Size of HH Number of household members at origin   1427 5.7057 3.1098 24 1 
Assets of HH Dummy variable indicating assets of household, 1 if owns land or 
buildings 1415 0.8544 0.3528 1 0 
Expenditure of HH (all 
obs.) 
Expenditure of household during previous six months as logarithms of 
local currency 3344 4.7301 5.5643 14.2973 0 
Expenditure of HH (only 
positive obs.) 
Expenditure of household during previous six months as logarithms of 
local currency 1420 11.1389 1.2263 14.2973 5.4806 
Primary in HH Dummy variable indicating education level completed by household 
member, 1 if primary 2893 0.2122 0.4090 1 0 
Secondary in HH Dummy variable indicating education level completed by household 
member, 1 if secondary 2893 0.3353 0.4722 1 0 
Tertiary in HH Dummy variable indicating education level completed by household 
member, 1 if tertiary 2893 0.2254 0.4179 1 0 
No Education in HH Dummy variable indicating education level completed by household 
member, 1 if no education 2893 0.2271 0.4190 1 0 
Professional in HH Dummy variable indicating occupation of household member, 1 if 
manager or professional worker 1896 0.3296 0.4702 1 0 
Service in HH Dummy variable indicating occupation of household member, 1 if 
service or clerical worker 1896 0.2078 0.4058 1 0 
Agriculture & Crafts in 
HH 
Dummy variable indicating occupation of household member, 1 if 
agricultural or crafts worker 1896 0.3249 0.4683 1 0 
Elementary & Other in 
HH 
Dummy variable indicating occupation of household member, 1 if 
assembler or elementary worker 1896 0.1377 0.3446 1 0 
Employed in HH Dummy variable indicating employment of household member, 1 if 
employed 2778 0.6523 0.4763 1 0 
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Appendix 2. Test of appropriateness of tobit model 
As mentioned in section 3.1.3, there is a way of informally evaluating whether the tobit model 
for the probability and amount of remittances is appropriate for the estimation purposes in this 
study. The problem with the tobit model is that the effects of an independent variable jx  on 
the probability of observing a positive value of the dependent variable, and on the conditional 
expected value of the dependent variable, are both proportional to jβ , and both functions 
multiplying jβ  are positive and depend on the vector x  only through σβx , where σ  is the 
standard deviation of the tobit model error term. Thus, the independent variable is not allowed 
to affect the probability of the dependent variable negatively and value of the dependent 
variable positively, or vice versa.  
However, whether the tobit model estimates for Uganda, Senegal and Nigeria – discussed in 
sections 6.1.1, 6.2.1 and 6.3.1 – hold or not may be tested by comparing the tobit model 
estimates to the estimates obtained with the probit model, which was carried out as the first 
part of the two-part model for the probability and amount of remittances in sections 6.1.3, 
6.2.3 and 6.3.3. For the tobit model to be appropriate, the probit coefficient estimate jγ  for 
some independent variable jx  should be “close” to the ratio σβ j , which are the tobit 
estimates. However, due to sampling error, these will never be identical (Wooldridge 
2009:595).  
Wooldridge (2009:595) points out that one should not be too concerned about differences in 
the signs or magnitudes of these measures, if the variables in question are statistically 
insignificant in both models. Hence, only the variable coefficients that are statistically 
significant in both the tobit and probit estimations are chosen to gauge the appropriateness of 
the tobit model. The different estimates from each of the countries under study, and the level 
and percentage differences between the ratio σβ j  and the probit coefficient jγ  are 
presented in table 27.  
Looking first at the differences between the ratio of σβ j  and the probit coefficient jγ  in the 
second to last column of table 27, most of them are less than 0.1 in absolute value, which 
could be considered to be a rather small difference. However, when proportioned to the size 
of the probit estimates in the last column, the differences prove to be rather large – only a half 
of the 24 percentage differences are less than 10 percent in absolute value. It thus might be 
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said that this comparison test casts some doubt on the appropriateness of the tobit model and 
the estimates obtained with it. Yet, it should be noted that the test is informal and the 
expression “being close” is at best vague. Further, as pointed out by Wooldridge (2009: 595), 
the coefficient and the ratio will never be identical anyway due to sampling error. 
         Table 27. Comparison of tobit and probit coefficient estimates in estimations of probability and 
         amount of remittances in Uganda, Senegal and Nigeria  
Uganda 
Independent 
variable 
Tobit coefficient 
βj 
Probit coefficient 
γj 
Ratio 
βj/σ 
Difference 
βj/σ - γj 
Difference (%) 
[(βj/σ - γj) / γj]*100 
Secondary 4.8995 0.4406 0.4496 0.0090 2.0427 
Tertiary 6.7967 0.7181 0.6237 -0.0944 -13.1458 
OECD 10.7303 0.8123 0.9846 0.1723 21.2114 
Urban Uganda 5.9273 0.5136 0.5439 0.0303 5.8995 
Service 4.5916 0.4921 0.4213 -0.0708 -14.3873 
Reason 6.9863 0.5866 0.6411 0.0545 9.2908 
Employed 8.4466 0.8132 0.7750 -0.0382 -4.6975 
Alone 3.8235 0.3715 0.3508 -0.0207 -5.5720 
      
Sigma σ 10.8982     
Senegal 
Independent 
variable 
Tobit coefficient 
βj 
Probit coefficient 
γj 
Ratio 
βj/σ 
Difference 
βj/σ - γj 
Difference (%) 
[(βj/σ - γj) / γj]*100 
Married 1.3561 0.3100 0.2437 -0.0663 -21.3871 
Primary -1.9380 -0.4230 -0.3482 0.0748 -17.6832 
OECD 4.4296 0.8980 0.7959 -0.1021 -11.3697 
Reason 5.0403 0.8681 0.9056 0.0375 4.3198 
Alone 1.6753 0.3798 0.3010 -0.0788 -20.7478 
Expenditure of HH 1.0371 0.2221 0.1863 -0.0358 -16.1189 
      
Sigma σ 5.5656     
Nigeria 
Independent 
variable 
Tobit coefficient 
βj 
Probit coefficient 
γj 
Ratio 
βj/σ 
Difference 
βj/σ - γj 
Difference (%) 
[(βj/σ - γj) / γj]*100 
Married 1.3787 0.2917 0.2910 -0.0007 -0.2356 
Son 2.3139 0.8042 0.4885 -0.3157 -39.2564 
Tertiary 3.3007 0.6553 0.6968 0.0415 6.3330 
Duration 0.0753 0.0159 0.0159 0.0000 0.0000 
OECD 6.0603 1.3197 1.2794 -0.0403 -3.0537 
Urban Nigeria 3.3497 0.7452 0.7072 -0.0380 -5.0993 
Professional 1.9104 0.4978 0.4033 -0.0945 -18.9835 
Reason 1.0521 0.3051 0.2221 -0.0830 -27.2042 
Employed 5.5005 1.4097 1.1612 -0.2485 -17.6279 
Assets of HH -0.8971 -0.3413 -0.1894 0.1519 -0.4451 
      
Sigma σ 4.7369     
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Appendix 3. Interaction effects in probit estimation of two-part 
model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda 
In the left-hand side figures, the interaction effects of the interaction variables in the probit 
estimation of the two-part model, plotted against predicted probabilities of the dependent 
variable, are displayed. The blue dots indicate the correct interaction effect for each of the 
observations, and the purple dashed line depicts the incorrect marginal effect. In the right-
hand side figures, the z-statistics of the corresponding interaction effects, plotted against 
predicted probabilities of the dependent variable, are presented. The blue dots indicate the 
actual value of the z-statistic for each of the observations, and the purple lines signify the 
values of the z-statistic corresponding to the 5 percent significance level, 1.96 and -1.96. 
  
Figure 1. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*OECD  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda  
  
Figure 2. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*tertiary  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda 
  
Figure 3. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*employed  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda
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Figure 4. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*assets of HH  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda 
  
Figure 5. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*expenditure of HH  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda 
  
Figure 6. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*male  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda 
  
Figure 7. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*tertiary  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda 
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Figure 8. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*employed  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda 
  
Figure 9. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*assets of HH  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda 
  
Figure 10. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*expenditure of HH  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Uganda 
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Appendix 4. CLAD estimation for Senegal 
Table 27 presents the results obtained with the CLAD estimation of the probability and 
amount of remittances for Senegal. The program for CLAD estimation in Stata 11 developed 
by Jolliffe et al. (2000) employs the bootstrap method, so the table presents bootstrap 
estimates of the standard errors, as well as the bootstrap estimate of the bias of these 
estimates. These were obtained with a standard bootstrap which, incorrectly, assumes that the 
sample was selected using a simple random design. The alternative assumption, and a more 
accurate one, would have been that the sample was selected in two stages – however, 
convergence was not achieved under this assumption. The default of 100 bootstrap 
replications were performed. (Ibid.:14) For an account of the bootstrap principle, see Efron 
and Tibshirani (1993). Similarly to other tables in this study, ***, ** and * indicate the 
statistical significance of the coefficients on the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.  
               Table 28. CLAD estimation of probability and amount  
                 of remittances in Senegal 
Independent 
variable Coefficient Bias Std. err. 
Sex 0.4219** -0.0813 0.2105 
Married 0.9479*** 0.0430 0.2030 
Son 0.1041 0.0230 0.1329 
Age 0.0328*** -0.0001 0.0069 
Primary -0.4439** 0.0732 0.2167 
Secondary 0.0665 -0.0625 0.1832 
Tertiary 0.2670 0.0629 0.3028 
Duration 0.0114 0.0024 0.0083 
OECD 2.3788 1.3492 3.3100 
Africa 1.2461 1.3574 3.3052 
Urban Senegal 1.0606 1.3633 3.2876 
Professional 0.1709 0.0467 0.2352 
Service 0.0553 -0.0079 0.1366 
Agriculture &Crafts -0.2460  -0.0194 0.2167 
Reason 1.3819*** 0.0589 0.4293 
Employed (omitted)   
Alone 0.0107 0.0357 0.1173 
Size of HH -0.0214**  -0.0041 0.0096 
Assets 0.2554 -0.0916 0.4304 
Expenditure of HH 0.3137*** 0.0081 0.0908 
Constant 2.5415 -1.3969 3.6028 
 Model Statistics 
 Initial sample size 2187 
 Final sample size 1525 
 Pseudo-R2 0.0924 
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When comparing these estimates to those obtained for Senegal in sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 
6.2.3, all in all there are quite stark differences in the signs and statistical significances of the 
estimates. However, the statistically significant variable coefficients estimated with the four 
different methods display more similarities to one another. According to the CLAD 
estimation, coefficients of variables indicating whether the migrant is male, whether he is 
married, his age, whether he has completed primary education, the reason for his migration, 
the size of his former household, and what the expenditure of the recipient household is are 
statistically significant. These variable coefficients have the same signs as those obtained with 
the tobit model in section 6.2.1, as those obtained with the Heckman selection model for the 
participation equation in section 6.2.2, and as those obtained with the two-part model in 
section 6.2.3. Moreover, these variable coefficients are statistically significant according to 
one or more of the three models estimated before. Altogether, the CLAD estimation seems to 
support the findings made from the results obtained with more conventional estimation 
methods.  
Interestingly, according to the CLAD estimation, the coefficient of the variable indicating 
whether the migrant resides in an OECD country is not statistically significant, even though it 
is significant according to all other models. This result, however, should be regarded with 
caution, as the upward bias of the bootstrap estimate of the standard error is particularly large 
for this variable. However, even if the bias of 1.3492 were deducted from the standard error 
estimate of 3.3100, and the z-statistic were calculated with this new standard error estimate of 
1.9608, according to the z-statistic the variable coefficient would still remain insignificant. 
Yet, these kinds of bias-corrected standard error estimates are not used, as the estimate of the 
mean bias tends to be very noisy (Efron and Tibshirani 1993:138). 
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Appendix 5. Interaction effects in probit estimation of two-part 
model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
In the left-hand side figures, the interaction effects of the interaction variables in the probit 
estimation of the two-part model, plotted against predicted probabilities of the dependent 
variable, are displayed. The blue dots indicate the correct interaction effect for each of the 
observations, and the purple dashed line depicts the incorrect marginal effect. In the right-
hand side figures, the z-statistics of the corresponding interaction effects, plotted against 
predicted probabilities of the dependent variable, are presented. The blue dots indicate the 
actual value of the z-statistic for each of the observations, and the purple lines signify the 
values of the z-statistic corresponding to the 5 percent significance level, 1.96 and -1.96. 
  
Figure 11. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*OECD  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
  
Figure 12. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*tertiary  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
  
Figure 13. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*employed (omitted)  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal
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Figure 14. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*assets of HH  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
  
Figure 15. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*expenditure of HH  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
  
Figure 16. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*male  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
  
Figure 17. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*tertiary  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
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Figure 18. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*employed (omitted) 
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
  
Figure 19. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*assets of HH  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
  
Figure 20. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*expenditure of HH  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
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Appendix 6. Effects of other migrants and parental funding on 
probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
 
  Table 29. Partial tobit model for additional estimation of probability and amount of  
   remittances in Senegal 
          
Independent  
variable Coefficient 
Robust 
std. err. 
Partial effect on 
the probability of 
remitting 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
International 
migrants 0.7084 0.4574 0.0176 0.5445 
International 
migrants^2 -0.0902** 0.0376 -0.0022 -0.0693 
Parental funding 0.0186 0.7180 0.0005 0.0143 
Joint significance 
  F Prob > F  
 Migrants 3.56 0.0287  
Model statistics 
 N 989  
 Uncensored 759  
 Sigma 5.5439  
 Log pseudolikelihood -1890300.3  
 Pseudo-R2 0.0553  
 F 323.69  
 Prob > F 0.0000  
 
Table 30. Partial Heckman selection model for additional estimation of probability and amount of 
remittances in Senegal 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent 
variable Coefficient 
Robust std. 
err. 
Partial effect on  
the probability of 
remitting Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
International 
migrants 0.1640 0.1479 0.0394 -0.1390 0.1106 -0.0799 
International 
migrants^2 -0.0212* 0.0127 -0.0051 0.0113 0.0114 0.0036 
Parental funding -0.0126 0.2037 -0.0030 -0.1237 0.2041 -0.1282 
 Joint significance Joint significance 
  Chi2 Prob > Chi2  Chi2 Prob > Chi2 
 Migrants 5.04 0.0805 Migrants 1.91 0.3852 
                                                                    Model Statistics 
   N 989   
   Uncensored 759   
   
Log 
pseudolikelihood -1060364.0  
 
 
   Chi2 .   
   Prob > Chi2 .   
   Rho -0.8229   
   Rho = 0: Chi2 9.82   
   
Rho = 0: 
Prob > Chi2 0.0017   
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 Table 31. Partial two-part model for additional estimation of probability and amount of remittances in Senegal 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on 
the probability of 
remitting Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
International migrants 0.1897 0.1251 0.0451 -0.0763 0.1086 -0.0763 
International 
migrants¨2 -0.0235** 0.0104 -0.0056 0.0035 0.0113 0.0035 
Parental funding 0.0130 0.2085 0.0031 -0.1037 0.1829 -0.1037 
 Joint significance Joint significance 
  Chi2 Prob > Chi2  F Prob > F 
 Migrants 6.95 0.0309 Migrants 0.82 0.4431 
 Model statistics Model statistics 
 N 989 N 759 
 Log pseudolikelihood -301380.22 R2 0.6015 
 Pseudo-R2 0.2018 Root MSE 0.9945 
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Appendix 7. Interaction effects in probit estimation of two-part 
model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
In the left-hand side figures, the interaction effects of the interaction variables in the probit 
estimation of the two-part model, plotted against predicted probabilities of the dependent 
variable, are displayed. The blue dots indicate the correct interaction effect for each of the 
observations, and the purple dashed line depicts the incorrect marginal effect. In the right-
hand side figures, the z-statistics of the corresponding interaction effects, plotted against 
predicted probabilities of the dependent variable, are presented. The blue dots indicate the 
actual value of the z-statistic for each of the observations, and the purple lines signify the 
values of the z-statistic corresponding to the 5 percent significance level, 1.96 and -1.96. 
  
Figure 21. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*OECD  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
  
Figure 22. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*tertiary  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
  
Figure 23. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*employed  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria
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Figure 24. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*assets of HH  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
  
Figure 25. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction male*expenditure of HH  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
  
Figure 26. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*male  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
  
Figure 27. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*tertiary  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
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Figure 28. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*employed  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
  
Figure 29. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*assets of HH  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
  
Figure 30. Probit interaction effect and statistical significance of interaction OECD*expenditure of HH  
in two-part model for probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
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Appendix 8. Effects of education, occupation and employment in 
recipient household on probability and amount of remittances in 
Nigeria 
 
 Table 32. Partial tobit model for additional estimation of probability and amount of  
 remittances in Nigeria 
Independent variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on  
the probability of 
remitting 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
Primary in HH  -1.4956** 0.6318 -0.0506 -1.0653 
Secondary in HH -0.6478 0.6130 -0.0214 -0.4680 
Tertiary in HH -0.8795 0.7653 -0.0294 -0.6322 
Professional in HH 0.8432 1.1407 0.0265 0.6193 
Service in HH 1.1071 1.3068 0.0337 0.8235 
Agriculture & Crafts 
in HH 1.6815 1.4326 0.0523 1.2412 
Employed in HH -0.5603 0.7054 -0.0173 -0.4145 
Joint significance 
  Chi2 Prob > Chi2  
 
Education  
in HH 1.94 0.1224  
 
Occupation 
in HH 0.53 0.6592  
Model statistics 
 N 767  
 Uncensored 532  
 Sigma 4.6489  
 Log pseudolikelihood -4324358.3  
 Pseudo-R2 0.1146  
 F .  
 Prob > F .  
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  Table 33. Partial Heckman selection model for additional estimation of probability and amount of  
  remittances in Nigeria 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on 
the probability of 
remitting Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
Primary in HH  -0.5948** 0.2734 -0.1191 0.1239 0.1583 0.1289 
Secondary in HH -0.2143 0.1755 -0.0411 0.0867 0.1948 0.0884 
Tertiary in HH -0.3162 0.2639 -0.0611 0.1124 0.1523 0.1149 
Professional in HH 0.2121 0.3188 0.0394 0.0455 0.2398 0.0439 
Service in HH 0.3453 0.3909 0.0621 -0.1046 0.1642 -0.1071 
Agriculture & Crafts 
in HH 0.7063 0.4612 0.1301 -0.2138 0.1883 -0.2190 
Employed in HH -0.1866 0.2688 -0.0342 0.0921 0.2900 0.0935 
 Joint significance Joint significance 
  Chi2 Prob > Chi2  Chi2 Prob > Chi2 
 
Education 
in HH 4.93 0.1766 
Education in 
HH 0.67 0.8805 
 
Occupation 
in HH 1.76 0.6239 
Occupation 
in HH 2.21 0.5291 
                                                                  Model statistics 
   N 766   
   Uncensored 531   
   
Log 
pseudolikelihood -2689065.0   
   Chi2 .   
   Prob > Chi2 .   
   Rho 0.0178   
   Rho = 0: Chi2 0.05   
   
Rho = 0: Prob > 
Chi2 0.8189   
 
Table 34. Partial two-part model for additional estimation of probability and amount of remittances in Nigeria 
 Likelihood of remitting Amount remitted 
Independent variable Coefficient 
Robust  
std. err. 
Partial effect on  
the probability of 
remitting Coefficient 
Robust 
std. err. 
Partial effect on the 
conditional expected 
log amount remitted 
Primary in HH  -0.5637** 0.2517 -0.1127 0.1309 0.1701 0.1309 
Secondary in HH -0.2005 0.1696 -0.0384 0.0843 0.2046 0.0843 
Tertiary in HH -0.3158 0.2618 -0.0612 0.1121 0.1630 0.1121 
Professional in HH 0.2329 0.3179 0.0431 0.0449 0.2461 0.0449 
Service in HH 0.3682 0.3804 0.0658 -0.1031 0.1704 -0.1031 
Agriculture & Crafts 
in HH 0.7095 0.4536 0.1304 -0.2110 0.2000 -0.2110 
Employed in HH -0.1718 0.2683 -0.0315 0.0996 0.2999 0.0996 
 Joint significance Joint significance 
  Chi2 Prob > Chi2  F Prob > F 
 
Education 
in HH 5.14 0.1621 
Education in 
HH 0.21 0.8908 
 
Occupation 
in HH 2.78 0.4261 
Occupation 
in HH 0.43 0.7374 
 Model statistics Model statistics 
 N 791 N 532 
 Log pseudolikelihood -616650.96 R2 0.5575 
 Pseudo-R2 0.4235 Root MSE 1.2198 
 
